The war in Ukraine has exposed different views on sanctions against Russia by Serbia, and the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the one side, and other Western Balkan states and entities on the other. The EU should handle the issue cautiously, to avoid further splits and to prevent securitisation of the issue.
When Vladimir Putin first invaded Ukraine in 2014, Europeans had a simple choice: increase or decrease their energy dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Europeans chose to increase. National governments like Spain and France could have freed themselves from Russian gas just by implementing their own national building renovation plans. But they chose not to.
The UK is no longer part of the European Union, but it is a critical player in the European gas market. As the EU seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, it relies on proximate non-EU states for access to an alternative gas supply, transport, and transit source. This requires cooperation, not competition or exclusion.
After Russia invaded Ukraine, the security map of northern Europe was redrawn. Within the space of two months, Sweden and Finland have jointly decided to apply for NATO membership, thereby abandoning their previous longstanding security doctrine of military neutrality.
Ukraine can become the first war where the two great global digitisation trends and social platforms measure their strength: techno-authoritarianism vs Silicon Valley. With an unprecedented number of online actors taking part in the confrontation, the strategy of sowing a (dis)information chaos in the war in Ukraine is better equipped than ever.
In early March 2022, EU housing ministers met informally for the first time in almost ten years. They had much to discuss – the housing crisis in Europe is evident. There is no country, no region, and no city where people are not suffering from the rising cost of housing. The ministers’ response was ambivalent. […]