DIGITAL REVOLUTION for the many, not for the few

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With the support of the European Parliament

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N°10 - Winter 2018 - 19
ISSN 2506-7362
This edition focuses on the digital revolution. The term revolution evokes images of peoples’ uprisings against the powers that be. What strikes me these days, is that the most ardent supporters of the digital revolution are multinational companies that invest heavily in new technologies such as artificial intelligence. That leaves one to think. Is it progressive these days to be critical of the digital revolution? It depends. I do think digital technology brought us a lot and has a lot more to offer, but we need to make sure it serves our citizens. This is far from given in the current political and economic circumstances. But it is something for which we should fight.

Let me give an example. I have now lived two and a half decades with the ‘Internet’. I remember creating my first email account, and the experimentation and anarchic abundance of the web back in the 90s. But when I go online today, things are different. I visit only a handful of websites, and communicate using social media, which are essentially advertisement companies. They track where I go, control what I see, and influence what I do, in order to make a profit. This taught me a lesson: in the absence of democratic intervention, the bottom-up community approach of the 90s lost out in favour of big commercial interests.

Now, this is bad enough. But imagine we continue like this with the next wave of digital technologies. The combination of massive amounts of data that will be collected by ‘Internet of Things’ devices, stored in the ‘Cloud’, and analysed with ‘big data’ applications, is a much more potent technological mix than the ‘Internet’ we have today. If we allow this new space to be dominated as much by commercial interest as the current web, then I would end up with a smart fridge manipulating what I buy and from whom. Luckily, the infrastructure for this ‘Next Internet’ is not yet fully in place, and we should think carefully about how we want this new environment to look like, and act together to shape it.

We need a similar approach to the future of work. Here as well, the prevailing line of thought is that people should adapt to technology, instead of the reverse. Obviously, we should help our workers to gain the skills to use new technologies to their advantage. But the idea that the increasing precarity among large parts of our workforce is an inevitable result of technology, instead of a lack of political willingness, is simply not true. That is why I am proud that progressive forces are pushing for a new law on transparent and predictable working conditions that will improve the lot of workers in the ‘gig’ economy and beyond. Change is possible.

Looking at history, I see that revolutions are won by those who are best organised. I do not see why it would be any different for the digital revolution. So, let’s get organised. Let’s use our democratic institutions to take control of our future, by shaping and using technology in ways that serve our citizens and society.
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#EP2019: How could the Left recover?

Democracy is a fragile state that is weakened by the growing hate speech and by the polarisation between “the good” and “the bad” where ideology should be the centre of debate. The best way to defend democracy is to put forward robust solutions to society’s problems and the Portuguese Socialist Party has been leading the way.

The Social Democratic parties are the leading political force in the fight against the enemies of democracy because the success of a political system is measured by its capacity to meet the expectations of its citizens, by its capacity to improve the living standards of its people.

Let there be no illusion: democracy is a social, cultural and civic construction and, as any construction, it needs to be looked after and taken care of. But too many of us take it for granted.

Democracy is the political system that best allows the participation of all citizens in the decision-making process and most of us do not even consider any other way of governance.

But democracy cannot be taken for granted and we must educate and defend it against those who jeopardise it, willingly or unconsciously.

Portugal has had the biggest increase in investment of the last 19 years and Portugal has the lowest unemployment rate since 2002.

#Left What is at stake in the next European elections is much more than selfishness against solidarity

@acmendes73

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DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENS’ EXPECTATIONS

by Ana Catarina Mendes

Most Portuguese citizens recognise the success of the progressive policies put forward by the current Socialist government, underpinned by an agreement between all political forces of the left.

Economic growth in Portugal is stronger than it has been at any moment during the past decades and - for the first time since 1999 - stronger than the Eurozone average; Portugal has had the biggest increase in investment of the last 19 years; Portugal has the lowest unemployment rate since 2002, with the creation of 330 thousand jobs since the beginning of this government; Portugal has the lowest deficit in the history of democracy in the country. The current government is an exercise of responsibility and of the deepening of democracy, because the parties converge for the sake of national interest.

The groundbreaking local election results in 2017, with the biggest victory of any political party by the socialists, shows that the Portuguese society trusts the progressive parties.

In the 2019 EU elections, we must meet the expectations of European citizens. This is the time to build Europe, to build the European Union that defends solidarity and political depth. We need more Europe, and we urgently need a new path to bring us back to the deepening of the political project.

The Progressives and Social Democrats must be the credible alternative, choosing to be on the side of the unsatisfied, of those who long for more and a better Europe. This is a new and demanding challenge for us Socialists. We must be capable of implementing reforms and changes in our countries, in Europe, as well as of reinventing our parties.

What is at stake in the next European elections is much more than selfishness against solidarity. We cannot build polarised societies that weaken democracies. We must strive to build political projects that answer our time’s needs. The challenges are plenty and the citizens expect our parties to put forward such a project.

Parties are the keystone of democracy and the best way to defend democracy is through public policies that solve problems, that improve the living standards of the citizens, that defend a more cohesive and fairer society. Social democracy must continue to do exactly that.

The best way to defend democracy is to put forward robust solutions to society’s problems and the Portuguese Socialist Party has been leading the way.

“...
WHY WE NEED AN OPEN LEFT

by Andrew Gamble

The Left has been losing ground for a decade. How does it reinvent itself and become successful again in the battle of ideas? It has to embrace new radical ideas and do politics differently.

Progressives believe that human societies are capable of being improved, but are also aware that progress has always been uneven, often won at huge cost, and that in the name of progress, human beings have unleashed forces that they increasingly seem unable to control. The situation for most people in the world has measurably improved over the last two centuries, but there is so much more to do, and new dangers threaten what has been achieved. The rise of populist nationalism in the last decade is a reminder of the fragility of political orders. Institutions which have provided peace, prosperity and well-being can easily be undermined and even discarded.

Two things are needed to face those risks. Firstly, the Left needs to embrace ideas which once again speak of the future and a better society for all, which can inspire change and build new coalitions of support. Secondly it has to do politics differently. The Left has to be an Open Left, building the broadest possible coalitions, avoiding the factionalism and tribalism which have so often hampered the Left in the past, and they have to become democrats again rather than technocrats, constantly interacting with citizens.

The Open Left’s vision for the future has four main priorities.

- The first priority is an open multilateral international order, which develops the multilateral institutions we already have both at the global and regional levels, but also goes beyond the western-centric order of the past by fully involving the rising powers in Asia, Africa and South America in determining the rules which should govern this order. Failure to maintain multilateral institutions and build on them hands the field to economic nationalism and military adventurism.

- The second priority is an inclusive and sustainable economy, based on reorienting our economic thinking away from the pursuit of economic growth at any cost and the maximisation of shareholder value to what is required to safeguard the biosphere and maximise value for all stakeholders, particularly domestic households and local
economies. It’s about what comes after austerity, the future of work in the new digitalised economy, a universal basic income, and a green New Deal. The next economic model – in seeking to rebalance the economy and tackle the problems of climate change and of places left behind by globalisation – will need to strengthen and extend state capacities to make possible a more decentralised, egalitarian and sharing economy and to encourage the emergence of new forms of enterprise. Local economies need more insulation from the globalised sectors of the economy, and economic activities should be judged as to how well they maximise stakeholder value rather than shareholder value.

► The third priority is a remodeled welfare state, based on a new commitment to universal basic services, which might include a form of universal basic income, to provide households with security, through income support and services, but also opportunity, through investment in education, health and care, ensuring that no-one is left behind. Citizens have to be persuaded to pay more for the many benefits they receive from public services which make up modern welfare states, and providers need to experiment with delivering their services in more local and decentralised ways. Hypothecated taxes, living wages, equal investment in all 16-20-year-olds, and capital grants to individuals are all ideas that should be explored further.

► The fourth priority is a renewed democracy, based on defending the basic institutions that have come to define democracy, including the rule of law, equal rights for all citizens, media plurality, freedom of association and freedom of speech, but going beyond them to deepen democracy by extending it into new areas in order to tackle the many new threats, such as the erosion of trust in representatives and experts, the eruption of social media, and the weakening of communities. We need to change the relationship between government and citizens, by increasing the transparency of government and the way government and citizens interact. Power needs to be decentralised to ensure real local accountability and more local participation in decision-making about local economies, the needs of households and the protection of the biosphere. The quest for equal citizenship, targeting the many forms of discrimination, disadvantage and abuse which still damage so many lives, remains central to the progressive project.

Doing politics differently means accepting that there is no single progressive party, no single will of the people or class that progressives can lean on in developing projects for change.

We live in complex post-industrial economies and multicultural societies. Opinions, interests, and knowledge are all divided, and the old certainties and landmarks have disappeared.

An Open Left has to acknowledge that there are many values, many perspectives and no single right way. That is the first step necessary to forming a new progressive coalition. Out of this can emerge a new and convincing vision of what is wrong and what has to be done to put it right, and a leadership that can convince voters that it is both competent and honest.

Millions of voters across Europe will rally to a party of progress that has an inspiring vision of the future, detailed policy ideas, a leadership that wins trust, and a politics that is open and inclusive. Bringing that party into existence and challenging the orthodoxies of the old political establishment of traditional conservatives and the new emerging political establishment of populist nationalists is the challenge now for progressives everywhere.

“The Left needs to embrace ideas which once again speak of the future and a better society for all.”

► AUTHOR Andrew Gamble is a British academic and author. Since 2007 he has been Professor of Politics at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Queens’ College.
Social democracy has failed on two fronts: on the one hand, it failed to create a transnational citizens’ movement capable of transcending the collective power of the Member States, which inevitably leads to nationalism; and on the other hand, the Third Way, with Blair, Schröder, Clinton and later Hollande, embraced neoliberalism. Under the guise of promoting a policy of growth and by banking on the deregulation of labour, the liberalisation of finance and privatisation, social democracy neglected growth through the more egalitarian distribution of productivity profits and wealth. In both cases it was incapable of exploiting the European dimension: there was no effective regulation of global capitalism, no European industrial policy supported by public authority which was comparable to that of the United States of America or China and no controls on finance. But with the de facto consent for fiscal and social competition, social democracy took refuge in its rearguard actions on social rights. A commendable fight, but one that is too often skewed by corporatism and clientelism. Its analysis lead it to the wrong conclusion.

Economic neoliberalism is pushing Europe towards political illiberalism. Social democracy was powerless to stop it. By combining intergovernmentalism and neoliberalism, the EU is rendering itself powerless and creating inequalities. It is also endangering European democracy and threatening its own survival.

Social democracy failed to realise that after the 30 years of growth that followed the Second World War, the distribution of added value was moving towards an excessive level of profits and a far too unequal distribution of salaries fed by globalisation and innovation. It would have been necessary, then, to identify the causes and take action against them. However, it chose to
try and offset these inequalities, notably those that were a result of unemployment, by turning to social transfer policies that were insufficiently financed by taxes and, therefore, required borrowing. Sovereign indebtedness has no other cause, and today the cost of debt reduction is weighing down on the middle classes and those in precarious work, causing a deflationary effect in Western Europe. Social democracy is now paying the political price and we need to find ways of turning things around.

Three challenges for the future of Europe

Let’s start with three challenges that, to be controlled, require a change of political scale and which justify the Europe Union: ecological transition, the rise of inequality due to the financial instability of global capitalism, and finally, the ‘Thucydides trap’ of one rising power - China - confronting an established power - the United States. These three challenges are linked as solving the climate equation both brings up questions of how to share the burden of our changing societies which have been weakened by rising inequalities, and creates the risk of clashes between China, the United States and Europe for access to resources.

EU treaties often impose unanimity in decision-making and the enlargement to the east further complicated things. With 27 very different states regarding their economic development as well as their values, intergovernmentalism once again becomes Europe’s status quo. As a consequence, the right of veto paralyses decision-making. What’s more, it leads to a de facto ranking of the 27 countries. A core group, dominated by Germany, with no other goal than its own prosperity, governs Europe. France makes pledges, but struggles to make itself heard. Italy is rebelling and the United Kingdom is leaving. Time will tell what damage this unequal, deregulated, low tax nation, vassal to Washington can do, alongside a European Union that is unsure of its own project.

Intergovernmentalism is becoming more toxic thanks to this neoliberal passiveness, which is complicating Europe’s already problematic relationship with capitalism. Capitalism has brought progress in Europe, as long as it was kept in check by democracy. In other words, as long as a delicate balance existed between political and economic liberalism, and between politics and the market. Social democracy was responsible for this balancing act. Globalisation broke it. Neoliberalism, an opportunist consensus without an explicit doctrinal foundation, filled the gap left by the absence of a precise European vision of economic policy within the EU.
A weakened social democracy

Neoliberalism turns the European Union into a club for the strong: states, businesses and individuals. On the one hand, the single market has remained an economic area of competition between business, but also between states, through a social and fiscal race to the bottom. On the other hand, the eurozone, without a government or a budgetary arm, is feeling the deflationary pressure of both Germany’s colossal surplus, and policies of budgetary and wage austerity designed to absorb excessive sovereign debt.

The degradation of the regime of sharing wealth and revenue - the distributional paradigm - driven by globalisation and technological innovation, is without doubt the cause of the rise of populism in Western Europe. More so than immigration, which added itself to the growing list of problems experienced by the most vulnerable sections of society, who already felt the pressure of wage drops, rent increases and the overcrowding of social services like schools and hospitals in working class areas. Of course, this phenomenon also has a identitarian dimension. But this menace to the welfare state - a symbol and emblem of the post-war social contract - is destabilising the middle and working classes. Social democracy, which is responsible for the system, now finds itself more vulnerable because of it. It can only bounce back with a two-fold agenda: regulate global capitalism outside of the European Union and re-establish solidarity within it.

During his confirmation as European Commissioner for Trade by the European Parliament, almost 20 years ago, Pascal Lamy challenged the EU to ‘control globalisation’. There’s still a lot of work to be done.

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CALL TO THE LEFT AND CALL TO EUROPE

by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Nicolas Schmit and Luca Visentini

The Left must seize the European elections as an opportunity to transform Europe and guarantee sustainable well-being for everyone. In a globalised world, no single European country is powerful enough to bring about this great transformation, but together they can. This is where the destiny of Europe coincides with that of the Left. Their simultaneous crises are not an accident of timing. Socialist and social-democratic parties as well as trade union movements played a decisive role after the Second World War in building a Europe that would ensure peace and prosperity for all. To confront current dangers, and their own decline, they need to find new momentum. We call on the European Left to live up to this historic new challenge and to approach the European elections equipped with a real plan for a just and sustainable society, to overcome both the European crisis and its own.

Read the full article online
www.progressivepost.eu

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AUTHOR Pierre Defraigne is Executive Director of the Madariaga - College of Europe Centre, and Honorary Director General at the European Commission.
Social Democrats have been sliding into the neoliberal trap - and lost many voters on the way. But there are answers to the question, ‘what is to be done’: facing electoral realities, renouncing neo-liberalism and going green are amongst them.

In 1971, the Republican US President Richard Nixon announced, “We are all Keynesians now.” In 2002, Tony Blair’s right-hand man Peter Mandelson announced, “We are all Thatcherites now.” So long, Keynes.

Blair’s “Third Way” began Labour’s trend of moving gradually further and further to the right. It seemed to work at first: Blair won and was quickly imitated by European Social Democrats, not to mention Bill Clinton. François Mitterrand changed his stripes in 1983 and in Germany, the SPD followed suit. So did many other parties. And here we are, a few decades later, surrounded by the disastrous consequences of this ongoing love affair of socialists with neo-liberals.

Following his stirring speech at Le Bourget (“My enemy is Finance”), I voted willingly,
if not with total enthusiasm, for François Hollande. As his term passed, those who had done likewise tried to console each other, eventually limited to “At least he hasn’t any more campaign promises he can break”. And then he would find another. He understood there was no point in running for a second mandate and is mainly remembered now for handing over millions of French taxpayers’ euros to the “1 percent” in exchange for fake promises to create more jobs.

How many of us throughout Europe have watched the slide of Social Democrats into the neoliberal trap, first in dismay, then in despair, as one country, one leader, one socialist party after another abandoned their principles and finally blew up the bedrock of socialism? They chose to hang on to the coat-tails of the neoliberals, failing to recognise that the voting public will always prefer the original to the copy.

Where have all the voters gone? And the politicians they used to vote for? A few are moving further left, although not to the Communists, some think the Greens are the key to the future, others still have put an end to years of hypocrisy and joined the mainstream right. Some are loyally trying to hold on and rebuild their parties.

For these last, the loyalists, they must answer the eternal—albeit Leninist—question: What is to be done? Here are my answers for what they’re worth.

→ In most places, you’re not a majority party now. Get over it and concentrate on coalitions. Every time you see a basis for agreement—perhaps not complete but covering your main goals, seize it, being careful to treat the partner as just that.

→ Renounce neo-liberalism visibly and audibly. High time for the secular left to take a lesson from the Church and say out loud “Mea Culpa” or better still “Nostra Culpa”. If you knew the details of how this ideology was invented, nurtured and spread worldwide, mostly by the American industrial and right-wing cultural elites that spent billions doing it, you never would have got hooked.

→ Go Green. Nobody disputes the reality of climate change now or—unless they’ve been living in a cave—ignores its likely consequences. For Socialists, however, the environment has generally been an afterthought. Put it front and centre where it belongs because it conditions so much else, including the future of our children and the end of the world-as-we-know-it. As the ecological economist Kenneth Boulding said, “Anyone who believes you can have infinite growth in a finite system is either a madman or an economist.” An ecological transition is indispensable.

→ And speaking of economics, last but certainly not least, the first and hardest thing to do is to get finance under control. All but two of the top fifty most interconnected corporations in the world are financial and they all own pieces of each other as well as having large stakes in all the major industrial corporations. If one fails, all the others are hit like lined-up dominoes—that’s why the 2008 Lehman Brothers crash was so devastating. The next one will be much worse. According to the Bank of England, taxpayers from all the Western countries...
paid 14,000,000,000,000 US Dollars – yes, 14 trillion! – shoring up the ruins of the last one. You probably won’t get a chance to change policy here but you can at least explain the danger so the public doesn’t blame you for complicity.

I don’t have space for many other issues, such as the power of lobbies, the onslaught of Transnational Corporations against the environment and against democracy. They are using trade treaties to increase their power against the legislative and judicial power of the State. There’s nothing here about foreign policy or what one might possibly do about President Trump or the growing popularity of populism. The left has not been so weak in decades. We need to follow Gramsci’s rule “Optimism of the Will, Pessimism of the Mind”. From the place we are, the Will comes first.

It is very clear that the results of the elections over the last five years are saying to the Progressives that they cannot simply continue thinking in traditional ways, proposing the usual and conventional solutions and hoping that the pendulum would shift very soon, elevating them into a more powerful, governing position again.

Read the full article online www.progressivepost.eu

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THE PROGRESSIVE WAY IN THE INVENTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

by Maria João Rodrigues
In spite of overlapping crises, the EU remains the most advanced case of supranational cooperation in human history. Will it survive in a world with big power struggles and nationalistic forces testing a comeback?

This will be at stake in the next years, and it is why next European elections in May are so decisive. European Socialists, Social Democrats and Progressives should play again a central role, as it happened all over the history of the European construction. The novelty, this time, is that their political fate will also be at stake, because they can no longer apply their own agenda at national level, unless they are able to change the European framework.

This article aims at sharing some reflections with a historical perspective, about the direction to take now in each of the key battles in which Socialists, Social Democrats and Progressives have been involved over the last decades to shape the direction of European integration.

1) Taming the European Single Market with strong social standards and cohesion policies has been one of these key battles. In the eighties and nineties, the Delors Commission was able to combine the big move for a European Single Market with a full set of social directives, social dialogue and a stronger Community budget to support social and territorial cohesion. This was decisive to support the catching-up of many Member States, which joined the EU in the sequence of enlargements that followed suit. The next move now should be about fighting social inequalities by turning these new social standards into new European law, economic and social policies as well as financial means. This is the contribution of the European Social Pillar.

2) The second big battle has been about economic governance, one in which Socialists, Social Democrats and Progressives were confronted with many more difficulties and defeats. A very unbalanced architecture marked the creation of the European and Monetary Union (EMU): a monetary union without a banking and a budgetary union. This was followed by the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact, with an ordo-liberal bias towards austerity and under-investment, which Progressives were not able to correct by lack of arguments and strength. As it overlooked the need to regulate the financial system, Europe suffered harshly with

“The Internet of things, cloud computing and Artificial Intelligence can bring progress, but there is a need to define proper regulations in order to avoid a Big Brother nightmare.”
the 2008 financial crisis, which also exposed the flaws of the EMU, creating a powerful engine for economic, social and political divergences at the heart of European integration. The next step should be to strengthen the regulation of the financial system, and to complete the architecture of the EMU with a banking union and a fiscal capacity, as a pre-condition to rebalance European integration. The role of the SPD in this endeavour is particularly relevant.

The third battle has brought some positive outcomes, but it is a never-ending one. How can we design a European strategy for growth, jobs and social cohesion, in order to make the best of the energy transition and of the digital revolution? The first attempt to define such a strategy was again in the hands of Jacques Delors, but it would be with the Portuguese Prime Minister António Guterres and ten other Socialist Prime Ministers that it was successfully defined and adopted by the EU in the Lisbon European Council. The new strategy has influence economic and social policies of all Member States, including the 12 new ones joining the EU before the 2008 financial crisis. Conservatives used this crisis to impose a blind austerity - which Socialists and Social Democrats were not able to avoid, in face of strong speculative movements against sovereign debt. More recently, Socialists and Social Democrats started overcoming this blind austerity, and, with the Portuguese PM António Costa and Udo Bullman, pushed for a new European Investment Plan in the European Parliament. The new fight should now be for amplifying the scale of this Plan to build a low carbon economy and a society where digital innovation improves the quality of life of all European citizens. However, this will be difficult to finance if there is not a major overhaul of the taxation system tapping into new sources of benefits (financial, digital, pollution) to fund, not only infrastructures, but also a new kind of education and social protection systems to support all those who move to a new kind of jobs. Furthermore, the digital transformation requires a major revamping of the progressive approach: the Internet of things, cloud computing and Artificial Intelligence can bring progress, but there is a need to define proper regulations in order to avoid a Big Brother nightmare.

To make the EU a key player of international governance was the aim of the fourth battle of European integration for Socialists, Social Democrats and Progressives. They could count on important EU instruments because people belonging to this political family – Javier Solana, Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini - consecutively took the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The two latter were in charge of implementing the potential of the Lisbon Treaty: one built up the European External Action Service, the other the European Defence Capability. An EU Global Strategy was developed with Solana in the aftermath of the Iraq war, and a new one with Mogherini, during Obama’s time and thus before Trump’s Presidency in the USA. Then, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change was a major achievement, after a detailed preparation by Ségolène Royal. Ever since, defending and updating the multilateral system for peace, cooperation and sustainable development became more difficult, in spite of Guterres being at the helm of the United Nations.

The next fight will be on how to use EU’s political weight in the multilateral system and in EU’s bilateral relations, both trade and more comprehensive partnerships, to build-up an international coalition to protect multilateralism, and to respond to the new global challenges, such as climate change, poverty, finance, digital transformation and democracy. The EU must assert itself as a fully-fledged political entity, much more than just a big market. This European sovereignty was clearly stated in the Rome Declaration of 2017 sponsored by the Italian PM Paolo Gentiloni.

However, who would think the major current challenge in EU integration would come from the EU neighborhood and from within the EU itself? This was the case when major military conflicts combined with social distress in the Middle East and in Africa triggered large flows of asylum seekers. The first reaction of most European citizens was to receive and protect them; but, in many Member States, xenophobic reactions followed, giving new strengths to authoritarian, nationalist and anti-European movements, which were already growing for other reasons such as unemployment and social precariousness.

Socialists, Social Democrats and Progressives, after some hesitations and divisions, have come up with a comprehensive approach to pursue a values-based and orderly management of migration as part of the next fight: European asylum system, European borders, stronger partnerships with the neighborhood and legal migration corridors.
The confrontation of positions about migration and the protection of asylum seekers was magnified by authoritarian nationalists in several Member States, to disguise a more fundamental confrontation of positions about democratic standards and the protection of European citizens civil rights; this is now becoming a major confrontation about democracy at all levels in the European Union. For nationalists, the European Union weakens democratic governance; for progressive pro-Europeans, the European level is indispensable to deepen democratic governance. This is our sixth battle, where Jo Leinen and Mercedes Bresso have excelled with innovative proposals.

The next fight should be about deepening democracy at all levels and making sure that the EU has the means to ensure democratic standards in all its Member States, giving a stronger content to European citizenship, and following the EP chairmanships of Baron, Borrell and Schulz. Moreover, we have a new challenge arising: manipulations in the cyberspace might disturb the exercise of democratic political rights, and we must counter this with higher awareness.
RESIST

THE ‘ZEITGEIST’

by Robert Misik

The Left is in crisis. Specifically the left parties are in crisis. It’s mostly parties that have stopped resisting, parties that gave in to a neoliberal ‘Zeitgeist’. We need to see them fighting again.

We talk about the ‘crisis of the Left’, or ‘the Left in crisis, but we have to ask ourselves: which Left precisely is ‘in crisis’? The left movements, the left subculture, the left NGO networks, the left intellectual jet-set or the counterculture-Left? Or is it about the left-wing parties, the parties on the centre-left, the Social Democrats and liberal-left parties? Only forty or fifty years ago, this question would have been nonsensical. It would have been clear that there are left-wing parties that are part of left-wing grassroots movements, and on the latter would naturally have regarded the left-wing parties as “their parties”, as “our people in the parliaments”. Only since the rebellious 1960s, the left movements and the left parties have split, rebellious movements and politics in the parliaments have taken different routes.

Parties of the democratic Left live off the idea of progress, of the idea of a better future: economic growth, prosperity for all, technological progress, social progress and democratic modernisation. They are associated with the promise of gradual progress for all, like Bobby Kennedy’s beautiful metaphor: the tide lifts all boats, not only the luxurious ones.

In the past thirty years, however, economic crises have abruptly interrupted phases of growth. Globalisation became increasingly important and it was accompanied by a discourse that depicted the world as a place of struggle, where everyone is in competition with each other. The neoliberal doctrine radicalised the paradigm of competition and legitimised the growth of inequalities, stagnation in lower and middle incomes, as well as the increase of fear of decline. Fear, literally, ate its way into our societies.

Social Democrats have always been an alliance of the working classes and the urban democratic middle classes.

But who should elect people for such a tepid promise? That only the worst can be prevented? Who should be inspired by that? How can such messages counter the epidemic of fear in our societies?

Social Democracies were thrown into an identity crisis: Increasingly, it became unclear what they actually stand for.

The majority of these parties traditionally not only have a mass electoral base, but also a broad base of members or a network that supports them, for example in the trade unions. This is true for the SPD as well as the SPÖ, the US Democrats as well as Labour. You can call this the lower middle class or working-class; the terms are imprecise here, but many of the people concerned no longer feel represented by Social Democracies or other centre-left parties, and not even by other parties of the traditional party system. They feel that contemporary politics is being pursued by a political establishment in complicity with the economic elite. That the political elites and the economic elites are a caste. La Casta, as Podemos in Spain says.

They might not be entirely right, but they are not entirely wrong either. Above all, however, they have the feeling that they are not actually represented by anyone. That they have a vote, but that they don’t have a voice.

This has to do with the mechanisms and rules of professional politics: with the detachment of political actors from normal
people, with the change among the functionaries of social democracies, with their transformation to middle-class parties.

These sections of the population that feel they have a vote, but not a voice, are vulnerable to migrating to right-wing protest parties because they are frustrated that there is no one to represent their concerns.

Many say that the solution to all these problems would be to turn to the working class. The Social Democrats should be less concerned with issues of social liberalisation, less with minority rights, less with anti-racism and the like, and more with higher wages, better schools, the worries of the workers, more with the “ordinary people”, the “regular guys”. Forget the artists and people like us here who go to film festivals. And stop speaking up for minorities, because you will scare off the white working class.

I don’t think it’s a solution. First, because Social Democracies have not stopped making capitalism fairer because they started to stand up for the rights of gays and lesbians.

Second, because you don’t regain more credibility when you stop speaking up for issues that are important to you. Because you don’t regain credibility if you stop sticking to your values.

Third, because the parties of the democratic Left have a great historical tradition: they have always been both parties of social progress and democratic modernisation. Social Democracies have achieved both the eight-hour day AND the democratic right to vote; they have achieved both the protection of workers AND freedom of expression and the protection of minorities. They fought for all of this at the same time. And they achieved all of it. They have always been an alliance of the working classes and the urban democratic middle classes.

And even today, democratic left-wing parties can only succeed if they manage to represent both the lower middle classes and the hard-working people, as well as the urban middle classes, for whom a just society and liveable communities are as important as a democratic society.

Another crucial question is credibility. The credibility of parties - that they have a plan, that they have an idea how to tame this wild turbo-capitalism. How more solidarity can be restored. How democratic politics can take back control of a global economic system on auto-pilot.

Many people have the feeling that we have created a sick system. And that nobody knows how to repair it. To put it simply: You can talk to a working man and explain to him that it is - apologies for this - not possible to secure a living wage and decent pensions, and talk at the next moment to a CEO from the financial industry and give in to his wishes. Or you can say to the working man that you definitely support his demands and explain to the banker that it is not possible to give in to his wishes.

Credibility is needed that left-wing parties will at least try. Perhaps only in small steps. Maybe with setbacks. But that they will try. You need to be able to trust Social Democrats to fight like lions.

Robert Misik lives in Vienna as a writer, curator, video blogger and exhibition organiser. He writes for several Austrian and German newspapers. His topics include the critique of capitalism and globalisation and the history of Social Democracy.
Believing in hope that could be entrusted in us again...  

by Ania Skrzypek

European Progressives have much more to be proud about than just their tradition. There are many exciting examples of diverse contemporary initiatives, which undoubtedly could inspire more confidence. And that is the key – since self-assurance and courage in proposing choices will be the defining factors in the battle that is upon Europeans in 2019.

There is no other movement like the Progressives. This statement is true regarding a handful of positive features, but it also indicates some proclivities that are difficult to handle. Social democrats frequently deliberate the roads that they did not take and ponder mistakes they made. That comes from a tradition of critical reflection. But currently it makes them particularly vulnerable. It is not appreciated as a sign of responsibility, and it is driving them to defensive positions at the same time. This short piece will argue a need for focusing on sources that could bring new confidence instead.

A spirit haunts the meetings of the future of social democracy. It is a hope that one day it will all stop: the headlines will no longer speak of death of social democracy in the light of one or another election, people will see the populists and others for whom they really are and return to the centre-left. Similar thoughts were a source of comfort in 2008, even though the pendulums don’t just swing back. Not when the political stages are changing profoundly.

There has been enough waiting, enough regretting and complaining about the successes of others. It is time to shake off the grim and move back into action. A new energy is primarily a matter of conviction – what Barack Obama showed saying yes, we can. The historical objective is to return to win the argument on how to shape a better future for everyone – regardless if to that end there is one competitor (like in the past) or many enemies (as it seems to be the case now).

This is a call to see beyond the curtain of pessimism and self-pity, while many encouraging examples of centre-left renewal are being overlooked. If instead of being singled out they were put in one, comprehensive
The historical objective is to return to win the argument on how to shape a better future for everyone.

When it comes to traditional values, two claims have been endlessly repeated. First, that social democrats are victims of their own success and with the emancipation of the working class, the mission of the movement seems unclear. Second, that what people rally for today – excessive inequality or lack of solidarity – used to form the core of the centre-left agenda, while Progressives today seem invisible on those issues. While the first one is untrue, since it would imply that world is free from social injustice; the second prompts the question what could be done. And here, three examples are telling: the first is Portugal, where the PS-formed government using traditional values as guidelines to make bold choices. Austerity – no, public investments – yes. The second is Sweden, where Stefan Löfven and the SAP campaigned unapologetically on a programme focused on quality jobs and welfare, bringing home more votes than expected and emerging as the only stabilising actor in pre-governmen-tal bargaining. And the third is Austria, where against all odds, 40.000 people participated in a deliberative process of writing a new SPO programme. Their mobilisation showcases what Felipe Gonzalez recently said at a joint event with FEPS in Madrid: if you want to save representative democracy, you need to make it a participatory one indeed.

Finally, there is the issue of democracy itself. Much has been said about so-called traditional politics being under siege, many ‘isms’ (populism, neo-liberalism) have been stuck onto ‘the others’ which Progressives detest. But as someone said, the emblematic election of Donald Trump (and others) is not a crisis of social democracy, but an affliction of democ- racy as such. The fight that needs to be fought is not against them, but in favour of standards and principles of democ- racy as such. The fight that needs to be fought is not against them, but in favour of standards and principles of democracy. It is about remembering that it is an ideal for which so many have sacrificed so much. This is why Pedro Sanchez’s attempt to end the commemoration of Franco’s regime is so monumental. This is why Jacinda Ardern telling her oppo-nents off when they asked about her family planning during the campaign was cutting-edge. They were both about integ-rity and leading by example.

These are just few, selected examples – but many more could be chosen. The difference is in fact being made every day, but it is difficult to quote in times of disbelief. But they showcase that Progressives can become the movement they really aspire to be. The key is to start also seeing positives and allowing confidence to grow, to start believing and making bold choices. It is about trusting oneself, one’s genuine instincts and hopes that could be entrusted in Progressives again.
Right-wing populists are exploiting the social question, not because they want to resolve it, but because they appeal to a nation’s pride as a substitute for the pride of the former working class.

Social Democracy in Europe is ailing. The reasons are well-known and manifold: the disappearance of traditional industrial jobs and associated voter groups, robotics, the shrinking role of trade unions and the general fact that an increasingly divided society can no longer be represented by a single party. A retreat into nationalism is an illusion – the way forward is to a European republic.

That is why “The flag will do it” is currently the running gag in the current debate about Brexit. It is not that Brexit will bring UKIP voters any economic benefits, but at least they can be proud again to be “British”.

In the meantime, throughout Europe, parties or leading personalities to the left of Social Democracy (Jeremy Corbyn in Great Britain, Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France and Sahra Wagenknecht in Germany with her movement "Aufstehen" - “Get Up”) are re-adopting the class as well as the national approach and a new convergence emerges in the party systems: national-neoliberal (right-wing populist) is teaming up with national-social (left-wing populist) - but one that has already existed in the 1920s: aside from racism, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s statements with regard to the European Union are very similar to those of Marine Le Pen; the Italian coalition government composed of the somewhat “progressive” Movimento Cinque Stelle and the openly xenophobic...
Lega Nord is another good example of this convergence.

Social Democrats in Europe, who always try to do their best with regards to the European Union, even if their efforts are often neither consistent nor brave enough, have ultimately succumbed to the error which Richard Rorty prophesied in the “ros: that of betraying the class which forms the base of their own electorate by allowing for the economic liberalism of Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder etc., because it seemed the only possible way to modernise society. The “Third Way” (Anthony Giddens) ultimately left Social Democracy in Europe in political limbo.

But perhaps we do have to decide, not between the convergence of nationalists of the right and the left on one side and the liberal centre on the other, but in fact between right and left, between capitalism and democratic socialism. That sounds bold, but it is being thought about aloud.

In his book The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal, Axel Honneth, the last veteran of critical theory, calls for socialism and democracy to be linked together again in the 21st century in a new social experiment.

But the question is: socialism where exactly? At a national or European level? That is where the current discussion on the future of Europe and the 2019 elections to the European Parliament comes in. “Le Socialisme dans une seule nation” (“socialism in one country”) was the path that set François Mitterrand on a collision course with Europe in 1983 and ultimately led to his failure. Mitterrand changed tack and became a committed European, but submitted to Thatcherism and Reagonomics, i.e. to a liberalisation that France is still grappling with. Decades later, Marine Le Pen, like UKIP voters, still feeds off responding not to the EU, but to the brutal social cuts under Margaret Thatcher and others.

Is it not time to turn the slogan about socialism and nation around? Socialism, but in Europe, rather than only “in one country”. And might that not be the task for a new European social democratic movement in the 21st century?

In his book ‘The nation or the sense of the social’, published in the 1920s, the French sociologist Marcel Mauss defined nation as “institutionalised solidarity”. This means solidarity that is not arbitrary, as it was, for example, in the Greek debt crisis. Based on Mauss’ definition, the current debates about a European Minister of Finance, a European unemployment insurance (Olaf Scholz), a euro area budget or about Italy’s debt crisis might in practice be about the question whether Europe is finally prepared to “institutionalise its solidarity”. If Europe were to do so, we would finally see it become a nation as defined by Marcel Mauss. The answer to Marine Le Pen’s question, namely “Quand il n’y aura plus la nation, qui s’occupera des pauvres?” (When there is no more nation, who will look after the poor?), prompting voters to flock to her, would be that Europe will look after them. Europe will become socially minded, or it will cease to exist.

Whether European Social Democrats can make of a European unemployment insurance a national unifier as Bismarck’s general health insurance in the Germany Empire of the 19th century remains to be seen. The fact is, however, that if European Social Democrats are seriously striving for a European democracy, they must demand that the general political principle of equality for all citizens of Europe be implemented; that is an essential, although not sufficient, condition for any democracy.

Citizens do not compete with one another within a nation. Nor should they do so within Europe in the future. What do Social Democrats in Europe have to lose by taking courage and joining forces in the upcoming elections to the European Parliament with a forward-looking strategy of a socially minded Europe based on the principle of general political equality? The call for equal rights for European citizens could lend a dull electoral campaign for the European Parliament the lustre of an emancipatory movement for a European democracy – and, if we are lucky, would not only prevent the downfall of Social Democracy in Europe, but would give it a practical working programme that would appeal to citizens across Europe for the coming decades.

What do Social Democrats in Europe have to lose by taking courage and joining forces in the upcoming elections to the European Parliament?

> AUTHOR

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What do we want from technology?

“Technology is neither good nor bad nor is it neutral”

by Justin Nogarede

According to the US Historian Melvin Kranzberg, “technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral.” In the same way, many concepts in the debate on technologies have to be de-dramatised: Cyberspace does not exist. The ‘internet’ does not exist. The use of these terms reinforces the popular perception that we are dealing with an all-pervasive and amorphous entity that escapes anyone’s control.

‘Cyberspace’ and ‘internet’ are easy but mystifying catchwords for what in reality are a myriad of networking, information and communication technologies. These technologies are bound to have an effect, but what that effect will be is contingent upon dominant economic and political interests. Therefore, we should not fall prey to the fatalistic belief that technology develops autonomously, and that this is fundamentally beyond our control. Technologies are developed with a goal in mind, they embody certain values, and favour certain uses.

Even with self-learning applications of artificial intelligence, that is, even if we treat technology itself as a ‘black box’, choices can be made about its use and deployment. Many of the digital technologies we see today can either be used to empower individuals and communities or to constrain and control them. We can see this in practice when we look at the different approaches taken in, for example, China and the US. Leaving this terrain fully to engineers and the private sector is ill advised, and narrows the scope for democratic decision-making. This is especially so in the digital environment, which, unlike the natural environment, is fully man-made and malleable.

Unfortunately, EU regulators have largely forsaken this role. By and large they refrained from actively shaping and regulating the ‘internet’. The

“Cyberspace does not exist. The ‘internet’ does not exist. The use of these terms reinforces the perception that we are dealing with an all-pervasive entity”
current infrastructure that we use to communicate and receive information online mainly serves commercial interests, with relatively little public control or oversight. The result is an online environment where citizens are being tracked and manipulated, and their personal data are maximally exploited for commercial gain. This is often presented as something inevitable, but we forget too quickly that things were different before, and that alternatives are possible. For instance, the postal service has been either fully or partially provided by public authorities, and has to comply with certain public interest requirements. For TV, most countries have public channels, and strict limits on advertisement.

On a more positive note, in Europe, public authorities are starting to realise that change is both possible and necessary. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is being applied since May this year, and provides a much-needed update and improved enforceability of personal data protection rules. Businesses often claim that the GDPR hinders and slows down innovation in big data applications - but this is wrong. These rules simply steer technological development in a privacy-friendly direction, which makes eminent sense. Why would we want to compete with China in developing technology that undermines our privacy and leaves us all worse off?

The discussions about the next EU research and innovation programme, Horizon Europe, reveal a greater belief in the public capacity to steer technological development into societally beneficial directions. The future programme will set policy missions for research and innovation activity, and hence consciously direct technological development towards a solution of pressing global challenges. This is high time, and will hopefully help to reverse current trends, whereby the development and use of new technology has often served to increase existing inequalities, instead of minimising them. That funds are pouring into block-chain technology, which is an expensive technological fix for the lack of trust in public institutions, is both a sign of our time and should be a call to action. Why not focus our efforts on the fact that the majority of our citizens are still stuck in traffic jams while driving polluting cars, pay ever higher prices for outdated houses, and are putting in more hours at work for a real wage that is stagnant?

In 1999, the Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig observed in his ‘Code and other laws of cyberspace’ that the

"Unfortunately, EU regulators have largely forsaken the role of actively shaping and regulating the ‘internet’.

"
The management of intellectual inequalities is the greatest challenge of the 21st century

Interview with Laurent Alexandre by Alain Bloëdt

Artificial Intelligence is at the heart of the digital revolution. Will it help to reduce inequalities? Its influence on the development of human potential is underestimated as are its very real impacts on education and health.

Progressive Post: Will the digital revolution reduce or increase inequalities?

Laurent Alexandre: It all depends which inequalities. Intellectual disparities are much greater than physical ones, and produce much greater inequalities. It’s for this reason that income disparities are much greater in the 21st century than they were in the 20th century. A skilled Artificial Intelligence (AI) engineer can earn several million dollars a month.

PP: What causes such disparities?

LA: The gaps are huge because the intelligence economy is a very scalable economy. If you are a good removal man, you will earn twice as much as a bad removal man. If you are an excellent AI expert, you will be able to help Facebook attract 100 million users, which are worth tens of billions of dollars.

PP: Can this same technology not help to reduce these intellectual inequalities?

LA: No, there exists no technology capable of increasing cognitive abilities, especially that of those who are less gifted. In the 21st century, we can redistribute money through the welfare state and social security, not IQ points. That is why I believe that the management of intellectual inequalities is the greatest challenge of the 21st century.

#Digital #Revolution Regulating AI requires multidisciplinary expertise that the traditional political classes simply do not have

@dr_l_alexandre
FOCUS

PP: Is education not the key?

LA: There is a common belief that school is able to reduce all non-genetic inequalities. Sadly this is a well-meaning but false assumption. By making university more accessible and giving everyone a secondary school diploma, we think we have democratised intelligence, but all we have done is open the doors to everyone, which is not quite the same.

PP: Is increasing skills the only possible option to save workers?

LA: Companies will adapt without problem, they are resilient. The difficulty lies with the employees. I am talking, in particular, about employees who do not know how to read and write well. In France, one in three children leaving school is unable to summarise a five-line text. The same can be observed in Italy and in most countries.

PP: Is professional mobility a solution?

LA: Many believe that we will indeed change jobs regularly. That’s fine when you’re part of the elite and enjoy the training textbooks, but when you’re less gifted, the idea of having to relearn everything every seven years is very daunting.

PP: Can we genuinely not do anything, or don’t we want to?

LA: We just do not know. But if we continue to ignore genetic determinism, we won’t be able to set up educational research programmes to overcome it in the future, as we did for many health determinisms. Since 1960, for breast cancer research alone, we must have invested over $100 billion, but nowhere near that much on educational research. Health and education are the two main pillars of the 21st century. We do spend a lot on education, but not on its research.

PP: Is the world burying its head in the sand?

LA: With new personalised therapies, you can spend several thousands of dollars a year on a person with cancer. When a child is not gifted and finds themselves «intellectually handicapped» compared to the AI of 2050, how much will be spent then? Nothing! There’s a flaw in the reasoning.

“School is believed to be able to reduce all non-genetic inequalities, sadly this is a well-meaning but false assumption.”
DIGITALISATION IS NOT THE DEVIL

by Anthony Gooch

Globalisation has been the whipping boy for all that is going wrong in these times of political uncertainty. In Europe and beyond, too many people feel that greater economic openness and interconnectedness has cost them a lot and brought few rewards. They feel unheard, do not know where to look for help or who to trust. Many are turning inward, with political and societal consequences, from Brexit to the changing political winds around the continent.
As if this were not enough, along comes digitalisation to change everything – and at a faster pace and scale than we could ever have imagined. It is reshaping not just jobs but whole industries, as well as our education and employment systems. It is also reshaping how we communicate. By 2021, the number of devices connected to networks will be triple the global population. But to what end? We should be concerned not just about quantity of connections, but also about their quality.

Today, it is easier than ever before to find like-minded people – but equally easy to stay shut in a comfortable silo of conversation with them. It is easier to reach and to sway others – but too often through fake news or distortion rather than facts and careful reasoning. Online interactions can erode our ability to listen to those different to us and break down the trust between individuals, within communities and in governments, as well as how they can sway elections or lead to violence.

In this “perfect storm”, there is a crucial need for the leaders to listen to and learn from citizens – and technology can help. Because digitalisation is not the devil – technologies are means, not the end. As researchers of human behaviour on Twitter revealed in Science Magazine recently, it is human beings who choose to share misinformation and fake news far more than true news stories. It is up to us to determine how digital technologies shape our world. Digital technologies are also being used for good, to help increase citizens’ engagement with their governments and participation in their societies. Three examples that inspire me are the “World We Want 2030” digital platform, Colombia’s plebiscitodigital.co initiative, and the OECD’s own Better Life Index.

Supported by the UN, the World We Want platform was a call for people to “join the conversation” and help shape the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The campaign stated, “we must make our governments listen and take action on the things that matter most to people everywhere”. The project brought together citizens from 90 countries to take part in its 2015 Policy Strategy Group, while others became social media influencers for the cause.

This process has strengthened the true legitimacy and relevance of the SDGs for citizens around the world. As a result, the SDGs enjoy a far greater “societal license to operate” than their ‘top-down’ predecessor of the Millennium Development Goals. We are seeing the difference already, with SDGs being used by policymakers and policy shapers through civil society alike as a compass and GPS for their actions and resource-allocation in coming years.

In Colombia, civil society organisations created plebiscitodigital.co, a platform driven by blockchain, in order to allow citizens abroad a means to cast a symbolic ballot in the historic referendum on the peace process between Colombia and the FARC. At the time, there were about 7 million Colombians living abroad, of whom only 599,000 would have been able to vote, and yet many of whom had left precisely because of the violence. As the organisers stressed “their voices have strength despite the borders and that is why we decided to invite them to expose their message to the world through this digital urn”. The results were not binding for the government, but the initiative gave expats a way to share their opinions and let their country know they still cared about domestic issues.

At the OECD, we are proud of our OECD Better Life Index (BLI), a platform to give people a voice, empowering individuals, enabling communities to take action and the potential to inspire, channel and make a difference to humanity.

In the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, we asked ourselves: what can we do for the people we ultimately work
The digital transformation brings wellbeing and inclusive growth. As we go about this, we have made a conscious choice to listen first in order to understand better what we are facing, all the while knowing that we cannot delay action for too long.

We need to invest in the magnetic pull of such initiatives to drive collective action.

The OECD Better Life Index has inspired similar initiatives regionally and locally around the world everywhere from South Korea and New Zealand to the US and Canada. This foray into civic-tech has the potential to transform many of the bases, structures and conditioners of our societies in order to seek to improve what we truly value as human beings – our quality of life. By injecting citizen feedback, we can truly make our policies better, helping to push the envelope and spark disruption internationally, re-defining what growth means, and putting people at the core of the design of policies.

EU leaders face a dual challenge: developing policies that help us make the most of digitalisation while at the same time using digital technologies to enhance citizen engagement and win back citizens’ trust. To ensure that digital transformations lead to better policies and better lives, to positive engagement between citizens and in societies, we at the OECD are well embarked on our “Going Digital” project.

This cross-cutting project brings together a diverse group of experts and stakeholders to help ensure that the
UNIVERSAL WELFARE FOR CHANGING LABOUR MARKETS

Not an unconditional income, but an unconditional welfare

by David Rinaldi & Francesco Corti

Digital technologies and robotisation create employment opportunities - but other jobs will irrevocably be lost. Fears about job quantity should not drive attention away from addressing job quality. Basic income solutions have been tabled to deal with many people out of the labour market. Such solutions may end up weakening public services and the redistributive role of the State. What is needed is a policy mix to modernise our welfare so that it can serve to protect and empower European citizens.
ew digital technologies deeply modify our way of interacting, doing business and conceiving the labour market. Most of us, as consumers, have a direct perception of the digital transformation: when we purchase products through the web or apps; when we want to communicate with someone or liaise with our bank or the public administration; when we look how to move from A to B. This is only, however, the tip of the iceberg.

The digital age not only paves the way for modernisation but it also opens up the development of new business models.

Confronted with scenarios of radical change, public sector intervention should focus on managing the massive transformation of the labour market with equal emphasis as it should address the country’s productivity and competitiveness. On the employment front, the problem is twofold. On the one hand, there is the issue of quantity: how many and which jobs can be created thanks to the new digital technologies, and how guaranteed in the near future? Will all of us work less and possibly from home?

With regards to the first issue, the European Commission reminds us that the employment rate in the ICT industry in Europe has steadily grown ever since 2006 at a pace of +3% per year, eight times faster than the average employment growth rate, and the trend is increasing. On the other hand, the automation and robotisation process entails the loss of many jobs, mainly affecting the range of the so-called ‘middle-skilled workers’. Reliable estimates claim a loss of about 20–25% of those jobs. It might be easy to calculate which and how many jobs can be automated, but it is much more difficult to imagine the types and the number of jobs that could be created.

Years ago, when banks introduced ATMs for automatic cash withdrawal, it was feared that this would lead to a substantial loss of employment in the banking sector. The result was quite the opposite: the new tool allowed banks to minimise some costs, leaving the door open to reinvestment for opening new branches, and creating more employment.

Solutions such as the basic income developed as a radical and left-wing response to the gradual loss of power encountered by workers and aims at a more inclusive society, able to make even those who don’t work feel active. Certainly commendable objectives.

With a large proportion of the population out of the labour market, providing everybody with a basic income might even seem a logical solution, but it hides some implications which need careful treatment.

Recently, the corporations of the World Economic Forum and several businessmen from Silicon Valley have added to the ranks of the citizenship income supporters. Why? Basic income, particularly if used as a sole or primary source of welfare, tends to be a measure fostering the market by limiting de facto the State’s room for manoeuvre, including the redistributive role. Some pro-market right-wingers therefore look kindly on a welfare system which is converted into unconditional income support as it allows consumers to have a steady flow of income to spend for buying products and services that the State, whilst employing the expenditure on the basic income, will no longer be able to guarantee. The State therefore risks being further subjected to the market criteria along with a further marketisation of welfare services, particularly educational and healthcare services.

It is certainly less visible, but citizenship income is a one-to-one and populistic response to the issue of job losses due to automation and robotisation, as much as
building a wall is a one-to-one response to migration.

What is necessary, is a policy mix, able to offer suitable solutions for the complex phenomenon.

Obviously, in terms of political communication, a policy mix is a less valuable material with the electorate, but we are convinced that there might be elements that are very appealing in terms of political communication. A modernisation strategy for welfare policies should include:

► Stronger activation and re-activation policies for making the workforce not only more suitable to tasks connected with the new jobs in the green, circular, digital and care economies, but also more resilient, in order to provide workers with the means to face future changes in the labour market.

► A solid strategy of social investment, involving both social infrastructures and investments for education and early-years childcare. This is not only an instrument preventing socio-economic inequalities from becoming inequalities of opportunities, but it also sets the ground for a more productive future workforce.

► New policies for education and training to ensure that all citizens have appropriate cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Lifelong learning, for instance, is still very underdeveloped and not integrated sufficiently with business dynamics. Modernisation of the social protection instruments especially to extend social rights beyond the classical categories and definitions of labour

“citizenship income is a one-to-one and populistic response to the issue of job losses due to automation and robotisation, as much as building a wall is a one-to-one response to migration.”

and to promote protection systems supporting workers during the transition from one job to another.

A modern welfare state must be able not only to extend the social protection to new forms of employment, but also to provide support for the citizens’ growth, development and the achievement of their aspirations. Protect and empower, as the Dutch social scientist Anton Hemerijck summarises. That shall be the role of a modern welfare state.

A change is necessary, not towards a basic income, but rather towards citizenship welfare: universal welfare which is not related to the employment status, where the services of the welfare state, social security and social investment do not depend on working conditions, but on citizenship.

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DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION: TIME FOR REFLECTION ON THE QUALITY OF WORK

by Christophe Degryse

Today, we find ourselves in the middle of a new revolution: that of digital transformation, which some call the 4th industrial revolution. This transformation is linked to major improvements in artificial intelligence and robotics, but also to the development of a new business model - that of the platform economy. Ever-more intelligent robots, capable of completing non-routine, cognitive and manual tasks (medical diagnoses, driverless cars, article writing, logistics...), and digital platforms that have shaken up whole swathes of the traditional economy (Uber, AirBNB, Upwork, TaskRabbit).

Many jobs will be destroyed, others will be created, but all of them will change. Certain sectors are at the forefront of this transformation. Jobs in banking, logistics, transport and chemistry evolve rapidly, sometimes with major redundancy plans, followed by announcements of the creation of new jobs. On 6 November 2018, banking giant Lloyds Banking Group announced a personnel overhaul, with the aim of boosting their digital capabilities. They were going to cut 6,240 jobs... and create 8,240. It was an announcement that is reminiscent of the English textile industry, for example, where workers who were considered obsolete - despite their experience and know-how - were replaced by new workers - claimed to be ‘qualified’ - as they were the ones who would operate the machines.

Bleak studies on a ‘future without jobs’, that often feature in political, economic and social debates of the last few years, may have overshadowed another equally important debate: that of the transformation of work. What are the so-called ‘intelligent’ new jobs in factories and offices? Automatisation and digitisation of a growing number of jobs in the commercial, distribution, banking and insurance sectors are leading to profound changes in the organisation of these jobs.

This has given rise to questions on health and safety - the EU-OSHA, the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, talks of "emerging risks" - , working hours, skills, work-life balance, new methods of...
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e-management and monitoring of worker performance. Several European media outlets recently brought to light working conditions in large logistics centres. It’s no exaggeration to say that in these centres humans have become little more than the implementers of ‘intelligent’ algorithms. Is this the future of work?

What’s more, the rapid development - especially in Anglo-Saxon countries - of the platform economy has lead to a transformation of the boundaries of companies. Thanks to these platforms, it’s possible to outsource an ever-increasing number of tasks to all four corners of the globe: encoding, accounting, secretarial work, translation, design, programming, drafting of texts. The development of online outsourcing, seen as a wonderful ‘opportunity’ by the World Bank, could also be a menace as jobs are moved to countries in Southeast Asia or Africa, where prices are more competitive. However, it is impossible to ignore that outsourcing almost systematically leads to a deterioration of working conditions: the jobs are low-paid, temporary work with no long-term career prospects, formal contracts, labour relations, social security or continuous training.

To paraphrase Lord Ashley, we should be concerned that the various improvements made to machines (today’s robots and algorithms) tend to lead to the replacement of stable, qualified jobs by precarious ones. This phenomenon is referred to by certain writers as ‘de-professionalisation’ and goes widely unnoticed. It would be useful to respond to this digital transformation with reflection, based on concrete data, on changes in working conditions and quality of employment.

Bleak studies on a ‘future without jobs’, that often feature in political, economic and social debates of the last few years, may have overshadowed another equally important debate: that of the transformation of work.

#DigitalRevolution: the development of a new business model, that of the platform economy, according to Christophe Degryse

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“We need to restructure the distribution of income”

Interview with Philippe Van Parijs by Alain Bloëdt

The technological revolution, a factor in the disappearance of jobs - this is an idea which is increasingly propounded, and yet Philippe Van Parijs is unconvinced. In an interview he explains the need for a universal income to go alongside this change.

Philippe Van Parijs is a Belgian philosopher and economist. He holds the Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics at the University of Leuven.

The Progressive Post: It is often said that huge quantities of jobs will be lost - but is that really the case? Or is it rather fear-mongering?

Philip Van Parijs: Fear of immigration stirs up public opinion perhaps more than fear of technology-driven job losses. Technological change will certainly have a major effect on employment but, to keep it simple, I would say that the combination of technological change and globalisation does not lead to a reduction in the amount of work but in the polarisation of earning power. Those individuals who have capital, intellectual faculties, specific qualifications that have become lucrative as a result of technological change and/or globalisation, from footballers to software developers, will see their earning power go through the roof.

PP: And the others?

PVP: Individuals in direct competition with a mass of other people around the world, just as competent, sometimes highly qualified, but whose qualifications have lost all their market value because of technological change or because of the transfer of certain kinds of activities to another part of the world to which they have no access.

PP: What will happen to these people who are becoming vulnerable?

PVP: What will happen at the bottom of the scale of earning power will depend on the institutions that control the labour market in each country. This may mean very high unemployment if there is a minimum wage and high employee protection. In other cases, it may mean increasingly precarious jobs and an increase in the working poor, those who need to have more than one job to meet their family’s needs.

#BasicIncome is different from existing social security systems
*PP: How should we react to this technological, and hence economic, change?*

**PVP:** We need to change the distribution of income. These incomes derive from the wealth produced by capital accumulation and previous innovations, and should therefore be distributed to all citizens of a society. A basic income is part of this logic.

*PP: What will be the effect on the future of employment?*

**PVP:** We need to make it as easy as possible to move between different spheres of activity: work, education and voluntary work, within the family or outside. We need more flexibility, and this should start with apprenticeships.

*PP: Would that be very different to what exists already?*

**PVP:** Basic income is totally different from social security in France as we know it, in the form of the ‘Revenu de solidarité active’ (RSA), or Hartz IV in Germany or reddito di cittadinanza in Italy...

*PP: Why?*

**PVP:** This kind of social assistance targets the poor. It grants or supplements an income to those unable to earn a living from work, which creates an unemployment trap and an increasingly polarised society. Basic income, on the other hand, is the bedrock that underlies all income in order to avoid precisely this trap.

*PP: When people like Bill Gates or Mark Zuckerberg come out in support of a basic income, do you think they really believe in it or do you think they are just being opportunistic?*

**PVP:** I think that some of them really believe in it. We need to be careful here because they are not all saying the same thing. Some of them have a simplistic view, because we should not replace the right to work with the right to have an income. But the basic income actually strengthens the right to work for those people who would otherwise be dependent on social benefits or income support.

Those who have capital, intellectual property, or specific qualifications that have become lucrative as a result of technological change and/or globalisation, from footballers to software developers, will see their earning power go through the roof.
A spectre is haunting Europe: the spectre of... digitalisation. Developments in new digital technologies, in particular big data, algorithms and artificial intelligence, have created a debate on the future of work and its consequences for workers.

There is a lot of fear in the discussion, mostly because trends relating to new technological developments predict major job losses. The forecasts vary significantly: anywhere from 6% to more than 50% of jobs could be lost. There is also quite a bit of divergence in identifying who will be affected: initially the forecasts tended to predict mainly the loss of lower skilled jobs, particular in manufacturing. But opinions varied on whether the effects would be mostly substitutional, displacement, or replacement oriented, and thus on whether the effects would involve mostly loss, shifts to other skill sets and occupations, or in fact an actual increase in new jobs and occupations.

One version of how technological advances and change would affect work is the so-called stage process. In this scenario, based on supposed historical observation of previous technology waves, the initial introduction of new technology leads to rapid job...
displacement. However, problems with implementation arise, necessitating a partial reversal and adaptation, thus creating opportunities for skilled work. Other dark visions of the future increasingly encompass areas of the workforce previously deemed less susceptible to the onslaught of digital technologies and digitisation. Artificial intelligence, autonomously adapting processes and self-optimising algorithms however are being credited with the ability to replace many types of highly skilled work, and even creative occupations.

Another development poised to have major impacts on work relations is the role of big data and algorithms in platform work. In the world of platforms, the mediation between worker and employer takes place through an intermediary (the platform) which, using algorithms, matches tasks to workers or clients, monitors, rates, measures performance, etc. The process is highly intransparent and workers have little recourse in a system in which there is little collective action or bargaining power and in which their employers are often unknown and largely unreachable.

One of the characteristics of the digital world, which is often overlooked but which poses great challenges for workers and regulators, is the tendency for a consolidation and concentration of activities. This is in part because powerful actors tend to dominate the sphere, pushing out competitors and smaller players by marginalising their presence and visibility, thus becoming even more powerful. This of course makes workers and their representatives’ ability to push back much harder.

In debates, Europe is often portrayed as a laggard in the race to develop key technologies whose inevitable impacts on work and employment have to be managed, muted or countered. It is indeed true that in light of globalisation, those who are the forerunners in technological trends and the dominant actors in the global marketplace do tend to have advantages in determining the trajectory of development. But not necessarily because these developments are inevitable, immutable or even optimal. Studies of much earlier waves of technology have convincingly demonstrated the social shaping of technologies such as refrigerators, which are electric and therefore only hum, rather than gas driven and loud, due in large part to Thomas Edison’s business acumen, economic power, and lobbying success.

So what role can government and the public sector play in the challenges that lie ahead? There are at least two major areas in which governments, in their ability to fund and regulate, need to act. One is in supporting technology and organisations of work that promote skill development. Automation versus expertise is a choice and not always a predetermined option. The second involves protecting workers in an environment in which ever more dominant actors determine working conditions and employment relations, particularly in the platform economy. For work to be sustainable (in terms of security, health, and pay) and social systems viable, regulation needs find new ways to encompass increasing numbers of self-employed and workforces on demand. First steps have been taken, but much more remains to be done.
EUROPE’S INNOVATION OPPORTUNITY  

by Fred Block

While there is much concern that Europe is falling behind the US and China in the competition for global technological supremacy, the reality is that Europe has a unique opportunity to focus its innovation efforts on the quality of life of its population.

Some people claim that Europe is doomed to become a technological backwater as the United States and China fight for global leadership in the great innovation race. But this view is deeply misguided. The reality is that there is not a single global innovation race; there is not one particular technological breakthrough that will secure the future for the nation or region that develops it. Instead, we have entered a period where the exploitation of advanced computer capacities, new materials and new production techniques makes innovation ubiquitous.

Despite the dominant role of US.-based computer firms and China’s ambitious state-funded technological initiatives, there are still many thousands of opportunities for European innovators to be leaders in developing technologies that will have significant economic and social payoffs.

Moreover, both the US and China are continuing to concentrate their innovation efforts on those technologies that are likely to yield future military advantage. For example, in the US, both industry and government are pouring billions of
dollars into the effort to create autonomous cars and trucks. This is happening in spite of widespread public skepticism about the safety and desirability of computer-controlled vehicles. The skepticism is appropriate given that terrorists could reprogram such vehicles to become killing machines that plow into crowds of pedestrians. But, of course, the Pentagon is itself extremely enthusiastic about autonomous vehicles precisely because of their utility as killing machines. And for the same reason, the Chinese authorities are also likely to prioritise those innovations that have military value.

Europe has an opportunity to become an innovation leader by focusing on those technologies that promise to address the real needs of the civilian population. But to take advantage of this opening requires learning the lessons of the last sixty years of innovation policies — that governments have an absolutely central role to play. Contemporary technologies are complicated and require a diversity of scientific skills, so private firms—even the largest and most successful—cannot and will not make progress on their own. Nor can one expect that the research programs developed by university-based scientists and engineers will automatically come up with critical breakthroughs.

In fact, almost all of the big technological advances of the last sixty years have occurred when governments identify a specific technological challenge, use funding to focus the attention of researchers on the problem, and facilitate high levels of cooperation among technologists from industry, from universities and from public sector laboratories. This is precisely what Mariana Mazzucato has documented in her book, The Entrepreneurial State. To be sure, technological innovation is always a journey into the unknown with results being uncertain, unpredictable, and often taking far longer than anyone imagined. Furthermore, as with any other government initiative, innovation policies can be executed skillfully or ineptly. Overly ambitious goals, too much centralisation, and continuing support for research groups, regardless of their progress or lack thereof, can turn such efforts into the proverbial boondoggles that simply waste taxpayer money.

But the good news is that there is an emergent set of best practices that increase the probability that such initiatives will actually produce results. One is to begin with many small and highly focused grants to see if research groups can make advances on some specific aspects of the larger challenge. Another is to create anchor institutions that simultaneously bring together a critical mass of public and private researchers working in the same place and also coordinate the efforts of a geographically dispersed network of researchers.

The real challenge is to figure out which areas of research to prioritise. It is here that Europe has the advantage of being less militarily focused than its geopolitical rivals. This makes it feasible to open up decisions that have been purely technocratic to democratic debate. This would also facilitate a break with the US model where the government takes the big risks, but the successful firms like Apple and Google have reaped all of the rewards while also minimising their own tax burden. There are multiple policies that can assure that the profits earned from government-led innovation efforts would be widely shared.

One obvious example of a priority that would emerge if the public were given a voice would be to focus on technologies that could lower the cost of building attractive multi-family housing complexes that use renewables to meet their own energy needs. Such efforts could simultaneously address climate change and housing affordability while also creating substantial overseas market opportunities. But there are many other comparable innovation challenges that could improve the quality of life for millions of people.

At the current moment, of course, many on both sides of the Atlantic have lost faith in their political leaders and the neoliberal policies of the past decade. Enlightened innovation policies, rooted in democratic input, could well be indispensable for reforming both our economies and our politics.

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There are still many thousands of opportunities for European innovators to be leaders in developing technologies that will have significant economic and social payoffs.

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Fred Block is Research Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Davis. He edited with Matthew R. Keller State of Innovation: The U.S. Government’s Role in Technology Development. His most recent book is Capitalism: The Future of an Illusion.
Automation: A gradual process

An interview with David Hémous by Alain Bloëdt

Contrary to popular belief, the automation of work and everyday tasks will not happen overnight. It will be a gradual process over time. It is important to channel this change.

Progressive Post: Are we really experiencing a technological revolution?

David Hémous: Automation is happening, but it’s a gradual process. We have been talking about it a lot in the last five years, but it has existed for 30 or 40 years.

PP: You don’t agree with doom and gloom merchants who predict the replacement of humans with machines?

DH: No, because if we take the example of lorries, we have indeed started automating them, but drivers are not all going to lose their jobs tomorrow. I do not really believe in studies that predict the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs and mass unemployment in 20 years’ time. However, I think that we can protect those who will fall foul of automation in two ways: first, by redistribution, second by granting them a supplement such as universal income, the donation of a stock portfolio to certain people when they turn 18, or other social innovations.

PP: How could we intervene in the job market?

DH: In my opinion, we need to protect workers more than jobs. We need to make sure that workers are able to move more easily from one sector to another and have access to training that allows them to be as useful as possible with current and future technologies.
**PP:** Do you find that there is a real willingness to support these changes or do you feel resistance?

**DH:** So far, there has been a lot of talk about training, but not much is happening in practice. I think we can do more.

**PP:** If these changes began to appear over the past few decades, why are we only taking notice now?

**DH:** I think the main reason has to do with the financial crisis, which led to unemployment and forced us to reflect on its causes. In addition to that, new technologies have come on the market in the last fifteen years or so that are quite impressive, such as artificial intelligence. Driving had always been considered to be one of the most difficult activities to automate, but even that has become a reality. Finally, the fact that automation could affect qualified professions has pushed those concerned to take an active interest in the issue.

**PP:** Do you think that digital evolution is a contributor to economic growth?

**DH:** It all depends on which measurement you choose as a standard. With regards to GDP, for example, yes. But that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s a good thing for everyone. It could well increase both GDP and inequality at the same time.

**PP:** In any revolution there are winners and losers, that’s the nature of economics. But how can we ensure that the digital revolution, unlike other economic revolutions, benefits the greatest number of people possible?

**DH:** The ratio of winners and losers varies greatly from one country to another. In France or Germany, for example, inequality has not changed much in the highest earning 25% of the population. The technological changes of the last thirty years, therefore, have probably been compensated by other phenomena. It’s different in the top 1%, where the issue of digitisation plays a less important role. In the United States or the United Kingdom, on the other hand, inequality has increased. I would say that, in general, while digitisation and automation tend to increase inequality, redistribution through taxation and other means can compensate for this phenomenon, at least in Europe.

> “I think that we can protect those who fall foul of automation in two ways: first, by redistribution, then by granting them a supplement such as universal income.”

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| We need to make sure workers are able to move more easily from one sector to another and have access to training that allows them to be as useful as possible with current and future technologies. |
Ten points of reference for a progressive narrative on migration

by FEPS Global Migration Group

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted by UN Member States, in Marrakesh, Morocco, December 2018 is an unprecedented progressive frame for a top-down and also a bottom-up approach on Migration.

Considering the growing anti-migration and xenophobic sentiments that are spreading in Europe and elsewhere, as reflected again at the Salzburg EU summit, where EU leaders showed their unity on Brexit and their division on migration, FEPS has presented a progressive vision on migration in New York on 21st September, right before just the UN General Assembly.

Migration is not about numbers, it is about people. Behind the numbers there are men, women, children, all with their own unique feelings, experiences, fears, hopes, and stories; each with their dignity and their right to strive for a better life. As the way we deal with migration will affect their right to move and lead a decent life, and the stability and cohesion of the receiving communities, progressive migration and integration policies must be grounded in humanity and solidarity and imply the utter rejection of measures, initiatives and practices that can harm human dignity.

Even though migration is reaching unprecedented levels in the present global context, we must recognise that this is not an emergency: migration is a structural and ordinary feature of our contemporary
world, and short-term, simplistic and narrow policy responses will not only not “solve the problem”, but will likely make the consequences of mismanagement more severe. As the reasons for migration are rooted in the uneven development and distribution of wealth, in the conflicts and persecutions, and in the ravages of nature and climate change, it is only at the global level that migration can be effectively governed and it is the current global architecture that needs to be changed.

Given these assumptions, the FEPS Global Migration Group offers the following suggestions as a frame of reference for progressive forces all over the world and to support the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration, to be adopted in Marrakesh on 10th and 11th December 2018.

1. **Exposing the reality of migration**

The debate about migration is characterised by countless myths. Supporting evidence-based information is crucial, particularly when fact-based evidence is no longer enough, and information is often manipulated or misrepresented. We must do our utmost to demystify migration, widening the constituencies that speak about it, resorting to the support of incisive drivers of information and exposing the many misperceptions and blatant lies that circulate, as they feed fear and insecurity, and lead inevitably to the adoption of inappropriate measures both at domestic and international level. The very idea of migration needs to be normalised to lessen uncertainties and inspire greater confidence in the capacity of governments to manage it.

2. **Endorsing a wide and fair dialogue among countries**

Looking at the phenomenon from a single-sided perspective inevitably leads to partial, one-sided responses, and reinforces the “us versus them” view. Most states are countries of origin, transit and destination at the same time, and share more interests in a wide and global approach than one may commonly think. We must build on this and develop a multidimensional dialogue among countries of origin, transit and destination to identify the most appropriate policies to govern migration flows in the interest of all states and all people.

3. **Developing fair and equitable mobility pacts**

From the perspective of an orderly management of migration, cooperation among states should be directed to building a common policy of organised mobility between countries of departure, transit and arrival, developed in the interest of all. These transnational mobility pacts should provide for co-management and comprise both channels for regular migration and return policies. This would aid to remove incentives for irregular movement and dismantle smuggler and trafficker networks.
4. Promoting safe, orderly and regular migration

Strengthening and increasing the legal possibilities for migrants to reach their countries of destinations safely is not only a moral duty but also a necessary precondition to dealing effectively with irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking, and in order to prevent people dying on long and dangerous routes.

6. Turning disorder into order

People's perception of order needs to lie at the very heart of any migration policy. The state needs to be in control and to be perceived as being in control. Being in control, however, does not mean closing borders, resorting to arbitrary detention, or arbitrarily expelling newcomers. It means developing and managing legal migration channels, efficient asylum policies and practices, but also border controls. It means having in place and being able to implement precise rules and smooth functioning procedures that are clear and transparent for all, migrants and law enforcers, in the full respect of the rule of law and of the rights of the migrants, and in a context of political accountability. It also means addressing all forms of exploitation of migrants by ruthless traffickers and smugglers as well as crooked employers, while entirely avoiding the criminalisation of migrants which has devastating effects, because it arouses fears of migrants and contributes to turning them into scapegoats.

7. Countering the exclusion with the inclusion

We must overcome the idea that newcomers and local population are all competing for limited resources, whether they are jobs, services, housing, benefits or wealth. In our view, both newcomers and local populations share the same interest in overcoming inequalities. To achieve this goal, policies and measures aimed at reducing inequalities for all and at increasing labour's share of profits need to be introduced.

8. Accommodating differences

Cohabitation between newcomers and locals is always challenging. Social standards differ, but the gradual change of

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In the outskirts of Ventimiglia, the Italian town on the border with France, an informal campsite has been established along the riverbed. Ventimiglia (Italy), 2017.
individual rules and standards is occurring all the time. With the exception of the practices that are utterly incompatible with the principles of liberal democracy, it is essential to assert that changes cannot and must not be unilateral. In fact, differences need to be accommodated to the needs and shared rules and values of a pluralistic polity. All activities that make room for different traditions must be supported by public authorities at all levels, making differences visible in the public sphere, thereby legitimising them and allowing people to become familiar with them, and by involving citizens in discussions and debates in appropriate public spaces.

9. **Fostering the communities’ resilience**

A matching system between the needs of newcomers and those of the municipalities and civil societies that receive them should be established, with the goal of balancing measures between the two and producing more equality and social justice for all. Any such system requires national and international support, aimed at fostering the communities’ resilience, which is a necessary precondition for the implementation of a successful integration strategy.

10. **Promoting an idea of identity that is inclusive**

The promotion of an idea of identity that is inclusive rather than exclusive (based on exclusive characteristics, such as ethnicity or religion) is a difficult process, but a highly worthwhile one. Such an inclusive identity would be religion- and colour-blind, made up by citizens who join a community of their own free will. The use of legislation to prohibit, prevent and condemn racism and xenophobia is a prerequisite for such a cultural transformation which is not a “corruption of cultural values” that is to be feared but an “enrichment” of a culture that needs and can be welcomed.

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In the dead of the night an old barge approaches the dock of Lampedusa. More than 300 men, women and children hold their breath in the wooden shell that they left Libya in. Each “human layer” is a different “tariff”: those who sit in the bottom of the boat – at risk from suffocation – pay the lower price. Lampedusa (Italy), 2015.

Watch also 3 statements for a progressive narrative on migration:

**Giuliano Amato,**
Former Italian Prime Minister and Chair, FEPS Global Migration Group
https://tinyurl.com/y7ll7htl

**Louise Arbour,**
UN Special Representative for International Migration
https://tinyurl.com/y9z5ud4c

**Josep Borrell,**
Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs
https://tinyurl.com/y9zrj8mk
Migration: there are alternatives!

by Catherine Woollard

The FEPS paper Prioritising people: A progressive narrative for migration, presented at the United for a different migration conference in New York in September, as well as the discussions and events around the presentation, demonstrate that there are alternatives to the negative and defeatist approach to migration that dominates the European political debate.

With multiple ideas under four main headings, ranging from protecting the rights of migration to promoting an inclusive identity, the FEPS work demonstrates that a more realistic and evidence-based migration policy is emerging. Just as importantly, this is an approach to migration which also responds to Europe’s needs.

Europe has struggled through a migration paradox in recent years. On the one hand, all European countries urgently need new populations: the real crisis they face is the demographic crisis, as populations age and the dependency ratio rises rapidly. This threatens economic development in Europe, but it also threatens the European social model. In some cases, the threat is existential – the future survival of the country is at stake – the world’s fastest shrinking countries are in Europe, as emigration and declining birth rates combine to create the perfect storm.

Yet politics has become dominated by anti-migration thinking, with policy-makers seeking to reduce or even prevent all migration and increasing reliance on fantasyland options of preventing all arrivals, deporting millions of people or increasing birth rates to replenish populations. For refugees, the consequences are dire: at a time of record levels of forced displacement and with wholly inadequate provision of safe channels to reach protection, such as resettlement directly from host countries, many of those arriving in Europe are in need of international protection. And many have no choice but to arrive irregularly. Thus, preventing all migration also prevents refugees from reaching safety.

It is refreshing to see alternatives being presented. Key amongst these alternatives are legal routes and regularisation as the paper emphasises. As well as safe routes to protection for refugees, safe and legal opportunities for other migrants are essential. The benefits include increasing routes to protection for refugees, safe and legal opportunities for other migrants are essential. The benefits include increasing the management of migration, such that people can be matched to job opportunities, as well as a reduction in black market labour. The presence of people in situations of irregularity and destitution creates public hostility more than the number of arrivals does itself; asylum systems are stretched to capacity if there are many people applying for asylum who are not entitled to protection. The answer is not to end asylum for all but rather to expand other opportunities.

As the paper notes, legal migration through provision of work and student visas, circular migration schemes, targeted recruitment and so on, also generates smoother cooperation with countries of origin and transit. If all that Europe has to offer a country is a small amount of development assistance, that tends not to be enough to persuade the government to cooperate with the EU’s agenda on migration. Most of the countries in question are not so dependent on European aid for it to be decisive, especially when it is a country in which the population and leaders consider migration to be a positive thing, both for themselves and in general.

There are also great risks attached to the current approach of buying support on migration control from repressive governments: they are unreliable partners and reinforcing corrupt and abusive institutions in such countries leads to more displacement. The alternative is to manage migration by accepting it and working on mutually beneficial approaches.

The paper also emphasises the importance of inclusive identities, inclusive nations and inclusive societies, rejecting the defeatist and inaccurate suggestion
that "integration has failed". There are countless positive examples of “integration”, however it is defined, and many examples of good practice in support to integration. It is simply a question of learning from the evidence and providing the necessary resources. There is a deeper truth here: the real threat to integration is the rhetoric that argues that it is impossible: this line is spun by those politicians nostalgic for a white, Christian Europe that has never existed. Creating inclusive societies through provision of rights is not easy – indeed, some would argue that it is a perpetual struggle because there are always forces ready to strip the rights of one group or another. Here the paper is re-committing to this struggle through supporting integration through rights and empowerment. It also reiterates the need to avoid criminalisation of migrants and of those working with them. In the absence of state action, civil society has stepped into the breach, mobilising across Europe to engage in support of the rights of all. We now face a backlash that must be resisted.

In its positive and realistic approach, the paper echoes the Global Compact on Migration, a pragmatic and yet rights-based vision for the governance of migration. Those who oppose the reality of migration are in denial about both its inevitability and its positive potential – pursuing what we term the “Ostrich approach” to migration, with their heads in the sand. Of course, all political parties need to respond to voters’ concerns but within representative democracy they also have a responsibility to present new ideas, to start debates on alternatives to the status quo, and to challenge myths and misrepresentations. There is no doubt that the centre-left has been discombobulated by the debate on migration, but recent elections show that it does not win votes through absorbing the positioning of the far right; this strategy has proven self-defeating, and will be again if pursued at the European Parliament elections of 2019. At the same time, providing “solutions” is not the answer either, because framing migration solely as a problem is to accept the assumption of the extremists. “Normalising” and managing migration, can be achieved through putting in place the alternative policies described in the paper – tried and tested in some cases, and innovative and different in others. Gradually building the political support and resources for these alternatives is the way forward.

Watch also 3 statements for a progressive narrative on migration:

Guy Goodwin-Gill, Emeritus Professor of Refugee Law, Oxford University
https://youtu.be/hPDOA2qDL4o

Hervé Le Bras, demographer, historian, emeritus researcher at the French INED and director of research at the French EHESS
https://youtu.be/dSREHxcyNUM

Ana Elisabetta Galeotti, Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Eastern Piedmont, Vercelli
https://youtu.be/qaLrPrXXThI

“The answer is not to end asylum for all but rather to expand other opportunities.”
Catherine Woollard
@ecre
The increasingly diverse population (of cultures, nationalities, languages, religions, etc.) in our cities is a direct consequence of globalisation and the human mobility it brings. States assume that this diversification must be managed, because without intervention it tends to generate ideological extremisms, political fragmentation, social division, daily xenophobia and racism. However, they have yet to find an effective and durable answer on how to govern diversity. After three decades of exploration, we are in a phase of frustration. The underlying problem is that the irreversibility of this process has not yet been taken seriously.

This debate began in the eighties of the last century, following parameters of social justice, equality, fundamental freedoms and human rights, but also of national-state protectionism. At this time, multiculturalism seemed the answer, focused on providing specific rights to those who are different, or a renovated version of national-civic assimilationism focused on minimum duties required to live together: a common language but also sharing symbols and historical national narratives. This is the basis for the proliferation of citizenship tests and integration contracts, which have generated so much debate, as these test would probably also be difficult to pass for some national citizens.

Today, these diversity-driven proposals face frustration when finding that in some cities, diversity has been territorially
Today we see how diversity remains a clear factor of socio-economic inequality and picture new processes of domination.

The first thing that must be achieved is that the population recognises diversity. Soon we will all be “others”? Without this prerequisite, people will hardly have the predisposition to enter into positive contact with others, but will always be negatively oriented by prejudices and stereotypes. Furthermore, this diversity-recognition can act as an antidote against any kind of fundamentalism that may want to impose its own world-view on others.

This management methodology rejects this subtle trend that whoever defines diversity never include themselves within it. The segregated reflecting socio-economic inequalities, while it has not even penetrated other neighbourhoods. We see how diversity remains a clear factor of socio-economic inequality and highlights new processes of domination.

The denunciation of discrimination related to diversity is our way of generating awareness. The “diversity gap” in public administrations, police, schools and political parties also remains a pending issue very similar to the process of incorporation of women in mainstream institutions.

We are likewise in a historical phase of consciousness in which any proposed policy must be intersectional, i.e. connecting identity criteria with socioeconomics, legal status, gender, and even educational levels. This phase of “superdiversity” (Vertovec) will become more multidimensional as new generations advance through mixed marriages. We are just entering a historical phase where having a single national identity in the family becomes the exception.

Given this new geography of diversity, the two former policy paradigms do not offer a convincing map. Everything is now very complex. One person may hold multiple categories of differentiation that can potentially be translated into inequality. We are in a post-ethnic and post-racial era.

These two approaches also do not manage to see that many of the problems arising from diverse societies are due to a lack of contact and mutual knowledge. This is the basis of the intercultural policy paradigm. The premise of this policy philosophy is to think of diversity not from state parameters that tend to interpret it in security and instability terms, as an alteration of a national tradition. Living together in diversity cannot be anything other than the product of learning and the result of socialisation that public authorities should be responsible for. We need to recognise that the former approaches have completely neglected the claims of national citizens, who are also in need of new parameters to live in diversity contexts.

#Culture #Democracy The “diversity gap” in public administrations, police, schools and political parties also remains a pending issue. @ricardzapata
conceptual barrier that the other policy paradigms continue to reproduce is slowly breaking (in historical time, everything seems very slow). One is framing diverse societies in minority and majority terms. There are still recognised scholars who speak about migrants as minorities! Another barrier is thinking about these dynamics in terms of opposition between unity (civic-national proposal) and diversity (the multicultural approach). To advance this process, interculturalism seeks to promote encounters in public spaces, micro-politics, face-to-face interactions in neighbourhoods. There is no other way than social engineering!

To approach diversity in dichotomous terms (pro/cons) contravenes the current historical course. Interculturalism is a new public mindset, a new public culture in a society of multiple-identities. This path of reflection is fully connected to my view that it is not “diversity of cultures” which we need to focus on, but on how to give content to a “culture of diversity”. This means that people need to learn to live within diverse settings, as this context is new for all (for newcomers, for those living here for a long time, new generations, citizens, etc.).

What young people learn from diverse public spaces is not always positive. There is much resentment and a feeling of being treated unequally. There is even a learning process to live with small-scale everyday racism, and even with the worrying trend to trivialize racist situations, with the fear of public spaces governed by violence, cultural harassment, and self-restriction to go to certain public spaces. At this micro-level there are many social relations that simply are unseen by a macro-scope, and that are important for confirming the feeling of belonging, cohesion and solidarity.

The two former policy paradigms have not managed to articulate convincing answers for these frequent micro-conflicts, most of them driven by pre-judgments, stereotypes, and false rumours, invading the people’s public space, influencing their attitudes towards immigrants, trust and social capital.

Interculturalism also has a transformative dimension. This will probably force us to reboot our parameters on how to live together. The xenophobic extremisms and the politics of fear are, as I see them, a final romantic reaction to resist the current historical path that will be of diversity.

Trying to seduce people with retrogressive narratives, which tend to essentialise a national identity that hardly exists outside historical imagination (what does Frenchness, Germaness, mean today?).

We need to rethink the main pillars of our societies with multiple national allegiances, with complex identities, and centre our efforts in promoting contact, these new realities can foster solidarity and cosmopolitan societies. It is the turn of interculturalism; we need to take this diversity management strategy seriously.

Diversity is a context we need to learn to live with. Another dimension of the intercultural approach is that it considers diversity as a resource. It is obvious that in a polyglot society with a high cultural capital, the society has a potential human capacity that can allow us to act globally in an interconnected global economy.

“It is obvious that in a polyglot society with a high cultural capital, there is a potential human capacity that can allow us to act globally in an interconnected global economy.”

AUTHOR

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To build public faith in democracy throughout Europe, Progressives must deliver policies of redistribution as well as recognition. Culture is key in this regard.

When they are asked about their vision for the future – both for their states as well as for the European Union – Progressives immediately mention decreased inequality. Yet building more just societies requires policies not only of redistribution but also of recognition, to use the terminology of the philosopher Nancy Fraser. That is, in order to build public faith in democracy throughout Europe and to continue to gather public support, Progressives must design policies and programmes that deliver both. Culture is key in this regard. Progressives should recognise its potential in three main ways.

A Progressive Language Around Culture

First, the Progressive opposition towards trickle-down economics is well known. However, this is often accompanied by a pervasive belief in forms of trickle-down culture, which must be overcome. In the same way as wealth doesn’t trickle down from tax cuts to the rich towards the poor, culture cannot be built top-down. The European Union is a good example of this.

“Participatory cultural projects create and activate relationships that are often directed towards engaged civic action in local matters.”

Despite numerous speeches by EU leaders about the importance of culture in building a shared sense of identity, both concerted policies and a serious commitment to investment in that direction remain absent.

The belief in trickle-down culture is also at play in the lack of a systematic Progressive response to culture wars, which are increasingly prominent in political debates. If Progressives want to win these conversations, they must take an active stance in them. Yet this is not to say that they must accept the assumptions that circulate around culture.

For example, culture and immigration are often – and wrongly – conflated in political discussions. UNESCO’s definition is clear: Culture is “the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and […] it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”. That is, culture is a crisscrossing of modes of living.
values, and practices; it is much more than the place from which an individual originates or their religious identification or lack thereof. Identity is fluid and this should be celebrated.

To do so, Progressives must change the focus of these debates away from the logic of a zero-sum conflict between static identities defined around preexisting differences, and toward the development of relations within a heterogeneous community that is connected by a set of shared goals. Doing so may not only contribute to healing political discourse but is also fundamental to recognise the value of all citizens and their diverse experiences.

**Progressive Cultural Policies**

Second, Progressives should support, develop and implement cultural policies that are grassroots-oriented. This requires acknowledging an ongoing paradigm shift in the cultural sector. Although there will always be artists who work individually in their studios, contemporary art practices are increasingly participatory if not collaborative, and cultural leaders increasingly discuss the best ways to ensure the democratisation of the sector's governance.

In other words, many artists and arts organisations are interested in developing work with and not just for audiences. This work has consequences in terms of community-building. Indeed, evidence shows that participatory projects create and activate relationships that are maintained for many years thereafter, often directed towards engaged civic action in local matters. Furthermore, as many post-industrial and rural communities feel abandoned by decision-makers, supporting participatory cultural programmes outside of urban centres would contribute to addressing this problem. But while the nativist right uses culture to legitimise nostalgic, belligerent, nationalist narratives, Progressives could harness its potential to celebrate the value of towns and people, and to strengthen and develop new ties within communities.

However, to make this happen on a large scale, professional practitioners need to be encouraged. Instead of high-cost investment projects, a progressive cultural policy would focus on supporting grassroots organisations, namely by providing thousands of small grants in each EU country and region. Such funding could be targeted to areas with few cultural activities, which would address territorial inequity.

Unfortunately, both small-scale funding for community projects and the idea of directly

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**UNESCO’s definition is clear: Culture is “the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs”**.
addressing inequities with cultural investment are rarely among the top concerns of cultural policy makers at national and at EU level.

*Culture in the Progressive Vision for the Twenty-First Century*

Third and finally, the era of popular support for managerial politics is over. Progressives must develop, propose and implement a bold, inclusive model of development that responds to the challenges not only of today but also of tomorrow. For example, instead of simply aiming to correct existing patterns of inequity, Progressives should aim to preempt the future reinforcement of such tendencies.

One iteration of this idea, focused on redistribution: even if experts disagree regarding the likely impact of robotisation on the number of jobs that will be available in the future, they tend to agree that routine occupations will decrease. At the same time, creativity will be increasingly important to ensure quality employment. Yet access to creative education is becoming a privilege of the wealthy. Rather, to preempt the reinforcement of existing inequalities of access to the labour market, Progressives should invest in the skills necessary for the jobs of the future.

Another example, this time on recognition: the centre-left has failed to develop a vision around cultural identity that acknowledges the value of being a member of a state (being British, French, Portuguese…) while also opposing the nationalism of populists and nativists on the one hand, as well as the globalised, de-situated identity of neoliberal on the other hand. The centre-left cannot build support for, say, an effective global governance of climate change (which requires understanding that international collaboration can be the best way to defend the national interest) without upholding an understanding of identity that is both internationalist and community-embedded.

Culture can help Progressive leaders respond to many of our current and future challenges. They should embrace it.

*Culture is a crisscrossing of modes of living, values, and practices; it is much more than the place from which an individual originates or their religious identification or lack thereof.*

> AUTHOR

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Culture remains a sensitive mechanism that responds quickly when a political or social change occurs, even before it becomes apparent to the wider public. Therefore some radical governments may feel the need to control culture in order to suppress its natural tendency of being a social negative/positive change barometer. The role of the Centre-Left is to introduce regulations and initiatives that can prevent this from happening.

For most of the 20th century Polish culture struggled with censorship, implemented by foreign powers (before 1918), gradually more radical Polish governments (in the 1920s and 1930s) and finally from 1945 until 1990, when censorship was executed by a centralised office with regional branches. The influence of the censorship was far greater than one can expect: it created the notion of self-censorship, which kills all dissent and stops the possibility of a change.

One can argue that today in Poland censorship and self-censorship are coming back and again, access to the public mass media becomes limited if an author, actor or director expresses his/her dissatisfaction with the government. Moreover, the “dissident” plays, movies and books are not funded by the state agencies, and large companies (owned or co-owned by the state) refuse to provide financial support for such initiatives. It needs to be noted that in Polish history, including the post-war period, culture played a significant and exceptional role in politics by shaping the general public’s opinion on various topics, influencing internal relations. Artists were becoming national heroes regarded as “the nation’s conscience”, and reading books and magazines published in the underground or smuggled from the West was part of being progressive intelligentsia. At the same time, the government treated official culture with respect (not only popular culture, but also original and niche artists), supporting initiatives on the local level, putting the idea of social advancement through culture and education into practice.

The phenomenon of the importance of culture can also be observed today, when, for example, the movie “The Clergy”, depicting the sins of Polish priests had been seen by...
2,5 million people in the first 10 days since its release, making it the biggest opening in the history of Polish cinema.

All the facts mentioned above need to be taken into account by the Centre-Left, and a future Centre-Left government, when creating cultural policy in Poland. This policy should confront all practices leading to censorship, even the most subtle ones suppressing diversity, creating imbalance and social exclusion, by strengthening not only a transparent decision-making process in cultural institutions but also by including the different artistic societies in those institutions. Therefore the way of appointing managers in the cultural institutions (such as theatres and museums) need to be revised and a stronger mandate should be given to the employees and the unions.

But culture starts at home. By this I mean that more attention should be paid to local cultural initiatives which support not only personal development but more importantly, can serve as a means of preventing social exclusion. Such well-designed initiatives, with help from local activists, support emancipation and integration. In every district, artists, especially at the beginning of their professional life, should be granted a stipend or/and a free-of-charge space to pursue their career. This simple step of making previously unused spaces available for local initiatives would stimulate creativity and inclusion. Local governments can also become patrons of cultural actions aimed at children and adolescents from disadvantaged backgrounds by funding NGOs involved in such activities. Ideally, this can become a program developed on the national level, however it needs to be designed in a way that guarantees diversity and an unbiased approach regardless of the change in the government. The progressive ideas of inclusion and diversity should be embedded in the structure of such a program.

Libraries, with substantial annual guaranteed funding, in every school and district open 24 hours, with some organisational help, can become vibrant centres of local activism. However idealistic as it sounds, libraries open 24/7 will symbolically balance off-licences that never close in every small town. Introducing such an idea by the progressive political movement would be a strong standpoint.

In order to become an agent of progressive social change, culture in Poland needs to receive stable financial support on the local level.

Finally, accessibility. Although this topic has been mentioned by many Polish politicians, no government up to this day in Poland has managed to fulfill promises in this important sphere. All programs on national TV should have subtitles or translation into Polish Sign Language and, when appropriate and possible, a visual description for the blind and visually impaired. This should at least apply to all news, programs for children, live coverage of important events, and TV shows produced by public television. Disability cannot prevent any Polish citizen from participating both in culture and politics.

In order to become an agent of progressive social change, culture in Poland needs to receive stable financial support on the local level, however the decision of who and what activity receives this support should both be transparent and guarantee diversity and promote the idea of a multicultural and multilingual society. The Centre-Left progressive cultural policy is of great significance today when, as some experts point out, Poland has been in a metaphorical sense divided into two parts with Poles watching TV channels presenting a vastly opposite interpretation of reality, participating in different cultural events commemorating historical dates with a current political agenda. When creating Centre-Left cultural policy, the current situation needs to be evaluated and analysed critically - only then would this policy be able to serve Poland’s progress and unity in a united Europe.

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NORMALISATION OF THE ECB’S MONETARY POLICY IS TIMELY

by Peter Bofinger

The European Central Bank (ECB) is due to end its Quantitative Easing (QE) programme at the end of the year. The step has been announced for a long time; it should not lead to instability. If major problems emerge, however, the ECB could follow the Bank of Japan’s yield curve control model, which has been effective since September 2016.

If everything goes according to plan, the European Central Bank (ECB) will end its “extended asset purchase programme” at the end of the year. This marks the end of a three-year phase in which public sector and private bonds totaling €2 trillion euros were bought. The high level of these unconventional measures naturally raises the question of the implications of the announced exit for the financial system and the real economy of the euro area.

Based on the mandate of the ECB, which is to ensure price stability in the euro area, the current forecasts speak for a normalisation of monetary policy. For the years 2019 and 2020 and beyond, it is widely expected that the inflation rate in the ECB’s target area will be close to its target of “below, but close to 2%”. At the same time, the euro area has been able to return to a stable course of growth following the recession in 2012 and 2013. In this sense, there is no longer an obvious need for exceptional monetary policy measures.

Nevertheless, the transition to a “normal” monetary policy is not without its risks, in particular for the development of long-term interest rates of the euro area Member States. In principle, one should expect the transition to be comparatively smooth. Since the ECB has long announced this step and the financial markets are determined by forward-looking expectations, it should already be priced into the bond prices.

The direct impact of Quantitative Easing on bond yields is not obvious

Looking at the development in the United States, even a further decline in bond yields is not unlikely as can be seen after the end of the bond purchases (Chart 1). This shows the fundamental problem that one cannot identify systematic contemporaneous relationships between the volume of bond purchases by central banks and bond yields. For example, the bond curve for German government bonds has even taken a steeper course since June 2016, even though the ECB has continued to buy up a large amount of bonds (Chart 2). Obviously, the direct effect of bond purchases on prices and thus returns is largely offset or even overcompensated by indirect expectation effects.

In this sense, it is very difficult to predict the effect of discontinuing bond purchases. However, given the importance of long-term interest rates in the stability of the banking system and, in particular, the real estate markets of the euro area, the ECB should not abandon its influence on capital markets completely at the end of their Quantitative Easing.

The experience of the Bank of Japan

In the case of erratic market developments, the ECB could consider copying the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy strategy. In September 2016, the Bank Of Japan (BOJ) announced its “yield curve control” by which it means simultaneously controlling
short and long-term interest rates. It implies a symmetric range around zero for 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB) yields which initially was +/- 0.1% and has recently been widened to +/- 0.2%.

This strategy would give the ECB the option – at least for the period that immediately follows the end of the bond purchases – of announcing a stabilisation of long-term interest rates. In its effects on bond yields it would be fundamentally different from QE as it does not longer directly target quantities of bonds but bond prices.

In the specific institutional framework of the European Monetary Union, the focus of this strategy should not be on interest rates for national government bonds, as the ECB would then risk being accused of monetary financing of Member States which is explicitly prohibited by the Maastricht Treaty. Instead, the ECB should consider targeting the average interest rate of long-term government bonds issued by Member States weighted according to the ECB's capital key. This would have the advantage that the ECB would not have to intervene in portfolio reallocations between the bonds of Member States that leave the average unchanged. In addition, market participants would still bear a substantial risk regarding the development of individual bond yields. "Market discipline", i.e. risk spreads between bond yields of Member States, which many economists, especially in Germany, regard as an essential feature of a Monetary Union, would still remain effective.

A first analysis of the BoJ's yield curve control by Clarida et al (2018) comes to a rather positive assessment: “Since its inception in September 2016, YCC has allowed the BOJ to control the yield curve more effectively”. The amount of JGBs the BOJ had to purchase has decreased, and fixed-rate purchase operations have been utilised successfully to stabilise the yield curve. This is partially due to the credibility of the BOJ and its communication strategy, as it was perceived by market participants.

All in all, now is the time to move to a "normal" monetary policy. The end of bond purchases by the ECB corresponds to the stabilisation of the euro area economy and the medium-term prospects for price developments, which correspond to the monetary policy mandate of the Treaty.
Since 2015, the macroeconomy of the eurozone has been influenced by the implementation of Quantitative Easing by the European Central Bank. In December 2018, the ECB’s QE is coming to an end, but concerns remain about eurozone recovery from the crisis and the increasing divergence among eurozone countries. Who is going to replace the ECB and take the lead for sustainable and full-employment recovery in the eurozone?

The ECB’s unconventional monetary policy has been an extremely useful “painkiller” to cope with the symptoms of the eurozone disease. However, the dosage of such a monetary painkiller will soon be reduced. More importantly, ECB’s QE might not have eradicated the true causes of the eurozone malaise, but actually exacerbated them. Recent data shows that the considerable monetary mass injected by the Euro-system into peripheral economies eventually flowed towards the core of the system, making eurozone core-periphery divergence perhaps even more acute rather than less pronounced.

The eurozone is affected by the intrinsic problems affecting all processes of economic and financial integration between countries at different levels of development. In normal times, abundant capitals flow from the core of the system (say Germany and France) towards the periphery (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy), feed a booming growth and core-periphery convergence, but also widen imbalances. Peripheral countries usually get increasingly indebted towards core economies. Everything looks fine insofar as a virulent shock does not take place, such as the 2007-2008 financial crisis. When this happens, capitals suddenly change direction and try to go back home. Problems start due to the spread of fear about bankruptcy of the whole financial sector and of the ensuing economic collapse.

These problems did not manifest themselves so violently in fully-fledged political unions such as the US, the UK or Canada. In these countries, central governments (as properly backed by their own central banks) intervened with expansionary fiscal stimuli for much longer periods than eurozone countries on top of sizable rescue packages for their own financial systems. At the same time, public bonds became the safe assets par excellence demanded by frightened financial operators. In doing this, central governments implicitly adopted a redistributive stance between different regions as differently affected by the same crisis. The politically incomplete European Monetary Union however rediscovered itself as extremely fragile. In the eurozone, a “federal” fiscal authority that can implement a...
centralised expansionary fiscal policy in times of system-wide recessions is still missing. As is a European banking union. Indeed, eurozone financial systems are still largely fragmented in times of financial distress because they do not share common regulatory rules, a common supervisory body, or even a common insurance against bank runs.

What European policy-makers should do next is an act of consciousness. First, a common monetary policy is not the best option against deepening regional differences in the system. The ECB’s monetary policy is not even expected to deal with them. Second, a well-functioning eurozone can persist only if these differences are significantly softened. This goal can be achieved only via structural policies targeting the productive development of peripheral eurozone countries. This implies that EU industrial policies in support of the periphery’s productive investments must be financed through resources collected at the centre of the system. Hence, it is of paramount importance to create a EU fiscal authority with its own funds, perhaps provided by the imposition of a common European corporate tax. All these actions obviously entail the redistribution of resources from more developed to less developed regions. But this is precisely what any (sustainable) political entity in the world does. This is what the EU should aim to do too, if it really aspires to eventually becoming a political union.

The European Central Bank (ECB) started buying assets from commercial banks in March 2015 in order to support economic growth across the euro area and to help to return inflation levels to below (but close to) 2%.

This is how it works: The European Central Bank buys bonds from banks. This increases the price of these bonds and creates money in the banking system. Therefore, a wide range of interest rates fall, and loans become cheaper. Businesses and people can borrow more and spend less to repay their debts. As a result, consumption and investment are expected to receive a boost.

In June 2018, due to a rosier economic outlook for the Eurozone, the ECB announced the end of the QE program by the end of the year. The announcement was reiterated in October despite growth slowing again.

Research conducted by FEPS and the Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre, however, shows that much of the liquidity has not reached the real economy; rather it has ended up in the reserves of banking and financial institutions. The analysis highlights how QE and the monetary expansion was partly able to serve the economy of the Eurozone’s core countries, whilst it has not been a successful measure to support the relaunch of peripheral economies.

QUANTITATIVE EASING OR QE

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centralised expansionary fiscal policy in times of system-wide recessions is still missing. As is a European banking union. Indeed, eurozone financial systems are still largely fragmented in times of financial distress because they do not share common regulatory rules, a common supervisory body, or even a common insurance against bank runs.

What European policy-makers should do next is an act of consciousness. First, a common monetary policy is not the best option against deepening regional differences in the system. The ECB’s monetary policy is not even expected to deal with them. Second, a well-functioning eurozone can persist only if these differences are significantly softened. This goal can be achieved only via structural policies targeting the productive development of peripheral eurozone countries. This implies that EU industrial policies in support of the periphery’s productive investments must be financed through resources collected at the centre of the system. Hence, it is of paramount importance to create a EU fiscal authority with its own funds, perhaps provided by the imposition of a common European corporate tax. All these actions obviously entail the redistribution of resources from more developed to less developed regions. But this is precisely what any (sustainable) political entity in the world does. This is what the EU should aim to do too, if it really aspires to eventually becoming a political union.

The ECB’s Quantitative Easing been an extremely useful “painkiller” to cope with the symptoms of the eurozone disease but has not eradicated the true causes of eurozone malaise

#Eurozone - what comes after ECB’s #QE? Alberto Botta @UniofGreenwich

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Alberto Botta is Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Greenwich and a member of the Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre. He is also a member of the scientific committee of the Master program in Cooperation and Development of the University of Pavia in Italy. His research focuses on macroeconomic dynamics in the euro area as well as financial stability and economic development in developing countries.
Millennials live with a sense of uncertainty about their future, certainly when compared to the baby boomer generation. The concept of ‘intergenerational fairness’ is still not fully worked out - but Progressives can’t afford not tackle the issue. It’s about social justice. And it’s about their future voters.

Millennials, those born between 1980-2000, have come of age in the new millennium. Their views and expectations towards the future have been shaped by unique life experiences.

Millennials, for instance, have lived through the 2008 economic crises, and their difficult transition to the job market, financial strains and delayed adulthood have contributed to a sense of uncertainty about their future prospects, when compared to previous generations such as the so-perceived early-retiring, asset-rich baby-boomers (adults born between 1946-1964, the post-WWII generation).

Against this backdrop, the past years have seen an upsurge in interest on the concept of ‘intergenerational fairness’ by media and thinks-tanks, centred on the concern that today’s young people cannot hope to achieve the same prosperity as older generations.

In the days following the Brexit referendum, for example, headlines read ‘Baby-boomers stole our future!’ and several reports suggested a

#Millennials - age-cohort is a critical new political cleavage that policy makers should address and that #Progressives should tap into @M_TellesFreitas
significant generational divide in the British electorate. According to a survey by YouGov, while 64% of voters aged 65 and over voted to leave the EU, only 29% of those aged between 18-24 voted to withdraw from the Union. Diversely, as Nouvellet has shown, the larger the proportion of the youngest age-cohorts (18-29) in UK voting areas, the fewer Leave votes were cast, suggesting that younger voters were more likely to vote Remain.

Such discourse and examples that present the conflict of interests of different generations are making age-cohort a critical new political cleavage that policy makers should address and that progressives should tap into.

Progressives should seek to turn ‘intergenerational fairness’ into progressive politics also because this headline is still a politically ambiguous concept. For it to be turned into progressive purposes, the concept should be replaced with a distinct political vision of what a fairer settlement between generations would look like.

To this end, the recommendations, based on a research project of FEPS and the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute are three-fold:

**Progressives, lead the conversation!**

As stated, the concept of intergenerational conflict and its political direction is still up for grabs. Progressives must be clear in their articulation: intergenerational fairness does not mean cutting pensions and opposing baby-boomers and millennials in a race to the bottom.

**Progressives, confront the tough choices!**

Don’t entertain the rhetoric of a war between generations but rather speak about intergenerational justice and how citizens would see a fair balance of interests between both old and new.

**Progressives, connect the dots!**

Intergenerational inequality is linked with other kinds of inequality. Evidence shows that the sense of disadvantage is strongest when millennials are most exposed to liberalised economic systems and highly flexible labour markets. For intergenerationally-redistributive policy to be defensible, it needs to target wealth within age cohorts, otherwise it could become a regressive policy if it penalises an interest group such as baby-boomers as a single category - not all seniors are equally well off!

 Maria Freitas has been working for FEPS since April 2015. She is a policy advisor working on research areas including democracy, extremism and new political movements.
Spain is one of the EU countries where millennials are least optimistic about their future - and a large part of society shares this believe. A generation with more civil rights and freedoms has entered the labour market - but their life prospects are on the decline.

Most Spaniards are pessimistic about the future of millennials (people between 18 and 37 years old) and six out of 10 millennials themselves believe that their lives will be worse than those of their parents, an opinion that is even more widespread among the most vulnerable. This is what the results of a 40dB survey (formerly MyWord) tells us from a representative sample of 2,200 citizens between 16 and 75 about the life perspectives of young people, in research promoted by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), the LaCaixa Foundation and the Felipe González Foundation, within the GENERA project.

Social beliefs are neither random nor whimsical but respond to specific realities that should not be ignored. According to a study by the Resolution Foundation (2018), which compares the living conditions of different generations between 1969 and 2014, Southern European countries are the least favourable for millennials, because in these countries, young people are economically regressing – their living conditions are worse than those of people their age 30 years ago – while the other generations are more
comparable with the past. Elsewhere, young people have not retreated but stagnated, while older generations have fared better (the United Kingdom, Finland and Denmark); finally, there are countries in which neither the elderly nor the young have progressed (Germany and the United States).

Spanish millennials are a generation with more civil rights and freedom but worse prospects in terms of their social position.

Why does Spanish society believe that young people’s lives will be worse than their parents? In which areas is the reverse perceived? Are there no improvements? Despite recognising that scientific and technological progress, social tolerance, greater availability of information and gender equality improve the lives of young people, the difficulties deriving from their material conditions make it worse. In particular, citizens point to the poor quality of employment, job insecurity, and difficulties when renting or buying a home. We are facing a generation with more civil rights and freedom but worse prospects in terms of their social position. Again, social perception responds to reality itself: in the crisis years, between 2008 and 2014, people between 18 and 25 years suffered a salary decrease of 34% and those between 26 and 35 a decrease of 15%. However, among those over 65, income increased, on average, in those same years.

Who do Spaniards blame for the poor life prospects of young people? Do they reproach politicians, the economy or society itself? In citizens’ opinions, it is the policies adopted by both national governments and themselves are seen as being principally responsible. The fault is not with society.

How can the future of young people be ensured? What can be done? From a set of 15 public policies, among which the interviewees had to choose three, improvements in the quality of employment and the creation of new jobs attracted the vast majority of responses. It is striking that policies to promote renting or purchasing a house, which is one of the main problems for young people, are placed last in the list of priorities; behind even the fight against climate change or support for policies to increase the birth rate. Citizens – young and old – believe that the future of millennials depends to a greater extent on stable and well-paid work than on an accessible place to live.

Aware of the poor prospects for the new generations, Spanish society believes that the retired benefit more from government policies than young people. It is not clear, however, that society demands a radical change in political priorities: four out of 10 people do not know if the government should devote more public resources to the elderly or young people. Of course, among those who are clear about it, more favour the millennials. In short, there is more social consensus in the diagnosis – the poor prospects of young people – than in the solutions.

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The term "social housing" means different things in different contexts. Some housing researchers avoid the term, thinking that it entails a negative valuation of the form of housing and its residents ('welfare housing'). Here, when speaking about "social housing" several criteria apply: housing that is allocated and priced not only by demand and supply, but by administratively established rules that favour applicants in pressing housing needs and modest means, and aiming to provide housing on a lower price level than in the market.

Thus, social housing is non-profit housing that is affordable to households that are not particularly wealthy or high-income. Sometimes this is targeted housing where rules of allocation exclude more well-off households, sometimes these households are just placed at the bottom of the waiting list. In the majority of cases social housing is public rental housing but 'social home-ownership' is also possible. For example, in Finland there used to be – but no longer – a sector social owner-occupation where access to housing was means-tested, prices were administratively determined and transactions controlled.

The size of the social rental housing sector varies quite a lot: in the Netherlands it’s 30 percent of all housing whereas in Germany it’s only 3 percent. Social housing used to be one of the main instruments for governments to tackle housing problems in Europe in the post-World War II period. During the last decades many countries have experienced a government retrenchment from housing policy, involving cuts in government spending on housing, deregulation of housing markets and a general support for market provision of housing. Social housing has become considered to be somewhat of an old fashioned policy instrument. But should we really remove social housing from the housing policy toolbox?
Whatever form social housing takes, it always represents a national or local government intervention to housing provision with the goal of making sure that good quality housing is available to the less well-off. The government’s usual means for this are subsidised housing finance and regulation (price, quality, allocation etc.). During the post-WWII decades up to the 1980s, social housing was one of the central instruments in tackling the post-war shortages of dwellings and citizens’ rising demands for decent housing. This policy was bound with the expanding state intervention in welfare provision. This trend has taken a complete turn with the rise of neo-liberal ideologies and policies.

With this turning of the tide European housing policies have also been heading towards retrenchment. Governments are withdrawing from large scale intervention in the workings of the housing markets, financial support for production and consumption of housing is cut to very little or nothing, housing markets are deregulated. Housing policy retrenchment also has repercussions on social housing policies. Investment in the production of social housing has been falling in many countries and the existing stock has been diminishing due to tenure conversions (e.g. the UK’s Right-to-Buy policy) or deregulation (e.g. Finland). EU competition regulations have compelled the large social housing sector in the Netherlands to more targeted allocation and in Sweden to adopting “businesslike” principles.

In the present ideological climate social housing seems an old-fashioned policy – criticised by neoliberals for distorting the housing market and creating a “housing class” of subsidised tenants. Sure enough, social housing is not without problems. The smaller the sector, the more targeted the allocation of housing must be. With the concentration of poor people, social housing can become stigmatised “welfare housing”. If such housing is concentrated to the same neighbourhoods, these can become concentrations of disadvantage and social problems. Moreover, in many places much of the older social housing was mass-produced, architecturally monotonous and of not very high quality.

Should we then scrap social housing from the housing policy toolbox? The Global Financial Crisis halted the nearly universal growth of home-ownership in Europe. With the recovery of European economies the need for new rental housing has increased. Some countries have experienced a resurrection of private renting that was previously in decline. However, only in neoliberal economists’ dreams (an unregulated) private rental market can be the solution for providing affordable rental housing. We need that solution but we also need to reinvent social housing in a way that avoids the problems of segregation and stigmatisation.

Sometimes social housing is targeted and rules of allocation exclude more well-off households, sometimes these households are just placed at the bottom of the waiting list.

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Hannu Ruonavaara is a Doctor of Political Social Sciences, Professor of Sociology and Head of the Department of Social Research at the University of Turku in Finland.
Progressive Post: Do you think housing could become a campaign theme in the upcoming European elections?

Cédric Van Styvendael: I really hope so - despite it not being a European competence - as it is a major concern for citizens and a contributing factor to the aggravation of poverty in European countries.

PP: What do you mean by that?

CVS: One statistic sums up the situation well: one in ten European citizens spends more than 40% of their income on accommodation. We consider this to be over-indebtedness. In other words, the lack of affordable housing is a “weapon of mass destruction” against social cohesion. If government policies do not get the price of affordable housing under control, the situation could get dire.

PP: Why doesn’t this subject make the headlines?

CVS: It is not on the political agenda of numerous governments because it is not a subject that would provide major electoral gains. They also consider it to be an expense and, therefore, prefer to try and save money by transferring it to private companies and local authorities.

PP: Are the cities reacting positively, like with immigration or climate policies?

CVS: Cities quickly understood the importance of offering affordable housing to attract businesses and house workers on their territory. They, therefore, develop proactive policies which make access to housing a criteria of competitiveness.

PP: Does that explain why prices continue to rise?

CVS: We let the market have too much influence. We, however, consider housing to be a universal, common asset, not a consumer good. It has too much of an impact on our fellow citizens’ lives for us to leave it solely in the hands of the market. We do not resent or oppose the market: it plays its part and must continue, but it has never shown itself to be reasonable enough to be responsible for housing. The 2008 sub-prime crisis is telling proof of this. Ten years later, we’re once again in the middle of a housing bubble: eleven European countries are on high alert, with a 6% rise in housing prices. Collectively, we’re not taking this seriously enough, hence why we at Housing Europe are so worried.

PP: What do you propose?

CVS: Member States must put regulatory policies in place on, for example, rental
prices. Certain countries have tried it, which drew strong resistance from lobbies. They protest in the name of property rights and the right to set prices, etc., but when the market has got out of hand to the point where a 25 year old can’t leave home because he or she can’t afford to spend €1000 per month for a studio, then our society must provide him or her with answers.

**PP: How can a limit on rents be put in place?**

**CVS:** Germany used legislation, with lawmakers declaring that rent could not be higher than a certain market percentage. France has brought in the Alur law and founded a Rental Observatory, but there is still work to be done.

**PP: Is that the only way?**

**CVS:** The second way to regulate rents is through land and public development projects, but this assumes that communities take on debt and tie up funds, which isn’t good for their financial health. The European Union is suggesting solutions to this problem, but Member States have not yet organised themselves correctly.

**PP: What is the proportion of social housing in Europe?**

**CVS:** 10%.

**PP: Is the construction of social housing fully integrated in the next European budget?**

**CVS:** Not enough. We are concerned about the way in which the European Commission is restricting access to this kind of housing to only the most vulnerable: refugees, people living in extreme uncertainty, etc. For us at Housing Europe, the question of affordable housing should cover a larger portion of the population, and should receive support from the EU via the banking sector.

**PP: Should these expenses be classed in another category?**

**CVS:** In my view, yes, but when we question the European Commission on the matter, the answer is clear: under no circumstances will they change the current system. We’re not talking about taking all the investment outside of the criteria, just staying coherent. The EU cannot tell Member States during the European semester that they are spending too much on housing and then argue for the development of affordable housing for all as a duty when it comes to social cohesion. That kind of schizophrenia towards Member States is untenable.
There has been an increasingly marked retrenchment in housing policy within the EU. The return to growth has gone hand in hand with a rise in the cost of housing: plus 3.8% within the euro area between the second quarter of 2016 and the second quarter of 2017. Main points: large cities are most affected and the amount of affordable housing varies between countries. Various initiatives have been set up in the area of housing for low-income families, migrants and those with health problems. From the democratic Locative in Denmark to self-managed housing in the Netherlands, or the absence of social housing in Greece, here is a cross-section of current projects in Europe.

**SPAIN**

- **Borsa de Lloguer & Hàbitat 3**
  - To expand the concept of housing as a citizens’ right that brings with it a public duty to provide affordable public and private housing.
  - Freeing up vacant private housing as affordable rental housing. This aims to increase the number of affordable housing units on the market, reduce tensions caused by rising costs and provide affordable housing for large numbers of households. The emphasis is on renovating empty buildings to improve the built environment.

**NETHERLANDS**

- **Startblok Riekerhaven**
  - To create a “self-management” structure that brings all residents together in a common cause: taking care of their own lives.
  - Offer of apartments built on former sports grounds to refugees who have recently gained residence permits and to young Dutch people. There are 565 housing units made up of 463 studios and 102 shared rooms.

**FRANCE**

- **Paris Habitat, the largest provider of social housing in France**
  - To increase the density of current housing and reduce average annual energy consumption from 260 kWh/m² to under 80 kWh/m².
  - Refurbishment of a group of five tower blocks of 4 and 5 storeys built in 1965 containing 750 social housing units, adding a further two storeys to the 4 story blocks. 72 new units were built of wood to avoid overloading the original concrete structure.

**ITALY**

- **The ‘Vivi Voltri’ project of the DAR CASA**
  - To create affordable housing for low and middle income citizens in Milan and surrounding areas.
  - Construction of 113 apartments + 2 communal spaces that bring together tenants with a range of income levels and family types and 19 different nationalities: 46% of the inhabitants are Italian and the rest of the tenants come from 18 different countries.
### United Kingdom
- **Curo**, supported accommodation for people with health problems.
- To create housing with support services to enable people with needs (older people, the homeless, ex-service people, lone women, people with health problems etc.) to live a healthy and fulfilling life in their homes and their communities.
- Construction of houses and provision of services, with 13,000 dwellings in South West England housing 25,000 people.

### Denmark
- **Dansk Almennyttigt Boligselskab, DAB**, a unique feature of the not-for-profit Danish housing system.
- To encourage “tenant democracy” by increasing tenants’ autonomy, expanding the housing provided and engaging in regular dialogue with inhabitants. In other words, the families themselves are responsible for building and managing the housing.
- The creation of over 45 organisations, in particular in West Jutland, Zealand and Lolland-Falster. The DAB has helped to build around 50,000 houses, as well as some properties for commercial and institutional use. The DAB now manages around 48,000 homes.

### Germany
- **GEWOBA**, the biggest housing corporation in Bremen.
- To provide affordable housing in response to growing demand and a national housing shortage.
- Construction of housing projects using prefabricated units in the areas of Gartenstadt Süd and Neustadt, where there are four multi-storey residential blocks surrounded by wide green spaces.

### Greece
- No social housing programmes apart from those of private companies. Before the Greek crisis, there was a very healthy supply of properties and a strong construction sector with no specific state intervention. However, we should note the expanding role of private aid: POLIS, Kypseli Public Market, Curing the Limbo etc., both in housing renovation and in housing aid for refugees.

### Poland
- Affordable housing in Poznań.
- To achieve an environmental and social impact while increasing the capacity to respond to housing needs.
- Construction of around 1300 affordable housing units and associated infrastructure in the town of Poznań.

### Latvia
- City architect’s office, Riga.
- Completion of the process of privatising housing, facilitation of energy efficiency and promotion of rented housing in towns.
- Renovation of multi-purpose buildings or, in the case of Riga, post-war housing.

### Luxembourg
- Social renting agencies (SRA).
- To rent houses for projects of social inclusion through housing.
- Search for suitable housing and allocation, according to household composition, to those on low incomes.
In July 2018, Estonia became the first free public transport nation, where 11 out of 15 counties offer free bus services for everybody. The decision on the national level was based on the positive experience in the capital Tallinn, which made all municipal modes of public transport free for its residents almost six years ago, in 2013.

However radical abolishing all fees on public transport may look, from a fiscal perspective we are only speaking about increasing the subsidy level from approximately 80% to 100% in rural bus traffic, and from 75% to 95% in Tallinn’s municipal public transport. In fact, our public transport was subsidised well above half of the cost already before becoming ‘free’. This is the case in most public transport networks in continental Europe. And surely so if we include not only the direct running costs in the calculation but also investment into public transport fleets and infrastructure.

The success of the idea in the capital Tallinn was astounding: before the implementation, there were claims that free transport would discriminate against those who never use public transport and the quality of the services would suffer because of capacity shortages, an increase in vandalism, joy-rides by young people and the homeless. Once free transport was implemented, these claims were forgotten: public transport is now recognised as a free public service comparable in a way to street lighting. From 2013 onwards, satisfaction indexes with public transport quality improved in every measured category (punctuality, cleanliness, safety, etc). Current opinion polls on satisfaction with public services indicate 90% support in Tallinn for free public transport.

The economic model in Tallinn is based on stimulating the people living in Tallinn, but who have their fiscal residence elsewhere,
to register their official residence in the capital, thus relocating their personal income tax into the budget of the city. Tallinn’s official number of residents increased from 2012 from 416,000 to currently 453,000 people. By conservative estimates, the city gains 30 million euros more every year from formally new residents’ income tax. The annual loss of revenue from selling tickets for public transport was 12 million euros.

Tallinn did not invent the idea of free public transport, but we learned extensively from the many examples that already existed globally. However, once the idea was implemented, Tallinn indeed became the biggest city and the first national capital among approximately 100 free public transport cities worldwide. The experience of Tallinn encouraged and inspired others to follow and Tallinn has been active in the international networking of free public transport cities, researchers and citizens movements.

In the global debate, the claim is often made that for improving the use of public transport everything else matters except the price of the ticket. However, a special Eurobarometer poll asked which measures could improve traveling within cities in 2014. “Lower price for public transport” was the most chosen answer – by 59% of Europeans. “Better public transport” only came second with 56%. It appeared that affordability was the most important issue in the wealthier Member States: in Sweden this was the case for 79% of the respondent (Denmark 75%, Netherlands 73%, Germany for 73%).

Free public transport objectives combine simultaneously social, economic and environmental aspects. In bigger cities, the environment might be the highest priority; however, offering free public transport addresses the problems of the working poor universally. Increasing pressure on the environment and the widening gap between the wealthy and the poor will press policymakers globally to consider free public transport not only in urban areas but also in the sparsely populated countryside. Estonia and its capital Tallinn serve as a global lighthouse to those interested in the implementation of free public transport.

#Tallinn The biggest city and first national capital among approximately 100 free public transport cities worldwide.

Allan Alakiila @EUOffice

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Free public transport is possible in all European cities

Interview with Maxime Huré by Alain Bloëdt

Against the backdrop of the fight against climate change, ambitious new mobility and transport policies have begun to appear. Although the environment is not the only cause, making public transport free is one of them.

Progressive Post: Free public transport has existed for a while now, is it the environmental argument that has stoked the debate?

Maxime Huré: Yes and no. Cities are making public transport free for various reasons, and the environmental argument is the primary concern for some of them, notably in Germany, where cities have launched a joint study with the federal government on the subject. But elsewhere, it’s primarily for economic or social reasons. This makes it a global policy, not just a mobility policy.

PP: In your opinion, will free public transport become more widespread in the near future?

MH: That really depends on which areas we are talking about, as the issues are very different from one place to another. We already have Tallin in Estonia and I think that other large and medium-sized cities are going to take the plunge: Bonn in Germany has just launched a study and Clermont-Ferrand in France has also carried out research. The debate in Paris has also had an incredible effect. This might not necessarily lead to public transport being totally free, but having the debate opens up the possibility of public transport being at least partially free, for certain bus lines or certain members of the public, like the young.

PP: Do you think the EU could, and should, join the debate?

MH: Yes, I believe Europe has three potential roles to play. Firstly, it should assist innovation, by considering free public transport to be an important 21st century innovation and helping with the funding of certain trials. Secondly, by contributing expertise, research and evaluation, it can stop this ideological debate and provide tangible results that show the effects of making public transport free in all European cities.

#FreeTransport #Mobility
Europe could partner with cities hoping to make public transport free, to help them evaluate the effects
@Maxime Huré
free. Finally, the European Union needs to coordinate and connect the different territories, to show that some have already succeeded, while demonstrating how, why and with what effects.

**PP:** Speaking of Paris, the President of the Île-de-France Region, Valérie Pécresse opposed mayor Anne Hidalgo for economic reasons. Is she right?

**MH:** For the time being, we find ourselves in an ideological debate between those who consider public services to be part of a market economy, and those who see public transport as a common asset and believe that mobility could fulfil certain ‘right to transport’ objectives and should, therefore, be free of the market economy.

**PP:** Why fully subsidise users who can pay, when social pricing systems already exist?

**MH:** These kinds of pricing systems were put in place in the 1990s. So, making public transport free will clash with these policies. In some cities, they came to the conclusion that making transport free was more fair as, in practice, 40% of people who could benefit from it never request it for various reasons: it’s administratively complicated, lack of communication, etc. The first obstacle is, therefore, social, but there is another: social pricing systems are costly for operators. They have to hire personnel, put procedures in place and provide dedicated information for the public. All this means that making public transport free is an even more socially oriented measure than the original social pricing systems.

**PP:** Is free public transport sustainable for a city or a country?

**MH:** In my view, free public transport is possible in all European cities. Of course it will need time, as it requires adapting the transport network in preparation for a spike in use. A large budget is necessary to be able to do without the usual revenue and invest in the network.

**PP:** Does free public transport interest motorists? In Europe we know that the automotive lobby is very powerful and capable of changing or slowing down environmental decisions.

**MH:** Part of the answer to that question lies in analysing the different territories. Dunkerque - which recently made public transport free - is an example of somewhere that relies heavily on cars: 67% of journeys are done by car. We can already see that there is a shift from the car to the bus, but it could be different in other towns and cities. In my opinion, territorial analysis is essential. Today, however, there are no proper studies on the modal shift, meaning most studies are founded on estimations.

**PP:** Could the car industry try to slow this down?

**MH:** Yes and no. It’s important not to pit motorists and public transport users against each other. We all use multiple modes of transport. What’s interesting to the automotive industry in this debate about free public transport is that, for once, we’re not trying to get people to change their habits by penalising them for using their car by raising taxes on vehicles or by imposing tighter regulation on vehicles. This time we’re trying to entice people to change their habits by making transport free.

| In Paris, the debate may not result in public transport becoming completely free of charge, but it offers opportunities, which may well lead to partially free service. |
The election of Jair Bolsonaro is a product of the crisis and the perception of the population regarding corruption. However, its support base is heterogeneous and contradictory, which puts Brazil in even greater uncertainty.

Brazil is currently experiencing the most dramatic period of its three decades of democracy. The presidential election produced a result that a few months ago no one could predict and that translates to an extreme polarisation of Brazilian society. After the initial shock caused by the victory of an unprepared politician with proposals based on commonplace and prejudices, it is becoming clear that the causes for his triumph were based on the exhaustion of voters with three main aspects: corruption, economic crisis and public insecurity.

Brazil’s two biggest problems are a product of its democracy: its political system and its political class. Brazilian electoral law allows more than 30 parties to enter the Chamber of Deputies. The same electoral law fosters party instability and makes it very difficult to develop structures with a coherent ideological basis. Brazilians have a uninominal vote for federal MPs, but these votes count for the remaining members of the party list. Often, smaller parties obtain representation by presenting a figure with some regional or national notoriety to attract votes that then allow the election of other deputies.

Brazil has a presidential system with a very atomised parliament. In order to be able to govern, the executive power has to establish alliances that clash with its own ideology, multiplying the number of ministries as a way of distributing jobs to allies. This system also encouraged corruption and the purchase of MPs and senators to unblock measures in parliament. On the other hand, ideological flexibility encouraged the creation of informal parliamentary groups. Deputies and senators from various parties who defend the interests of evangelical churches, agribusiness or security forces align their votes with more discipline than those dictated by the parties they belong to.

Jair Bolsonaro has shown little or no parliamentary work during the twenty-seven years he was an MP. His ideas are retrograde and his speech is marked by verbal violence and prejudices. The first days after the election have shown contradictions, inexperience and even incompetence in matters of State. However, Bolsonaro was in the right place at the right time and with the right characteristics: in a moment of great public fatigue...
with corruption, he had the virtue of never having been involved in corruption schemes.

The support group of the president-elect can be divided into three streams: military, ultra-liberal and evangelical. The face of the first group is the vice-president-elect, Hamilton Mourão, a general of the army. The Brazilian military will be more prominent in the new government (Bolsonaro has already announced that four of his ministers will be military). In a context of great partisan weakness, they represent the most organic and institutional group of support for the new president. However, a return to a classic military dictatorship will be difficult. The world lives in a very different context compared to the Cold War period, and public opinion has the will and communication tools that are more difficult to control. The control of the media can be made more subtly and a redistribution of the budget spent by the state on advertising can not be excluded (which is already scary).

The ultra-liberal group is headed by Paulo Guedes, future “super-minister” of the Economy. Guedes intends to pursue a policy of accelerated liberalisation of the Brazilian economy, in a model that is dangerously similar to that implemented by Carlos Menem in Argentina in the 1990s - with catastrophic consequences. His vision for public companies may conflict with the vision of the military group, more likely to maintain a strong public business sector.

The evangelical group is perhaps the one that won the most votes. The support of Edir Macedo, leader of the “Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus”, may have allowed Bolsonaro to overcome resistance in a part of the population that once supported Lula. Macedo is the owner of a media group that he used to get the far-right candidate’s message out in the last weeks of the campaign. In Brazil, new Christian churches have conquered many former Catholics over the last three decades and the progressive positions of Pope Francis have contributed to consolidate a more conservative thinking among evangelicals.

Among Bolsonaro's supporters are protagonists of street violence and attacks on social networks during the campaign.
JAIR BOLSONARO, A CHALLENGE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
by Elena Lazarou

The election of Jair Bolsonaro as the next President of Brazil is the latest in a series of victories for right-wing populist candidates across the world. Like many of the leaders he is compared to, Bolsonaro based his campaign on security-driven nationalistic discourse combined with a rejection of the so called “failed establishment”. For the European Union, Brazil’s shift towards the extreme right poses a major challenge.

The supporters. Among them are protagonists of street violence and attacks on social networks during the campaign. They function as a sort of praetorian guard of the future president. Their actions are visible mainly in the armed militias that already control some neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro. The liberalisation of arms sales, one of Jair Bolsonaro’s main proposals, is a victory for this current. However, it could also turn out to be seen as an affront to the military group.

To begin to realise something about the future presidency, in these times of transition it is essential to be attentive to the balance of power of the president’s men. The contradictions between them will lead to confrontation and the rise of one of them. The presidency style will be defined by whoever wins this battle.

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THE FUTURE OF
THE LEFT
IN BRAZIL

by Mônica Valente

The recent elections in Brazil took place against the background of a widespread anti-politics, anti-PT and anti-system feeling. In this particular context, Jair Bolsonaro manage to style himself as a anti-system maverik candidate - while he benefited at the same time form the support by such traditionally conservative institutions as the neo-Pentecostal churches and the security forces, and not least by economic interests representing the financial and the agribusiness sectors as well as the arms lobby.

Former President Lula (2003-2011) was arrested and prevented from running, his successor Dilma Rousseff was impeached in 2016. Fears are that Bolsonaro will ban the Workers Party (PT) altogether.
His “anti-corruption, anti-politics, anti-left” and homophobic discourse, his attacks on human rights and his overall prejudice, transformed Bolsonaro into an “anti-system” candidate

For the “coup plotters” who brought about President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment and removal in 2016 and her replacement by Vice-President Michel Temer, the 2018 election aimed at the completion and legitimisation of this process through the election of a centre-right candidate to carry through a neo-liberal reform agenda. This entails the desired reform of social security, the complete privatisation of national companies, and the end of the multilateral foreign policy of the presidents Lula and Dilma.

To this end, the Workers Party (PT) was constantly attacked by the media, accused of being involved in acts of corruption. Contrary to Brazilian law, former President Lula was unfairly arrested, convicted and prevented from running, while most right-wing parties united around a candidate who received more than 40% of radio and TV time.

However, they neglected to agree this strategy with an electorate divided between the candidate of the left, Fernando Haddad (who took over when Lula was banned from running) for the PT in coalition with other left-wing parties, and an extreme right-wing former military officer, Jair Bolsonaro, representing a small party, the PSL (‘Social Liberal Party’), who won the election.

The attacks and media slander against the PT, as well as the involvement of right-wing constituents in acts of corruption, generated an anti-politics, anti-PT and anti-system feeling among huge parts of the electorate. This was particularly true of the middle class, a group that traditionally votes for right-wing candidates and for some of the more depoliticised social groups that emerged during the governments of Lula and Dilma.

This feeling helped Bolsonaro’s victory. His “anti-corruption, anti-politics, anti-left” and homophobic discourse, his attacks on human rights and his overall prejudice, supported by such traditionally conservative institutions as the neo-Pentecostal churches and the security forces, and by economic interests representing the financial and agribusiness sectors and the arms lobby, transformed him into an “anti-system” candidate.

Even though the left- and centre-left were divided behind three presidential campaigns, Fernando Haddad made it to the second round, where he received more than 47 million votes. The PT became the largest single party in the Chamber of Deputies, while the size of the left and centre-left’s representation increased slightly.

However, party representation in Brazil is split between a large number of parties, despite the electoral law now imposing a barrier to smaller parties that will encourage many of them to merge. The right remains in a majority in Parliament and the challenge facing Bolsonaro will be to temper the “anti-politics” discourse that pleases his supporters, as he has to appoint a government able to win a majority in the National Congress.

He will surely try to ban the PT and pursue his stated intention to criminalise social movements supporting the landless, the homeless, and the trade unions, as he seeks to govern either without an opposition or with an opposition that is on the defensive.

This framework creates a scenario for the left that it has not faced since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985, and the first necessary reaction is the creation of political alliances and unity in the face of the coming attacks on democracy.

The second measure is to defend an alternative program to oppose neoliberal changes in society. The new government will take these changes even further than the governments of the 1990s and the usurping government led by Michel Temer, since the future government will be neoliberal, authoritarian and closely connected to the interests of international finance capital and major international corporations.
The third measure is the need to establish stronger international relations by creating a front in defence of democracy in all its economic, social, and political dimensions. This front needs to be based on rights, freedom, equality, sovereignty, multilateralism and peace, because in addition to all the above, Bolsonaro’s government could become a cornerstone in the construction of the “international extreme right-wing” that is being built by former Trump aide Steve Bannon, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Italy’s Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, and others.

Without doubt, the immediate future is highly complex and will need democrats and progressives to work together, and to show a major commitment to building a democratic unity that will defend social and popular movements and be capable of mobilising and resisting.

Optimistically, one might be tempted to think that, once the elections were over and victory assured, attitudes and declarations would become more rational and realistic. So far it has not been the case. Threats against persons and social movements continue to be made by the new elected President and his supporters. Similar violence and uncertainty are also taking the lead in foreign policy and a new scenario looks difficult to predict for the moment.

Read the full article online
www.progressivepost.eu
**Love and Revolution**  
by Yannis Youlountas, 2018

Shots taken with a hand-held camera on the streets of Athens, Thessaloniki and Crete, accompanied by revolutionary songs – the film’s revolutionary tone is set with its opening images of demonstrators squaring up to police. The plot: a crisis that has lasted more than nine years, in a country that has been brought to its knees in its struggle to survive violence beyond words. The film describes the feelings of a population wounded by austerity. Their rage is depicted in tough images, all with a single goal: bearing witness to the brutality of the last nine years.

Director Yannis Youlountas presents a moving, violent and no-holds-barred documentary. It bears testament to a dark era from which Greece has not yet recovered. Interspersed with interviews, its leitmotiv is one of solidarity. This film reminds how, ten years on, the country’s wounds are still festering. With tales of love and revolution, music and shocking images, it tells a fascinating story in which the Greek people are the protagonists.

**To the Four Winds**  
by Michel Toesca, 2018

Farmer Cédric Herrou became famous when he was arrested for the crime of solidarity when he helped migrants cross into France. Now he tells their stories. The film looks back at the journeys undertaken by thousands of migrants and how they were helped by a man who was treated like a criminal by the French state. It is dedicated to his fight against the French justice system as he attempts to welcome and protect migrants in the Roya Valley. His story began in 2015 and he spent the next two years helping refugees.

The documentary was screened at the 2018 Cannes Film Festival and won numerous awards. It was shot by Michel Toesca, who followed the farmer with an "old camera" and a mobile phone. He spent more than two years shadowing Cédric Herrou, following these men and women and conducting countless interviews with migrants and the people who stood with them.
TO READ

**Hedge:**
A Greater Safety Net for the Entrepreneurial Age, 2018

By Nicolas Colin

Where do prosperity and economic security come from? Nicolas Colin explores how society has changed over the last three decades as a result of the technological revolution that has swept through the whole economy and led to the emergence of new businesses. He analyses the transformation of our society by examining the rise of populism with the advent of Donald Trump, macroeconomic instability, and the role of entrepreneurs and the state in this paradigm.

However, this change has exposed individuals to a new form of economic insecurity that largely explains the current crisis of the Western middle class. In this paradigm shift it is Europe, above all, that offers a distinct institutional context in which it is essential to ensure that the more ambitious objectives of economic security and entrepreneurial prosperity are achieved. Indeed, European citizens – most of whom still live fairly comfortably – have a great deal to lose in this transformation. There have long been concerns about the development of Europe. And in the face of such widespread mistrust of change, it is precisely here that European entrepreneurs can provide some useful lessons for the American technology industry.

**EU Climate Diplomacy**
Politics, Law and Negotiations

Edited by Stephen Minas, Vassilis Ntousas

Heightening diplomatic capabilities to address climate change is directly linked to the increasing threat it poses and is undoubtedly a defining new policy of our times.

Significant developments regarding climate diplomacy have been established at EU level which take the substantial risk for our economic, social and environmental well-being into consideration.

This timely book on the fast-developing topic builds fantastically on FEPS work on this previously. It offers analysis and foresight at a time when the EU’s diplomatic capabilities and foreign policy action is evolving tremendously.

With a good balance of academic reflection together with political realities it traces the politics, law and negotiations aspects very well.

Gathering 16 contributors into an array of articles defining various strands of the climate diplomacy issue it provides the reader a deep and thoughtful insight into the key emerging issues.

**Corporate Capture in Europe**
When Big Business Dominates Policy-Making and Threatens our Rights

Edited by Alter-EU

The new report by the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (Alter-EU) examines how big business has become structurally embedded in policy-making in the European Union as well as its Member States. Alter-EU is a coalition of over hundreds of civil society groups and trade unions fighting against the ever-increasing influence of corporate lobbyists on the political agenda in Europe. Via several case studies, the report retraces the ways in which the more than 25,000 professional lobbyists currently roaming the corridors of the EU institutions make their voices heard – and their desiderata become rules and laws. It’s about how big banks’ lobbying efforts have produced dangerously weak rules to protect the public interest ‘from the risk-taking and greed of the too-big-to-fail banks’ with the risk of another crisis looming. It’s about how the gas, pharmaceutical and arms industry weights on political decisions – but also on the industry’s behind-the-scenes influence in the recent Diesel scandal in Germany. ‘Get the money out of politics’ is amongst Alter-EU’s recommendation – and it’s a chilling realisation that something considered to be a basic value of our political system is described not only as a ‘recommendation’ but a necessary ‘culture change’: ‘politicians, regulators and officials have to remember that they shall serve the public interest.’

Find all publications online at [www.progressivepost.eu](http://www.progressivepost.eu)
The Fall of Wisconsin
The Conservative Conquest of a Progressive Bastion and the Future of American Politics

By Dan Kaufman

Historically, the US state of Wisconsin was a laboratory of progressive ideas: very early, it implemented a progressive income tax and stringent child-labour laws; later, the first unemployment-insurance program in the US.

In The Fall of Wisconsin however, Wisconsin native Dan Kaufman provides a warning account of how these progressive traditions were undone and turned into a model for national conservatives. Kaufman, who also writes for the New Yorker and New York Times Magazine, shows how the “divide-and-conquer” strategy of Governor Scott Walker (elected 2010) allowed powerful corporations and wealthy donors to effectively take control – laws protecting voting rights, labour unions, the environment, and public education were rapidly dismantled.

In the recent midterm elections, Walker lost to Democrat Tony Evers – albeit with a razor-thin margin. Kaufman’s account still provides a stunning warning about how fragile progressive achievements often are, and how the recent national-conservative turn of the US unfolded in detail.

The Welfare State Revisited

Edited by Joseph Stiglitz and José Antonio Ocampo

In their new book, the Nobel-Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and the former candidate to the presidency of the World Bank, José Antonio Ocampo look at the challenges that the welfare state faces and they demonstrate why strong welfare states are urgently needed today. Indeed, beyond the ethical and social cohesion arguments, well-designed welfare states act as automatic macroeconomic stabilisers during crises. In contrast, the weakening of social welfare systems as a result of short-term austerity programs leads to poor social and economic performance. The book also points out that there is a growing body of evidence and theory showing that more equal societies have better, stronger and more resilient economic growth – a point that, interestingly, has been underscored in recent research by the International Monetary Fund.

Invited to contribute, FEPS-Secretary General Ernst Stetter reflects on the future of the Welfare State in the European Union.
TO READ

**Work in the Digital Age**
Challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution

Edited by Max Neufeind, Jacqueline O’Reilly, and Florian Ranft

Work in the Digital Age brings together more than 50 world-leading experts and policy practitioners who address the implications of automation, stagnant productivity, and increasing levels of inequality within and between countries – and equip progressives with powerful tools to reshape the future of work for the benefit of society. Dramatic predictions of job losses have been made, such as in an Oxford University study which claims that 47 percent of total US employment is at risk due to computerisation. The book responds to a significant gap in the literature on the fourth industrial revolution. By analysing countries in terms of their digital density, Work in the Digital Age takes seriously the fact that countries are moving at different speeds when it comes to adopting, harnessing, and regulating digital technologies. The book provides case studies from more than 18 European countries as well as Canada, the US, and India, highlighting that there are no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions. Still, Progressive policymakers can learn from each other.

**Herzl,**
*une histoire européenne*

By Camille de Toledo et Alexander Pavlenko

“If I remain attached, until the end, to the dream that Herzl planted in the hearts of the Jews, it is not for Palestine or Argentina, Uganda or whatever. If I remain attached to this dream anyway, it is because it has proven to my eyes something inestimable: the role a dream can plays in history.”

A short quote that sums up the strength of this passionate graphic novel, an original investigation into Theodor Herzl’s the life, the journalist and writer who founded the Zionist movement. And it’s also the story of a people, the story of a man confronted with the fragility of life and the history of Europe.
**INSPIRATION**

**TO THINK**

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**Dual use technologies and civilian capabilities: Beyond pooling and sharing**

Andrea Aversano Stabile, Alessandro Marrone, Nicoletta Pirozzi, Bernardo Venturi

This policy paper investigates how to increase the pooling and sharing (P&S) of civilian and military capabilities in light of recent EU developments. The paper looks at potential areas for P&S: the sharing of training facilities, the pooling of experts and recruitment procedures; satellite systems; and remotely piloted aircraft systems. These are discussed in connection with EU developments such as the EU’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy.


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**Les internés civils de la Première Guerre mondiale – Le cas des Luxembourgeois en France**

Jim Carelli

During World War 1 thousands of foreigners living in France have been forced by the military and civil authorities to live in different sorts of camps, some called concentration camps. Among them are also 431 Luxemburg civilians working in France whom the researcher has found in camps all over France.

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**Precarious work, precarious lives: how policy can create more security**

Dr Sinead Pembroke

This report investigates the scope for policy interventions to address the negative impact of precarious work in Ireland. Drawing on focus groups and interviews, the report identifies five major policy areas in need of reform in order to ensure greater economic and social security for workers. These include employment protection, social protection, health, housing and childcare.

https://www.tasc.ie/publications/precarious-workers-precarious-lives-online-publica/

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**Triumph of the Women? The Female Face of the Populist and Far Right in Europe**

Elisa Gutsche et al.

Women voters were long thought to be relatively immune to the policies advocated by right-wing populist or extremist parties. That has changed, however. This study focuses on six European countries to establish reasons for this change. It analyses the policy objectives of populist and far right parties on gender and family issues, the role of women in those parties, women’s voting behaviour, and identifies possible (counter) strategies for progressive players.

The shadows of the financial crisis still prevail

Erik Bjørsted, Jon Nielsen, Sofie Holme Andersen, Emilie Lichtenberg, Emilie Agner Damm

Ten years after the financial crisis, the economic scars have not – and will never completely – heal. The recession and the unsuccessful crisis policy have had long-term negative effects on the Danish economy. Denmark has experienced a permanent loss of prosperity by 90 billion DDK. Also, the income of those who lost their jobs during the crisis is still lagging behind. Evidently, losing your job in a time of crisis makes you worse off.

https://www.ae.dk/publikationer/krisens-skygger-traekker-stadig-spor

Democracy and party politics during economic collapse: The case of Greece

Elisabeth Humbert-Dorfmüller & Lefteris Antonopoulos

The 2009 economic, social and political crisis has left its mark on the Greek political landscape. The centre-left is now fragmented, with the radical left-wing party SYRIZA leading reforms at the head of an unlikely coalition adopting a fairly flexible approach towards the European Troika’s demands for austerity against financial assistance. Elisabeth Humbert Dorfmüller and Lefteris Antonopoulos propose a review of the Greek political landscape since the restoration of democracy in 1974, putting the current situation in its historical perspective. In their view, austerity measures imposed by the Troika are challenging the Greek democratic political system, provoking popular discontent without visible economic results, and leading to a rise in political instability and populist tendencies


Populism: A Very Short Introduction

Cas Mudde, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

The Fondation Jean-Jaurès, the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and Éditions de L’Aube wish to make available to the French-speaking public this analysis of populism which combines – unusually – European, North American and Latin American perspectives. This is a translation of the book, published in English by Oxford University Press, by Cas Mudde, professor at the University of Georgia (United States), and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, professor at Diego Portales University (Chile).
