THE NEXT MISSION
OF COSMOPOLITAN
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Magazine by FEPS - Foundation for European Progressive Studies
www.feps-europe.eu/queries
Isaac Newton’s famous book “Opticks” concludes with a set of “Queries”. These “Queries” are not questions in the ordinary sense, but rather rhetorical questions intended to stimulate thinking. This was Newton’s mode of explaining “by query”.

About Queries
Queries

N°02 (8) / 2012
FOREWORD

7 The Next Mission of Cosmopolitan Social Democracy
Ernst STETTER

CONTEMPORARY COSMOPOLITANISM

12 Challenging Orthodoxy and Broadening Political Imagination – In a Search for a New Progressive Narrative Worldwide
Alfred GUSENBAUER

17 The Globalisation of Social Democracy
Pascal LAMY

20 The Cosmopolitanism of the Left – An Answer to Globalisation
Daniele ARCHIBUGI

24 Conflicts in Cosmopolitanism and the Global Left
Luke MARTELL

ENTRAPMENTS OF THE COSMOPOLITAN AGENDA

30 Progressive Cosmopolitanism: A Progressive Critique
Michael LIND

34 It is Time to Return to the Local
Jonathan RUTHERFORD

38 Social Democratic Internationalism Beyond the Comfort Zone
Monika SIE DHIAN HO & René CUPERUS
BUILDING A COSMOPOLITAN SOCIETY

46 Cosmopolitanism and the Global Articulation of Consequential Solidarity
Michael D. KENNEDY

54 Multi-Layered Migration and the Cosmopolitan Challenge
Lydia D. MORRIS

64 Intergenerational Solidarity, Sustainability and Climate Change
Louis LEMKOW

FORMULATING NEW COSMOPOLITAN SPACE

74 Shaping a New Internationalism of Enlightened Self-Interest
Inge KAUL

80 Trapped in Europe? ’Problematic’ Reformism, the PES and the Future
Gerassimos MOSCHONAS

88 The PES and the Future of ‘Social’ Europe?
Simon LIGHTFOOT

“Queries” is the scientific magazine of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies.
The Foundation for European Progressive Studies is a European progressive political foundation, close to the Party of European Socialists (PES). As a platform for ideas, FEPS works in a close collaboration with social democratic organizations, and in particular national foundations and think tanks, to tackle the challenges that Europe faces today.

Publisher: FEPS – Foundation for European Progressive Studies
First published in Belgium 2012
Publishing supervisor: Dr. Ernst Stetter (Secretary General – FEPS)
Managing Editor of Queries: Dr. Ania Skrzypek (FEPS Senior Research Fellow)
Editorial cooperation: Michael McTernan (Editor and Senior Researcher – Policy Network)

With the financial support of the European Parliament.
Designed by: RedWorks Belgium
Copyright © FEPS – Foundation for European Progressive Studies
ISSN 2032-9113
This magazine is published subject to the condition that it shall not by way of trade or otherwise be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publishers’ prior consent in writing in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

FEPS
Rue Montoyer 40, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Phone +32 2 234 69 00, Fax +32 2 280 03 83
info@feps-europe.eu
www.feps-europe.eu
The NEXT Mission of Cosmopolitan Social Democracy
In his “Cosmopolitan Vision”, Ulrich Beck wrote that: Cosmopolitanism which has taken up residence in reality is a vital theme of European civilisation and European consciousness and beyond that of global experience. For in the cosmopolitan outlook, methodologically understood, there resides the latent potential to break out of the self-centred narcissism of the national outlook and the dull incomprehension with which it infects thought and action, and thereby enlighten human beings concerning the real, internal cosmopolitanization of their lifeworlds and institutions (Beck 2004). These words capture the essential thought that served as an inspiration to embark on the debate if cosmopolitanism could indeed serve as a guideline for renewal-seeking social democracy.

Secondly, the discussions on globalisation embedded determinism in both political and societal narratives. The idea of contemporary times witnessing the most destructive processes ever has been widely spread. Within the last decade, it is obviously the 9/11 that marks the peak of societal panic, however the continuously growing fear of a different nature has been accompanying also the developments starting from financial to economic crises. This links with a disbelief that the primacy of politics can be achieved and that even overall politics matter. Overall lack of protecting frameworks and of relevant points of reference and refuge leads to a
massive retreat of people to what is tangible, what they think they can themselves safeguard. This explains withdrawal from political participation and the ongoing fragmentation of the contemporary societies. Since social democracy has always been about popular emancipation and civic involvement, that constitutes a great challenge on its way to a meaningful renewal. Cosmopolitanism has been built on a presumption that there is a sort of a societal deal necessary. It is needed to on one side morally oblige people to perceive themselves and consequently act as members of a society, and on the other it dictates also an appropriate institutional framework for this logic to be embedded in. Consequently, if reviewed now, it could indeed serve as an inspiration – helping to gear this communitarian feeling on all levels, from local to international. Without a convincing argument otherwise it may appear impossible to restore support for values such as solidarity – so much missing and so much needed in the post-crisis times.

Thirdly, cosmopolitanism debate may prove as beneficial for the progressives to win an argument about the future of the European Union. These two years that are left before the upcoming European elections will feature most dividing questions. Never in the past was there a debate about withdrawal of a member from the community – while now it is being seriously considered. The growing amount of doubts on where the integration or alternatively disintegration may lead to; the radicalisation of extreme political groups arguing against the EU; the concerns of the citizens, who in majority all feel overburdened with the costs of the austerity measures – these all will be important factors that will predetermine if people go out and vote and for whom they vote for in 2014. As progressives, we find ourselves in a particularly complex situation – on one hand we do not accept the right wing measures that shape the contemporary EU, on the other we fear embarking on that criticism publically - dreading that this may be too easily seen as another anti-European argumentation. Cosmopolitanism may therefore prove itself as a different approach that eventually helps to go beyond the boundaries of this particular entrapment. Focused on progress towards prosperity and wealth for all (which fundamentally the EC and then the EU have always had a mission to be about), it can bring back the focus of pluralisation of modernity and re-establish a hopeful nature of a progressive, political proposal. And such a hope is needed to convince people that it is worth to get back together again and seek commonly a different, promising scenario.

This foreword has been focused on the reasons why social democracy shall reconsider cosmopolitanism as a part of its mission. Naturally, it does not advocate for turning a blind eye on the deficiencies that this approach entails. It is widely commented that cosmopolitanism is still remaining a relatively vague concept to many, and to some even it appears as an elitist way of talking about global affairs. Progressives must be sensitive to these criticisms – especially that with the understanding focused on society they must keep in mind, that the battle they are in is the one for regaining public trust and support. These are rules that often are taken as self-evident, but they touch upon the core principles of democracy. Looking especially at the situation in Europe and the recent, very worrying developments in the different member states should remind all, that democracy is both an ideal and a process requiring constant efforts and involvement from all. Neither its existence nor citizens should ever be taken for granted.

The collection of the articles assembled in this volume provide different approaches to cosmopolitanism, both positive and sceptic ones. The clear cleavage can be found in the tone of the first and second chapter, which allows identifying the ideological questions underpinning this timely debate within the progressive movement. The 3rd chapter is devoted to how the cosmopolitan framework relates to the challenges of the modern times, while the 4th examines its potential impact on international, European Union and state levels. Altogether this provides an intellectually inspiring contribution to the debate on the renewal of social democ-
racy both Europe and world-wide. The fact, that the articles were written on both sides of the Atlantic provides an additionally unique aspect to this publication.

The majority of the articles had constituted in their initial drafts the background papers for a high level seminar that FEPS Next Left Research Programme and Policy Network & Wiardi Beckman Stichting Amsterdam Process featured in Brussels in October 2011, while several additional were received through FEPS and Policy Network as supplementary to that debate. We remain grateful to all the authors, whose work ensured reaching herewith a new conceptual horizon within our common debate on the future of progressivism and who pointed out herewith the fundamental dilemmas that the movement needs to answer urgently.
For progressives, cosmopolitanism is a tempting concept. Embedded in the core progressive values of equality and solidarity, embracing a renewed internationalism would equip us to provide compelling answers to the challenges of globalisation and the current global crisis. Cosmopolitanism provides a framework within which the different actors of the progressive movement worldwide can unite. In cosmopolitanism Alfred GUSENBAUER recognises the potential to put forward a modernised agenda to tackle the world’s imbalances and inequalities. He argues for a better global governance model that would ensure economic development by re-channelling global resources into a globally sustainable growth strategy. Pascal LAMY echoes this argument in his proposal to globalise social democracy so that it is able to tackle the challenges of the new century, alongside expanding the international agenda with issues such as taxation, energy and migration – which, in his opinion, have for too long been left aside. Furthermore, as Daniele ARCHIBUGI points out, a credible alternative to the current status-quo is needed, especially given the impact that neo-liberalism has had in strengthening global capital at the expense of weakening global labour. Finally, Luke MARTELL warns that cosmopolitanism must be embedded in social values and realpolitik, making a case for how to revive and combine the internationalist and cosmopolitan approaches.
Challenging Orthodoxy and Broadening Political Imagination – In a Search for a New Progressive Narrative Worldwide

By Alfred GUSENBAUER

Cosmopolitanism appeals to progressives as a relatively holistic concept. It provides a philosophical framework for parallel actions on all the levels of policy making. It is tempting as a humanistic proposal that offers reasoning for primacy of politics over economy and them both being at the service of society. In the era of a split among those three, which additionally undermines society’s capacity of dealing with the challenges of modern times, it is therefore worth revisiting.

At the same time, cosmopolitanism carries also a number of entrapments. The sceptics usually point out that it still remains a relatively vague idea, which lacks proper embedding in both politics and societal values. Contemporary scholars point out that its features have been rather liberal, also that its relation to other concepts such as left-wing internationalism still remains somewhat ambiguous.

The debate between progressive supporters and opponents of making cosmopolitanism a guiding idea for the movement is interesting, as it allows us to identify interesting ideological questions. While the deliberations on moral cosmopolitanism inspire the discussion on what the progressive values are nowadays and how they should be interpreted in a rapidly changing world, pondering on institutional cosmopolitanism allows the reopening the debate on the world’s order from a different angle than a regular reformist discourse. Altogether, both inspire to formulate a query: can one speak in terms of a global society nowadays?

The international discourse on globalisation was focused on the global expansion of capitalism. Regrettably, it hardly captured the evolving character of it – which in fact reflects the profound changes in the world’s economy. Progressing financialisation, altering the sense of production and consequently also trade
– these circumstances enhanced additionally the already existing imbalance of bargaining powers between capital and labour. Despite the fact that the recent crisis clearly exposed the deficiencies of the neo-liberal conceptualisation that led to this situation, there still seem to be lack of a credible and convincing alternative to it. Progressives naturally stand a chance to claim this vacuum, but only if they are able to provide a new narrative. Revisiting cosmopolitanism in its attachment to equality and social justice as principles embedded in the humanist tradition may offer an interesting political potential here.

The reason to believe that it could be feasible is also related to the lessons drawn from the recent social mobilisations across the globe. Despite their respectively diverse characters, their goal was roughly the same – namely a call for hope. Different scholars writing about this phenomenon agree, that though it is hard to make a prognosis on what the future brings for those mobilisations, their legacy is already quite clear. They have changed the character of political discourse, making it impossible for politicians to hold a debate nowadays in which issues such as equality would not be mentioned for example. This impact will be well recognised, especially by progressives, as a momentum to step into. In order to do so, however they must liberate themselves from regular orthodoxy of institutional thinking – and instead of dreaming about incorporating the movement; they should build on the revitalisation of the socially recognised values such as equality and solidarity. As in the past, like the post 1968 period, this is where an opportunity undoubtedly lies.

This essay draws from the debate on cosmopolitanism, bridging its essential questions with the reflections on the state of international affairs in the aftermath of the global crisis. Its aim is to present three proposals on how to use the momentum and successfully pave the path forward towards a more just global society

### Understanding new geopolitical map

The global crisis has been a catalyst for a number of shifts in geopolitics. Even though it affects everyone, the range of the impacts diversify. For the so called “North”, the crisis exposed inadequacy of the existing order, putting in to question all the existing social arrangements. The worry about sustainability and came into doubt when the potential to persevere pursuing the dominant position became apparent. And additionally, the fragmentation of societies and the deterioration of the societal values has progressed – with middle classes feeling “squeezed” and abused; affluent classes being almost exempted from the crisis consequences and the most impoverished ones falling even lower into misery. Dreams about competing in knowledge and skills have been overshadowed by statistics, showing that regardless of the numerous strategies at hand, the other actors have the potential to develop better in those fields. Political proposals based on the ambition to secure or preserve have become obsolete and has become as obscure to the anxious citizens, whose disengagement in institutional political life is becoming more and more apparent.

On the other hand, South has entered into a new chapter of its history. It may appear strange to speak about prosperity in these times of predicament, but the economic and social advancement of the South is undeniable. In contradiction to the North, the lower classes generally managed to benefit and have improved their economic situation substantially. This also explains the space that a new sort of progressive movements could use to raise in strength in the last years in that region.

This brief assessment leads to two conclusions. First of all, the two regions are drifting apart as far as their respective stages of development are concerned. This also implies that their interests will diversify and that will be much more difficult to unite under any global strategy – not to even mention under one, distinctively
progressive one. Secondly, the global North should grasp that its position has fundamentally changed. This means that in the new circumstances it cannot afford imposing certain solutions based on its mainstream understanding of fundamental concepts. If there is to be a new order put in place – and one is undoubtedly needed – one must be prepared that the political work leading to it will have a totally different character than what the history of the last 60 years may have taught us.

To begin with, the concept of global governance needs to be revisited – and the challenge lies in redefining that notion towards a more meaningful and tangible model. This debate must go beyond the usual discussion on reforming the global institutional system. It must be fundamentally about a sense of global politics, the nature of which is subject to perpetual change.

This connects directly with a need to give a content to the global agenda. For the progressives, the challenge is a double folded one. On one hand, they need to grasp the nature of contemporary capitalism and the stage it finds itself in the aftermath of the crisis. The ‘real economy’ must be brought back as the core reference point, as it must also become reconnected with incomes. It is the answer to the above shift in bargaining powers between capital and labour, as also to the emerging conflict between financial and production capitals. On the other hand, the diverse interests of the economies of the North and South, and consequently the varied positions and approaches of the working class across the globe needs to be embraced into a strategy. Rechanneling global resources to an overall benefit, with new ways of thinking about productivity and trade – these should feature in its building pillars. The cosmopolitan way of thinking may offer a way on how to think about these issues from a position of a global society, which would need an adequate sustainable development agenda to prosper and thrive.

Fighting pre- and post- crisis inequalities

One of the legacies of the global crisis is the enhancement of inequalities. The phenomenon is multidimensional, encompassing levels from the international stage to individual citizens. The imbalances resulting from it disrupt in consequence all sorts of institutional order, and at the same time also lead to further social unrests. Since the mission of social democracy has historically been to ensure social peace, while ensuring a balanced agreement between the capital and the working class – the query arises if this is still valid. The difficulty with answering positively is that the nature of financial capitalism features a new sort of relations within widely understood markets. This is where people do not have their say and this became a sphere that has gradually exempted itself from the primacy of politics.

Cosmopolitanism may prove itself as a useful concept here. It derives from the humanist tradition and it assumes a certain contract, which when implemented can lead to social justice and prosperity. The difficulty however is that it assumes an agreement of equals, that is anchored in social values. With growing inequalities on one hand, and declining solidarity on the other – the cosmopolitan conceptualisation poses a great challenge for progressives.

Equality must become a leading and guiding value. Naturally, what makes one ideology distinctive from the others is a system of values and the way they are mutually connected in their interpretations. Hence the argument
here is not to drop either solidarity or freedom, but rather to see them as deriving from equality. Furthermore, it is necessary to put in place a new interpretation of equality.

First of all, in the context of the global governance, equality must be the principle that ensures a right for self determination of regions, nations and people – by which a prerogative to decide upon its path towards social and economic prosperity shall be understood. Therefore a new understanding of multilateral cooperation must be proposed. Equals can have different experiences, potentials and expectations – and the best spirit of internationalism is to take them all into serious consideration, as constructive blocks of a new agenda.

Secondly, global governance should ensure that the principle of equality does not only refer to redistributive side of social justice – but primarily refer to the distribution phase. This imposes a different way of thinking about global economy and hence also about trade. Today’s global resources and assets are different to what used to be seen as the most valuable trading goods even ten years ago. Hence progressives must anticipate that, championing the questions such as equal access to knowledge, technology and the transfers of intellectual properties to give some examples. Another thread of this debate is an issue of public global goods. Here also lies a chance for reframing development and aid policies, making them serve the purpose of international solidarity.

Thirdly, equality must also gain sense as a value which, once implemented, empowers and emancipates people. In the mist and aftermath of the global crisis, there has been a certain reluctance towards internationalism observed from both the institutional level and within societies as far as abiding by their actions in principles of social justice. The first ones were questioning their own capacity to deliver within the shrinking resources at hand. The second ones have fallen into so much disarray, facing processes such as fragmentation and individualisation, that they lost their commitments, even to the grand causes that used to mobilise them. Exemplification of that is how little public attention there is nowadays for global causes such as the implementation of Millennium Development Goals, for example. The challenge is therefore to embed a multilayer equality as a guiding principle for communities on all levels of policy making – staring from local up to global, and to make those layers clearly complementary.

3. Designing tools for progressives to act

The mission of redefining global governance and proposing an alternative agenda in a spirit of new progressive narrative will require adequate tools to be put in place. It must gain public understanding and support to become a legitimate proposal, and hence the progressives will face the challenge of finding the most adequate tools to achieve that – locally, nationally, regionally and globally. Therefore the framework within which they will unite matters.

Currently, progressives across the Globe seem to be striving under different labels, which can be explained by diverse the political and historical traditions from which they originate from. The ambiguity of what classifies one as progressive results from on one hand institutional orthodoxy, and on the other the overall crisis of European social democracy that is momentarily searching for its new purpose. One can discuss the long and short of the significance of the traditional political parties. But the fact remains that in the overall dynamic political circumstances, in which emergence of new parties and mobilisations is a fact – one has to thoroughly reconsider the character of its own political organisation.
Both the demand for a new understanding of international affairs and consequently for a new agenda, is also a query on how to formulate one and subsequently implement it – they pose a great challenge to the political imagination. Progressives are in a fortunate position of still having a common organisational umbrella – namely Socialist International – which remains effectively the only surviving global organisation of that type. The way for it to find itself in a modern global reality is to position itself more as a platform, which will have different operational capacity than now – but which may also be more attractive as an umbrella to shield not only the traditional parties, but also the progressive social mobilisations. The goal, that shall be upheld, is that it shall be an actor capable to unite in the spirit of internationalism and promote the credible alternative, which unlike the dominant neo-liberal one of today – will be able to ensure social justice worldwide.

The deliberations on cosmopolitanism offers a conceptual framework for progressives to review their understanding of the modernity, of the contemporary world and finally of their own mission in it. In that sense it enables looking at globalisation and the aftermath of the global crisis from a different, societal perspective. Progressives must become more courageous and more determined in debating the challenges at international level and the potential for a global society – hereby challenging their own political orthodoxy and decisively broadening their own political imagination. Only that way a new narrative, and consequently a feasible new alternative agenda and an organisation to carry it can be framed to claim their own space.

Alfred GUSENBAUER is the Chair of the FEPS Next Left Research Programme, the President of Renner Institut and a visiting scholar at Harvard University. He is a former Chancellor of Austria.
Market capitalism has experienced an upheaval that is unprecedented in its globality if not in magnitude. And social democracy remains muted, weakened on the continent which saw it emerge, in the 19th century, as a reaction to the excesses of that very same capitalism.

The explanations put forward thus far for this incongruous state of affairs rely on two analyses which in my view are both flawed and insufficient.

According to the first of these analyses, social democracy has lost its relevance by allowing itself to be absorbed by a liberal economic ideology that it was too weak to resist – by lapsing into the comfort of day-to-day management, by engaging in back-room power broking whenever the opportunity arose.

I believe the facts belie this explanation: whenever they had an electoral majority, the reformers pushed through major and progressive reforms.

According to the second analysis, social democracy has been a victim of its own success. Its historical model is now exhausted. Its arguments, its positions and its solutions have now infiltrated the entire political spectrum, causing them to lose their originality and specificity.

Here again, reality suggests otherwise: the contradictions of market capitalism are still with us, and a significant portion of humanity continues to suffer its effects. The “social question” is as burning an issue at the beginning of the 21st century as it was in the middle of the 19th century.

If this is true, we are left with our problem of declining capacity to shape attractive solutions for our citizens. In order to address this, let me suggest a new approach.

First, on the ideological front: by revamping the theoretical critique of market capitalism. Then, on the strategic front: by changing the scope of our actions.
The progressives of today offer only an incomplete and superficial critique of the prevailing system. It is incomplete because it is still excessively influenced by the economism of social democracy’s founding fathers. It rightly criticizes the inherent dysfunctions and instabilities of the capitalist model, but it neglects three essential dimensions in today’s world: globalization, sustainability, and anthropology.

Globalization is more than just an expansion of the territory covered by capitalism. Technology, its essential driving force, is thoroughly altering the traditional domination of labour by capital. No longer is capital merely finance: it is knowledge as well. No longer is labour merely force: it is also imagination. The social fallout can no longer be handled by welfare systems relying on communities with a strong identity, whether professions, nations or classes: we need to rethink these systems on a global scale.

The capitalist model is no longer merely socially unsustainable, or even economically unsustainable: it is now also environmentally unsustainable. This means that from a conceptual point of view we should be focusing our efforts on coming up with a different growth model, one that is less extravagant, less demanding of human and natural resources, a new version of “prosperity” – but a model that is also capable of offering hope to the half of humanity for whom deep physical suffering is the daily lot, and for whom zero growth is a provocation.

As for the anthropological foundations of market capitalism, they are bound to be called into question with the advent on the national or international political scene of populations whose culture is not of Western origin. This long philosophical genetic sequence leading from the separation of body and spirit to the perpetual struggle between individuals with irrepressible appetites, ultimately resulting in the liberal economic theory of self-regulation, has now produced another version of the invisible hand. Other human philosophies have emerged elsewhere, philosophies that do not rely on the capitalist anthropological code according to which man is wolf to man.

To address these three limits to the current critique of capitalism clearly implies going beyond current theory and engaging in some conceptual groundwork involving intellectuals and thinkers on a scale that far surpasses our Western think-tanks and seminars. In other words, it involves a long process of intellectual navigation for which we urgently need fresh pilots!

Assuming that this ideological renovation exercise succeeds, we then need to introduce the same change of attitude at the political level, when it comes to defining priorities and building a new balance of power.

The priorities of progressives must be shifted from the State level to the world level, and the global regulation of market capitalism needs to be given the same importance as the introduction of the welfare State in the 19th century.

These regulations must be applied first and foremost to the sectors of international life that have already been identified: macroeconomics, health, environment, human rights, social standards, trade, to name but a few. From there, they must be extended to the financial activities sector, where the recent crisis revealed a big hole in international regulations in what was undoubtedly the most globalized sector. And finally, it must embrace the sectors that have been left aside, such as taxation, energy or migrations.

The challenge facing us in all these areas seems clear to me: to create global public goods, capable of harnessing the expansion of markets so that their efficiency can be enhanced, while making them subject to regulations designed to prevent excesses. Above all we need to establish a collective framework of values that are currently lacking in the area of justice, fairness and profit sharing.
But we still need to reflect on how such regulations could be strengthened where they exist, or created where they are lacking. We need to invent and establish a balance of power in international areas that are essentially still governed by sovereign nation states, and in which the only way to ensure order by regulation is through negotiations.

This is no small task given the enormous difference between the decision-making and legitimation process at global level and those prevailing at the domestic level to which we are accustomed. The only way to address this problem is to imagine, and then build, new alliances with the countries that are now at the negotiating table: China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Egypt, and many others.

Since we can reasonably assume that the position of these new players is, or will soon be, a product of their domestic political systems, progressive political forces in all those countries, including trade unions, should unite. They should start by sharing their vision of the failings of capitalism, and then, through discussion and negotiation, adapt the critical work and the resulting progressive political agenda to this new political geography.

I am not underestimating the challenge facing us, or the time required. I am aware of the efforts involved in altering the outlook of the progressive movement. On the face of it, trying to explain to party leaders who are yawning their way through meetings of the Party of European-Socialist that their priority task is to start working on the political front with the Congress Party in India, the Workers’ Party (PES) in Brazil or the Communist Party in China is, certainly, a formidable challenge.

I am also aware that this project will not obviate the need to change political practices of progressives at home, to dispel the widespread view that progressives are no longer present at the workplace and in ordinary people’s lives; or that we more-or-less share the selfish and security-minded attitudes that serve merely to aggravate exclusion.

And yet, if we look at the forces that need to be united in order to build up an alternative, to carry out an in depth transformation of the now globalized market capitalism, the starting point is the fact that the task exceeds the intellectual and geographical scope to which our culture has accustomed us. Our task is to build a new political space in a world which will have to be “de-westernized” and exposed to the projects of other people, other civilizations, other sensitivities.

And if it is to exist at all, that space must be open so that each one of the new forces to be mobilized has a role to play and feels as a stakeholder.

Let’s remember the origins of the labour and of the socialist movements. Internationalism was higher on their agenda at that time. It has, unfortunately disappeared from our agenda.

Progressives should oppose globally and propose globally. The globalization of social democracy is the key to its future.

---

Pascal LAMY is the Director-General of the World Trade Organization and a former European Commissioner for Trade.
A cosmopolitan social democracy can lead a new social front to tame and regulate the most disruptive forms of capitalism whilst preserving its dynamism.

Globalisation is often considered responsible for increasing, rather than decreasing, inequalities. And it is increasing inequalities both within countries and across countries. The reason is rather simple: globalisation in financial capital, trade and production has reinforced the position of capitalists and has weakened the bargaining power of labour. It has created greater opportunities in peripheral parts of the world, but it has also increased the number of dispossessed, eradicating them from their traditional social and economic environment. In a nutshell, globalisation may be seen as good news for the rich and bad news for the poor, good news for the right and bad news for the left.

At the dawn of capitalism, Adam Smith noted that Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform, combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. It took a long time for the labour movement to learn the lesson and to find appropriate measures to contrast entrepreneurs. Through trade unions and other labour organisations, the left has managed to counter-act the economic power of the tycoons, but mostly at the national level. Through electoral franchise, leftwing political parties, supported by the working class, managed to access government or to counter-balance the policies of right-wing political coalitions. This led to a wealth of regulations that limited the freedom of the entrepreneurs to the advantage of the population at large. The left-wing political parties also pushed to expand the protection of the disadvantaged parts of the population through the welfare state, a system of social protection financed by taxation and aimed at delivering services to everybody.

\[1 \text{ For a variety of perspectives, see D. Held & A. Kaya (eds.), Global Inequality. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007.}\]
Globalisation is creating a lot of problems for the regulatory actions of national governments and for the welfare state. Most regulatory mechanisms were developed and, above all, enforced, at the national level. In a globalising economy these regulations are much less effective: they are often baroque and they can be circumvented through the ordinary skills of an average manager. At the same time, it is increasingly difficult to identify who should contribute to the costs of the welfare state and who should be on the receiving ends of its benefits. Through globalisation, it seems that capitalism has managed to unbind the progress that the left and the labour movements had made through national level political action. Adam Smith’s insightful thoughts could today be rephrased: Global capitalism is always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform, combination to circumvent costly regulations, to pay the minimum taxes and to hire the cheapest labour worldwide.

It can, in fact, be argued that globalisation is just a far-reaching strategy of transnational capitalism to increase its bargaining power against the working class and to reduce the loads, including taxes and regulations, of national governments. Such a vision is not wrong, but it is reductive: globalisation does not just affect financial capital, production and trade; it also influences society, culture, knowledge and even religion. Still, it seems clear that globalisation is creating a new world order where capitalism has enhanced its interests and labour is lagging behind.

Pascal Lamy is quite right in reminding us that the labour movement and the left could not regain the contracting power that they have so difficultly developed over the twentieth century just by “impeding” or “blocking” globalisation. First of all, national governments can no longer effectively control the flows of capital, commodities and labour. Going along this path would absorb too many resources and its effectiveness is likely to be very limited, while the social and economic impact will be to lower the living standards of everybody, not just of the capitalist class. Second, globalisation does not just reduce the bargaining power of the working class: it is a vibrant economic, social and political phenomenon which creates major opportunities. A coalition willing to limit the speed of the global economy will not manage to become politically majoritarian because globalisation distributes advantages across many social classes and not just to the privileged few.

Pascal Lamy also urgently reminds us of the need to respond to current global trends in economic and social activities with politically responsible action. He calls, and rightly so, for a review and update of regulations and also a concerted effort to make them internationally stringent. He also calls for the production of global public goods. These two areas are of crucial importance since unregulated capitalism can cause wide scale long-term damage (the most obvious area is the environment), while the lack of global public goods will increase insecurity and instability.

The real problem, however, is not just to call for smarter international regulations or for the production of global public goods in key areas for the 21st century. The main difficulty lies in getting powerful, resourceful and legitimate political players to make this a priority. We can ask national governments to co-ordinate their efforts and to subscribe to internationally binding regulations. We can also ask national...
governments to provide resources for producing global public goods through international cooperation. Inter-governmental organisations, from the World Trade Organization to the World Health Organization, from the World Bank to UNICEF, should be in charge of these processes. But, so far, international regulations have not been properly enforced (as the case of the 2008 financial crises clearly shows) and global public goods have been severely under-produced.

The left should therefore work hard to recreate an effective and convincing transnational political programme. The first thing that the left should do is to go back to its internationalist roots. Even if the left and the labour movement managed to achieve most of its political, social and economic rights at the national level, they also had a strong propensity towards international solidarity. The left pioneered the first transnational political associations. The labour movement started to think and act trans-nationally long before its opponents. While national governments – often hijacking and manipulating consensus – were waging wars against each other, the left responded by organising international peace congresses. On the grounds of this great intellectual legacy, the left and the labour movement should openly endorse a cosmopolitan political programme.

The left should be able to combine its strength at the national level with its cosmopolitan values. It may appear, as noted by Olaf Cramme, that cosmopolitanism is “more of a problem for the left than the right.” But, so far, the right has managed to endorse a form of cosmopolitanism without political and social consequences. It is a cosmopolitanism which allows the manager, the banker or even the tourist to act across borders without any sense of responsibility. The cosmopolitanism of the left, on the contrary, has much deeper implications since it requires acting with a sense of global responsibility.

The political forces associated with the left should therefore openly endorse a cosmopolitan programme that should equally include substantive objectives and institutional transformations. The substantive objectives pertain to the kind of regulations that need to be introduced, the methods for their enforcement and the nature and quantity of global public goods to be produced. This requires, for example, the political parties of the left as well as labour organisations to explicitly commit themselves to these goals. But there is also a more ambitious institutional issue to be addressed: who should be in charge? Can global governance be left in the hands of the business sector and inter-governmental organisations without any accountability to the people?

For this reason, a cosmopolitan left should also endorse substantial democratic transformations in global governance: International Organisations, including the United Nations, cannot be in the hands of diplomats only. The citizens of the world should have a direct access to its operations, as recommended by a variety of campaigns. The control of the global economy should not be left in the hands of inter-governmental summits as those of the G8 and G20 that are neither accountable, nor transparent, nor legitimate.

Concerning the United Nations, the Socialist International has circulated a Position Paper which endorses several brave proposals for reform, asking member parties in government to actively support them. Something similar is also needed for economic institutions, where often national governments, even when dominated by left-wing political parties, are twisted between perceived national interests and cosmopolitan ideals. A cosmopolitan left should be able to propose a new social front to tame and regulate the most disruptive forms of capitalism whilst preserving its dynamism. For example, it should be brave enough to introduce a general form of taxation on financial transaction, the so-called “Tobin Tax”, which could at the same time increase financial stability (one important global public good) and generate resources to be used for global welfare programmes. If it manages to do so, cosmopolitan social democracy could be as appealing to the citizens of the world in the 21st century as much as national social-democracy managed to be the driving force of change and social cohesion in the twentieth century.

Daniele ARCHIBUGI, is a research director at the Italian National Research Council (CNR) in Rome, affiliated at the Institute on Population and Social Policy (IRPPS), and professor of Innovation, Governance and Public Policy at the University of London, Birkbeck College.

References


Conflicts in Cosmopolitanism and the Global Left

By Luke MARTELL

Social democrats should look for a global left rather than global cosmopolitanism. Inconsistency over cosmopolitan ends matched with too much faith in its means has hampered internationalism

Social democrats have been discussing how to respond to globalisation for two decades or more. Cosmopolitanism is one way that’s been proposed. Cosmopolitanism is about being open to others from around the world and having obligations to them. This relates to traditions in social democracy of internationalism, egalitarianism and collectivism. Social democracy has also sometimes had liberal and progressive supporters with views that fit with cosmopolitan principles of tolerance and pluralism.

Globalisation is said to be one thing that’s put cosmopolitanism back on the agenda. It leads to awareness of others, and of interdependence and global obligations. We’ve grown to see that we have globally shared problems – like climate change, human rights, global poverty, nuclear proliferation, and the risks that come with economic interdependency. Some argue that we should be addressing such problems and obligations through institutions like the United Nations or the International Criminal Court and via global talks about issues such as climate change and world trade. These means are cosmopolitan because they bring diverse people together to address common concerns.

There are two issues that arise for cosmopolitan social democracy. One is that it isn’t proving all that cosmopolitan when it comes to openness and friendliness to others. The other is that it may be being too cosmopolitan when it puts faith in global gatherings to address world issues.
Openness to outsiders

Social democracy’s response to globalisation should not be just to economic globalisation, the movement of capital and trade, or cultural globalisation, the mobility of communication and information. If it wants to respond positively to globalisation social democracy should do so also to the global movement of people. Immigration is the biggest test for cosmopolitanism. It asks us to put our money where our mouth is by being open to others, welcoming them and accepting them for who they are. Social democracy is failing this test and giving succour to those who are anti-immigration. Rather than embracing cosmopolitanism, social democratic politicians have joined the race to empathise with intolerance towards immigrants, the blaming of them for societies’ problems, and lack of openness to other cultures through questioning multiculturalism.

This is dangerous. It legitimates intolerance and racism. History has shown time and again what this can lead to in practice. It’s also empirically flawed. We aren’t faced with a tidal wave of migrants. Migration is one type of globalisation that has gone into reverse, since governments started to clamp down on it in the 1970s. 2.5% of the world’s population are migrants. Even when migration is fairly free – before the controls of recent decades and under the EU’s open borders – we aren’t swamped by immigrants. Immigration is economically beneficial. Britain’s New Labour government estimated that it boosted growth in the UK by £6bn a year. Migration turns unproductive workers into productive ones. Immigrants in the UK are twice as likely to start a new business as people born there. Immigration creates jobs. It was behind a boom in the UK construction industry. It leads to further growth when immigrants spend their wages. It increases tax revenue – the opposite of immigrants being a burden on the welfare state. It provides workers for areas where it’s difficult to recruit, for instance in high-skilled and low-paid work, and for public services. Young migrant workers also help with the demographic pensions crisis. Many prejudices are based on misinformation about migrants taking jobs and being a burden on the state. These need to be challenged rather than reproduced by anti-immigration rhetoric.

There are also cultural benefits. Look at London and New York. These are thriving cities, because of their diversity. Diversity is dynamic and leads to progress. Think of great sportspeople, scientists, writers and business leaders in rich countries and how many of them were born outside the countries that adopted them. But the most important advantages of immigration are the cosmopolitan ones, the ones for others. There are benefits for migrants themselves, often escaping poor or desperate economic and political situations, and for the world beyond our borders, for instance through huge remittances to poorer countries. Cosmopolitanism is about obligations to those other than our own. A failure of immigration is a failure of cosmopolitanism. And if social democracy won’t take up this kind of wider obligation, who will?

Social democracy and anti-immigration

Social democratic politicians say they need to align with anti-immigrant concerns to connect with their core constituencies. They have to be seen to recognise that peoples’ problems with things like housing and wages are linked to immigration. But in both of these cases there are social democratic and labour explanations for the problems. Lack of housing in the UK is not caused by immigration. It’s caused by lack of housing. A significant proportion of this resulted from the selling off of social housing by Mrs. Thatcher, a privatisation of state assets. Low wages for unskilled workers aren’t due to immigration (to the extent that wages go down with immigration, which is questionable). It’s not immigrants that cut wages. It’s employers that cut wages. The reason they do so is out of economic self-interest on the market and because of weak trade unions and poor employment rights.
Social democratic politicians are complicit in turning issues like housing and wages into immigration issues when there are social democratic explanations for them – in terms of the limits of the market and workers’ rights.

One argument is that politicians have to adopt anti-immigration politics to draw citizens away from the far-right. But it’s not clear that propounding racist arguments undermines the far-right more than validates their arguments and makes racism more acceptable. Either way, the centre-right will siphon off anti-immigrant sentiment from the extremes. Let them do that dirty work and let social democracy be the force that sides with progressive and liberal ideas and cosmopolitanism. Some say that social democratic politicians need to appeal to popular anti-immigrant sentiment to get votes. Of course politicians have to win elections. But every vote won by being anti-immigration is one lost to liberals or greens, especially on an emotive issue to do with tolerance and race. And some issues are too important and dangerous to turn into electoralism. Antagonism to migration, which is often racism, is one of those.

Politicians need to shape arguments, not just to accommodate the electorate. Social democratic politicians should respond to anti-immigration ideas by explaining the benefits of immigration and giving social democratic explanations for the problems it’s said to be responsible for. Where would we be if progressives, liberals and the left hadn’t tried to shape views in the face of popular prejudice? Would people without property have got the vote? Would we have trade unions? Would we have a welfare state? Would slavery have been abolished? Would women have the vote? Would homosexuality have been legalised?

**Global cosmopolitan politics**

Social democrats are lacking cosmopolitanism when it comes to openness to outsiders. But there’s a danger they’ll put too much faith in cosmopolitanism as a means. This is in the case of actors from around the world coming together in global institutions and talks to deal with global issues. Why should we have doubts about this approach? One reason is that there isn’t much evidence of values providing a basis for global cosmopolitan politics. World values surveys show that people identify with local or national identities as much as global ones. On the issue of openness to others, surveys show that people exaggerate the scale of migration, misconstrue who the main immigrant groups are, and blame migrants for problems to do with jobs, wages, welfare and crime. Large numbers believe there are too many immigrants and favour stronger immigration controls. That’s the social and cultural basis for cosmopolitanism, or the lack of it. What about prospects in political life?

United Europe is sometimes seen as the highpoint of cosmopolitanism. In the EU different countries have come together in mutual structures. But mobility within the union has been liberalised while that from outside restricted. Furthermore agricultural subsidies help European farmers to compete with those from poorer countries. Europe favours its own over outsiders – the opposite of cosmopolitanism. There’s also a record of cosmopolitanism not working in talks on climate change, nuclear proliferation, global poverty and world trade. Agreements are frequently not reached and are stymied by the most powerful states pursuing their own interests. They break down as a norm, or are weak, or unenforceable, or not carried out, for instance in relation to emissions reductions, millennium development goals, debt and aid pledges, EU deficit rules, and free trade.

**An alternative political approach to cosmopolitanism**

If there isn’t much basis for cosmopolitanism in social values or politics how can we pursue it? One way is through conflict politics. You can’t be cosmopolitan with an enemy who has opposite interests and ideas.
Clashes of interest and ideology are why global talks fail. So you should work with a conflict rather than a cosmopolitan way of doing politics. This doesn’t mean you can’t form alliances with others. But these need to be selective rather than agreements with all in globally inclusive fora. Of course you should do what you can through institutions like the UN. But the left will stand a better chance of achieving cosmopolitanism if it’s choosier. Social democrats should look for a global left rather than global cosmopolitanism.

If you want to reduce nuclear arms you’re better off doing it through bilateral deals with other states with nuclear weapons, as the US and Russia have done, than through global treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If you want to reduce climate change you may have a better chance looking for initiatives on the ground and supporting them than trying to agree and enforce abstract targets in global meetings like Copenhagen. If you want to combat American neoliberalism you might be better off starting a trade group with other anti-neoliberal states than pushing for global economic regulation via world fora like the UN, WB or IMF.

Top-down agreements (eg to keep warming to two degrees) are too abstract and unenforceable. So change needs to come from practical experiences on the ground – the power of example, for instance in areas like energy reduction, solar power or electric car initiatives. The “Tobin Tax”, debt relief and the exposure of exploitative MNCs are cosmopolitan initiatives to do with obligations to others. Social and protest movements put these on the agenda. They are a non-state source of cosmopolitanism that social democrats should look to for guidance and alliances. On issues of internationalism, liberalism, ecology, and appealing to young people, greens have a better record than social democrats. So social democracy should also reach out to the greens.

The future for cosmopolitan social democracy

Cosmopolitan social democracy needs to shape arguments against populist nationalism not accommodate it, or it will betray cosmopolitan respect for others and their cultures, as well as liberal principles of the right to move and escape suffering, and it will be abandoning progressive territory. The dangers of racism are too great to pander to anti-immigration. Social democracy can gain reactionary support by doing so but it will lose progressive support.

Cosmopolitan social democracy should work on different levels, not just through global governance. It should use bilateral forms of internationalism restricted more to those you can agree with, in conflict with those with different interests. This is rather than searching for an impossible cosmopolitan consensus with actors who have opposed interests and ideologies. There isn’t much choice when the other side is against cosmopolitan goals. This involves internationalism with cosmopolitan objectives but not cosmopolitan means. It includes working with developing countries and social movements who have cosmopolitan values. And internationalism needs to work up from the power of example and practice rather than pursue abstract and unenforceable agreements from the top down. Social democracy has to be friendlier to outsiders if it wants to call itself cosmopolitan. But it needs to compromise on cosmopolitanism in its means to achieve cosmopolitanism ends.

Luke MARTELL is professor of political sociology at University of Sussex, UK.
The first section of this issue of “Queries” focused on the potential that cosmopolitanism as a concept has to offer to progressives. The articles gathered in the second section take a more critical and reflective look at the implications of progressive cosmopolitanism vis-a-vis its impact on politics at the national level. Michael LIND argues that the case of cosmopolitan social democracy as a rescue from a predicament of national social democratic parties remains unpersuasive. His point is that democracy, liberty and equality must be built from the ground up and hence new social contracts within nation states is the way forward. Another doubt is reiterated by Jonathan RUTHEFORD, who claims that social democracy’s support of a neo-liberal cosmopolitanism has primarily served the interest of free flowing capital and not the interests of labour. Finally, Monika SIE DHIAN HO and René CUPERUS provide a typology of social democratic internationalism, arguing that a new internationalism must be coherent with national welfare solidarity. They make the case for a more politicised internationalism that would liberate itself from it’s heretofore too liberal-light character.
Progressive Cosmopolitanism:
A Progressive Critique

By Michael LIND

The debate about the relationship between progressives and the nation-state has taken on a new urgency because of the global economic crisis. On both sides of the Atlantic the national social contracts established after World War II by social democrats, left-liberals and enlightened conservatives are under attack from politicians and intellectuals of the right, who preach austerity and the curtailing or dismantling of social insurance programmes. The centre-left is divided among those who wish to defend and strengthen national welfare states and national labour regulations, and those who argue that in the age of globalisation social democratic victories can only be won at the level of regional or global governance.

The argument that social democracy at national level is outmoded and needs to be supplemented or replaced by transnational social democracy has become widely accepted by the centre-left. But the case for cosmopolitan social democracy is unpersuasive. To be precise, the case for cosmopolitan social democracy rests on two questionable assumptions – a misunderstanding of the way the world economy actually works and a very selective interpretation of the progressive tradition that exaggerates its historic connection with cosmopolitanism.

The first questionable premise of progressive cosmopolitanism is the idea that states are losing the power to control cross-border movements of goods, investment and people. In an essay entitled The cosmopolitanism of the left – An answer to globalisation Daniele Archibugi writes that “(f)irst of all, national governments can no longer effectively control the flows of capital, commodities and labour. Going along this path would absorb too many resources and its effectiveness is likely to be very limited, while the social and economic impact will be to lower the living standards of everybody, not just of the capitalist class.” Is it really too difficult or prohibitively expensive to “effectively control the flows of capital, commodities and labour”? If it is, then somebody should tell the People’s Republic of China, which may become the world’s largest economy in the next few years, according to some estimates. China has capital controls, which permit
it to rig its currency to subsidise Chinese exports while penalising the exports of other countries. Clearly capital flows can be controlled, without crippling expense. Chinese financial authorities do so every day.

What about commodities? Those who talk about globalisation as a force beyond the control of governments make trade sound like smuggling. But smuggled goods like drugs are a small fraction of the goods that cross borders. If a government decided to restrict imports of refrigerators or automobile parts, it would have little difficulty in doing so. Nor is it difficult for states to stop illegal immigration, if they are determined. Authoritarian states like Singapore do so quite successfully. In countries like the US, illegal immigration is economic and driven chiefly by employer demand. Thanks to their political power, American employers have resisted laws that would prevent them from hiring illegal immigrants. But a serious attempt at workplace enforcement would dry up the stream of illegal immigrants to the US quickly, notwithstanding America's two-thousand mile border with Mexico. We know this to be the case because the collapse of employer demand caused by the Great Recession has caused a dramatic collapse in illegal immigration to the US.

Obviously all policies have costs as well as benefits. My point is that, in contradiction to the narrative of the nation-state losing power to the allegedly irresistible force of globalisation, all developed states continue to possess the power to control the flow of capital, goods and labour, and many successful states strictly regulate one or more of the three. The fact that we are not living in a world of all-powerful markets and weak states is underlined, when we look at patterns of global trade in manufactured goods. Here we see two patterns that cannot be reconciled with the vision of the borderless global free market that progressive cosmopolitans share with neoliberals.

One pattern is the high degree of regionalism rather than globalism in international trade. For example, most cars purchased in Europe, North America or Asia are built in those regions, sometimes by companies based in other regions of what has been called “the Triad”. Many multinational corporations have subsidiaries in one or more regions of the Triad manufacturing the same products. As Alan Rugman has pointed out, companies would not pursue such a strategy in a truly global economy. The regionalisation of the world economy demonstrates the continuing importance of barriers to trade and investment as well as national and regional policies supporting particular industries.

Another pattern that undercuts the narrative of a borderless world economy is the domination of one global industry after another by multinational corporations based in the three largest industrial capitalist nation-states, if China is excluded from the list: the United States, Japan and Germany. Companies in large countries that exploit economies of scale in their home markets are more likely to conquer foreign markets. In a truly global economy, companies based in big nations or blocs like the European Union, would have no advantage over companies based in small countries. The inclusion of China merely reinforces the point about the role of strong nation-states in the world economy. Much Chinese production consists of assembly of components produced in those three leading capitalist countries or elsewhere. For example, according to the Asian Development Bank, most of the value added to Apple’s iPhone 3G came from Germany, Japan and South Korea, even though final assembly was in China.

Germany, Japan and South Korea are strong states, not weak states; needless to say, so is China. All of this weakens the case for cosmopolitan social democracy, insofar as it depends on exaggerating the power of global markets and underestimating the power of modern nation-states to shape flows of capital, goods and labour. But in addition to their practical arguments, progressive cosmopolitans also make a moral case for cosmopolitanism, based on the claim that cosmopolitanism is one of the fundamental values of the centre-left.
Republican liberalism versus progressive cosmopolitanism

In a speech to Policy Network in 2010, Pascal Lamy, the director-general of the World Trade Organisation, had this to say: *Let’s remember the origins of the labour and of the socialist movements. Internationalism was higher on their agenda at that time. It has, unfortunately disappeared from our agenda.* Daniele Archibugi makes a similar argument: *The first thing that the left should do is to go back to its internationalist roots. Even if the left and the labour movement managed to achieve most of its political, social and economic rights at the national level, they also had a strong propensity towards international solidarity. The left pioneered the first transnational political associations.*

This is a somewhat selective reading of the history of the left. It seems to equate that history with the history of the Marxist Internationals. It is easy to understand that individuals in the tradition of revisionist Marxism, which was both cosmopolitan and socialist, should wish to salvage cosmopolitanism after they have jettisoned socialism. But on both sides of the Atlantic and around the world the politics of the left in the last two centuries has included many other strains, progressive, populist, communitarian, syndicalist, anarchist and religious, for which the goals of reform did not include a borderless world or powerful supra-national institutions. To give only one example, until after World War II the mainstream union movements in the US, Canada, Australia and other lands of European settlement favoured not only restrictions on immigration to raise wages but also white supremacy. And the heritage of the left includes progressive and populist isolationists in the US and left-wing Eurosceptics in Europe.

Outside of the academic intelligentsia, the most powerful strain of progressivism among ordinary people, in the West and the developing world alike, is probably the tradition of republican liberalism – the tradition shared by the French and American Revolutions, as well as by some strains in the English Revolution of the seventeenth century. Republican liberalism is universalist in that it is based on the idea that all human beings share the same human or natural rights. But universalism is not cosmopolitanism. The universality of rights and values does not require the absence of borders, political or economic. Brazilians and Americans may share the same rights, but that does not mean that the Brazilians must allow any number of Americans who wish to live in Brazil to do so. Malaysians and Germans have the same natural rights, but that does not mean that Malaysians cannot impose capital controls on the flow of money from German investors that might destabilise the Malaysian economy.

One would never know from advocates of progressive cosmopolitanism that one of the great successes of the left in the past two centuries has been the erection of new borders where there were no borders before. Today there are more than 190 sovereign states in the United Nations, and the number is likely to grow further in the future. The replacement of giant, multi-ethnic empires by numerous smaller democratic nation-states with greater linguistic and cultural homogeneity has been supported by most on the left under the name of ‘national liberation’ since the American and French Revolution. With J.S. Mill, generations of liberal nationalists have assumed that it is easier to achieve democracy in a country with a common national language and a widely shared majority culture than in a country permanently divided among two or more ethnolinguistic communities. Critics of progressive cosmopolitanism are entitled to ask: What was the point of generations of anti-colonial national liberation movements, if nations, having gained their independence from a ruling family or a remote nation of overlords, are now expected to delegate their hard-won sovereign powers to a transnational authority of some kind? The answer cannot be that the new regional or global federation or agencies will be democratic in some ways. With the exception of the Austro-Marxists, a minor leftist faction of the World War I era, the goal of most liberals and socialists in the twentieth century was to break up the
Hapsburg, Romanov and European colonial empires, so that their constituent nations could form their own
democratic governments within smaller territories, not to keep the European or overseas empires together as
multinational democratic federations.

Creating the political space for democracy

Enthusiasm for the cosmopolitan project is weakest among countries with recent memories of struggle against
formal political rule, like India, or informal economic imperialism, like China and Brazil. And it is quite weak in the
United States, whose political culture is still defined by memories of rebellion against a metropolitan empire. The
attachment of most people in most countries to national sovereignty is compatible with limited amounts of
international agreement and concerted action, but it dooms any ambitious project for global governance.

Pascal Lamy writes: The priorities of progressives must be shifted from the state level to the world level, and
global regulation of market capitalism needs to be given the same importance as the introduction of the welfare
state in the 19th century. On the contrary, the last thing that embattled progressives need to do, at this dangerous and
uncertain moment in history, is to sign on to a crusade that has no more chance of success than earlier campaigns
by idealists on the left for global disarmament or world federalism. As the repeated failure of international accords to
limit global warming should have made clear, there is little chance that the three most populous nation-states of the
21st century, China, India and the United States, all three jealous of their sovereignty, will go along with a project of
shifting major regulations from the state level to the world level. And without the cooperation of the biggest
nations, no ambitious system of global governance can be established.

If progressives need a vision of global order, it should be what the economist Dani Rodrik calls “thin
globalisation”. Instead of pursuing the utopian fantasy of powerful transnational institutions that can
govern a global market in a borderless world, social democrats and other progressive factions should
campaign for flexible international rules that maximise the freedom of democratic countries to structure
their internal economies and to adopt internal social contracts as their citizens see fit. Democracy and
liberty and equality are not gifts to be bestowed on a grateful humanity by a benevolent global elite of
technocrats and activists. If they are to last through the terrible storms ahead, democracy, liberty and equality
must be built from the ground up, one city, one province and one nation at a time.

Michael LIND is a co-founder of the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C. and author of
“Up From Conservatism: Why the Right is Wrong for America”.

References

Cosmopolitan Social Democracy, Queries 2 (8) / 2012, FEPS and Policy Network & Wiardi
Beckman Stichting, Brussels.

It is Time to Return to the Local

By Jonathan RUTHERFORD

Democracy creates the common good and it must be deepened and extended locally, nationally and across the European Union

The cosmopolitanism that dominated third way social democracy in the last decade was influenced by a utopian liberalism which promoted the individual over society. This neo-liberal form of cosmopolitanism constructed imaginary enemies out of patriotism, social solidarity, localism, tradition and people’s desire to belong. Its transactional politics associated all these traits with intolerance, chauvinism, nostalgia and a general inward- and backward-looking attitude. It valorised the restless, the new, the different, the global, the future, and the particular, over the familiar, the same, the local, the ordinary, the past and the whole. Like post-modernism it flattened out time, space and the hierarchy of values. Meaning was relative and endlessly slipping its linguistic moorings. Like post-modernism it disentangled people from the social and cultural ties that anchored them in the world and so helped to facilitate the commodification of labour and the expansion of market transactions into society. In the name of its utopian ideal of loving humanity in general it loved no-one in particular and created a peculiarly amoral and over-rationalised view of the world.

Third Way social democracy embraced a capitalist modernisation in which nothing was fixed or held in place. It celebrated the borderless, the mobile and those who uprooted themselves in the name of aspiration. It denigrated those who stayed put, who didn’t climb the greasy pole of meritocracy and who failed to seize the opportunities it provided for the enhancement of their individual human capital. In its view the world was made up of the individual, the market and the state and nothing much in between. Tony Blair described this world as unforgiving of frailty and no respecter of past reputations. And his response? Only those open to it will be rewarded by it. It was a politics that ended up presiding over an increasingly irresponsible, insecure and
alienated society. It gave rise to a freedom without belonging which encouraged a person’s economic rights over his or her moral obligations to others. It has left an intangible sense of dispossession. We are like strangers who do not quite feel at home; uncertain of who we are and of our relationship to the past we come from.

**What does ‘European social democracy’ stand for?**

Social democracy is losing its place in the world. It has no home in the lives of people. It does not speak for a common life or a common good, but has become an administered politics associated with technocratic elites and a centralised state. Its origins in the vast body of collectivist voluntary activity, in the societies for mutual improvement, in the friendly societies and self-governing institutes of the nineteenth century have faded into history. Its roots in local life and in the workplace have either disappeared or been grievously weakened. It represents everyone and no-one in particular. What does ‘European social democracy’ stand for? It believes in multiculturalism, but it suspects the iconography of working-class patriotism. It believes in fairness, but fairness has been colonised across the political spectrum to the point of meaninglessness. It is for solidarity; but, when in office, social democratic parties embraced liberal market policies that destroyed solidarity. Social democracy has lost its meaning and it is foundering and disoriented. Across Europe its traditional supporters are deserting it. Many have fallen into the precariat and have ceased to vote or have turned to the xenophobic social movements of the right which combine ethnic absolutism with a promise to look after ‘our people’.

Social democracy has recoiled from this visceral politics of loss and belonging. It has been deaf to the pain. People fear their country and economy and their own lives becoming out of control. Many fear a world without borders, not just national borders, but borders that define social order, family life and common decency. They fear a loss of their culture and their identity which provide their lives with meaning. Who are we? Disorientated cultures like our own throw up these questions but cannot answer them. People are left to cope with uncertainty, and the issue of immigration has refracted the anger of many into a brittle nationalism.

Social democracy responds to this anger with rational argument, facts and figures – immigration is a positive for national economic productivity. No-one listens. Social democracy’s support of a neo-liberal cosmopolitanism has served the interests of free flowing capital and not the interests of labour both migrant and settled. It has stoked insecurity, ignored cultural resentments and avoided incommensurabilities. It has given permission to pass each other on opposite sides of the road. The evasions could be ignored through the years of economic boom but not any more. The left must confront them and seize the politics of identity and belonging from the right. We must make the difficult journey through the loss, the rage against newcomers, the fear of strangers, and the nostalgia for an old way of life.

It is time to return to the local, re-engage with the everyday lives of people and rebuild a political movement of the common good and of workplace and community organising. There will be no European
revival of social democracy without strong national movements, and there will be no strong national movements without powerful local democratic organisation. We begin where our forefathers and foremothers began: from home, with a love of home and for a better future home.

**The future is conservative**

We are living at the beginning of a post-liberal decade and the future is conservative. I do not mean it will be Conservative with a political upper case ‘C’ – the right has no understanding of this moment. Nor do I mean it will be conservative with a lower case social ‘c’ – we will not retreat from equality for women or from anti-racism. Rather it will be characterised by a social and cultural mood – what Raymond Williams describes as a “structure of feeling” – that is about a desire to conserve, protect and improve the fundamental elements of social life which are people's relationships and family, their sense of belonging and identity, the stability and continuity of home and place, and the human need for social security. When individuals have these goods they can aspire and strive for something more in their lives. When too many people lack these goods, society is divided, anxious, insecure, and distrustful.

There can be no meaningful cosmopolitan society, nor hospitality toward the stranger under our present conditions of distrust and insecurity. The foundations of ethnic tolerance and mutual recognition lie in people having an affirming cultural identity that gives them esteem and dignity. There can be no internationalism without first a confident sense of one’s own domestic place in the world. A future home that can be shared with others and an ethic of hospitality involves the act of giving which is based upon the experience of having been given to. A mean, unequal and unjust society does not foster generosity. And so the precondition for a social form of cosmopolitanism organised around the common good requires a society in which all are equally valued and a political economy which generates productive wealth and equitably distributes it.

Nation and culture are the places where people create a sense of belonging and identity. Keynes understood that a shared set of national cultural values is necessary for economic development and a strong defence against the ideology of laissez-faire economics. In his 1933 essay on “National Self Sufficiency” he confronts the “decadent international but individualistic capitalism” that caused the Wall Street Crash. Its “self-destructive financial calculation governs every walk of life”, he writes. *It is not just, it is not virtuous - and it doesn't deliver the goods.* But what, he asks, shall we put in its place? For Keynes the question was an opportunity to forge an English cultural renascence. His economic theory is grounded in the idea of an economic community; shared traditions provide the language of collective experience. They are the pre-condition for reforming and strengthening the nation state which remains the political unit best equipped for managing globalisation and rebuilding the national economy. Keynes economic theory was a part of re-imagining English national cultural values. In Britain this historical and cultural re-imagining has continued with the growing confidence of the Celtic nations and the emergence of post-colonial, hybrid youth and popular cultures.

A cosmopolitan nation depends upon a national economy which is able to create decent jobs to sustain its population. It requires policy spaces of democratic deliberation to restructure and diversify the economy. Keynes wrote in his 1926 essay, *The End of Laissez Faire* that the ideal size for the unit of control and organisation of the economy is the semi-autonomous body that lies between the individual and the state and whose criterion of action is the public good. These kinds of intermediate institutions devolve power, strengthen civil society and create synergies between individual ambition and the common good.
Three themes underpin renationalising the economy. **First, ownership matters.** Unlike our economic competitors, the UK has failed to keep control of its key industries. We are well on the way to owning virtually none of our key economic assets. **Second, investment matters.** The British economy is suffering a lack of capital investment. Renationalisation requires a national investment bank and radical reform of the banking sector - no bank should be too big to fail. Regional banks can contribute to spreading wealth creation and a system of community banking will help to capitalise localities. A cap on interest rates will reduce personal indebtedness and undercut loan sharks. **Third, protection matters.** Britain has one of the least regulated labour markets in the rich world. Reform of European regulation and a European living wage can create a level playing field for EU migrant and indigenous workers. Strong trade unions are the best defence against exploitation.

A cosmopolitan national culture can only work if we develop Keynes insight of a ‘national economy’. Underpinning it in Britain must be a new contributory welfare covenant based on social insurance that provides genuine protection for all including the disabled and sick. The future is conservative but paradoxically it will also be cosmopolitan. Britain and most European countries are now migrant nations and we must find ways of creating a shared common life that unites us in our differences. To achieve this will require a further paradox. The future will also be radical. The power of capital must be made accountable and used for the common good. Democracy creates the common good and it must be deepened and extended locally, nationally and across the European Union. In these paradoxes lies the revival of social democracy.

Jonathan RUTHERFORD is editor of Soundings journal and professor of cultural studies at Middlesex University, UK.
For a long time, there has been little controversy within social-democratic movements around issues of foreign and European policy. International cooperation, European integration, development aid: these goals were undisputed and not politicised within the centre-left itself. European and international affairs were more or less the exclusive habitat for experts, foreign affairs specialists, Eurocrats, European officials and NGOs. International politics was warmly applauded at party congresses, confirming the “good feel” of international solidarity.

This ‘permissive consensus’ about social-democratic internationalism (or the ‘silent convention’ in the words of Olaf Cramme) has been broken. International and European affairs have become highly politicised, even within the social democratic constituencies. A lot has to do with the populist challenge to social democracy; in fact, all establishment consensus politics has been scrutinized and challenged by the populist revolt against “elite politics” in Europe. But the most affected seem to be international and European politics, which depend largely on a representative mandate of trust in diplomats, NGOs and experts. This geographical and expertise distance within international politics is in itself a vulnerability. It can easily be portrayed as ‘far away’ politics (‘far from our own bed politics’). The right-wing populist Geert Wilders party in the Netherlands for instance constantly refers to European and international affairs as “leftist hobbies”. Therefore, we are now witnessing harsh politicisation at three fault lines/fronts: 1. development aid; 2. international security (humanitarian interventions), and 3. European integration.

The most tragic is the erosion of international solidarity in the realm of development cooperation. Nativist-populist resistance and the constant pressure of the critical assessments of the ineffective impact of development aid undermines popular support, as well as the political self-confidence of the left. The books by Paul Collier (The Bottom Billion), William Easterley (The White Man’s Burden) and Dambisa Moyo (Dead Aid) have sparked an important debate on the productive and counterproductive effects of development aid, but have also given ammunition to the populist cynicism about international cooperation.
Development aid is one of the symbolic targets of right-wing populism against social-democracy. It is portrayed as wasting tax payers’ money on poor people far away countries; people we don’t know and don’t trust, mediated through NGOs which we cannot trust at all, because these NGOs consist of hypocritical left-wing “caviar socialists”, who travel “First Class” to the slums of poor Africa, settling in luxurious expat compounds. Development aid is suffering from a monstrous negative image problem. How can we bring facts back into the debate?

As a result of the post-9/11 military/humanitarian interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, international security affairs have also become highly politicised. In the Netherlands for example the Dutch Afghanistan mission caused a schism within the progressive left. The Dutch Greens and social-liberal D66 support police training mission in the Afghan region of Kunduz. PvdA and the socialist SP oppose this mission. Background: there is widespread scepticism about the positive contributions military interventions could de facto make to security, good governance and democracy in the region. To what extent do corrupt warlords profit from humanitarian interventions? To what extent do the intervening parties become part of domestic, internal conflicts themselves? To what extent do international security operations abroad/out of area contribute to national security at home, or do they have a counterproductive effect, feeding home-grown terrorism?

The European Project has, in particular, come under political pressure. See the unexpected controversies around the EU-Constitutional referenda in France, The Netherlands and Ireland, even splitting the social-democratic constituencies. See the actual economic and political crisis in the Eurozone, causing unprecedented tension between debtor countries and creditor countries. See the triple division between intergovernmentalists (looking for problem-solving capacity via a strengthening of the European Council), federalists (who look for a strengthening of the community powers of the Commission) and eurosceptics, who fear the negative impact on the national democracy and national welfare state of the European Construction. We are witnessing a return to the agenda of the debate on multi-speed Europe.

These new facets of the politicisation of international politics are also a product of the overall political and socio-economic situation. In Europe, centre-right or conservative-populist governments have reacted to the financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis with harsh monetarist-neoliberal austerity politics, putting national solidarity at risk. Within a “populist Zeitgeist”, national austerity politics is narrowing the space for international politics and cooperation. Why cut down on the national welfare state arrangements, sparing international aid? Why keep up the appearance of international solidarity, if the appearance of national solidarity is brutally broken? To what extent is national solidarity a precondition for international solidarity?

Social-democratic reactions to ‘discredited internationalism’

As a consequence of all this, the internationalism of social-democracy has been harshly pushed out of its comfort-zone. In light of the new political context, we have to rephrase all “standard” texts on European and international affairs in our elections manifestos and political platforms. We cannot simply “copy and paste” – at least not without more robust argumentation – the demand for 0.8% of GNP to be spent on development aid. We cannot write without reflection that social-democrats want, by any means at all, to maintain and strengthen the international rule of law – implying the permanent use of military intervention. We cannot transfer our classical line: “we support a strong and social Europe”.

How do social-democratic parties react to the highly polarised politicisation of international policy?

_Grosso modo_, three kinds of reactions can be distinguished, all with new pros and cons. We distinguish:

1. the social-democracy of fear;
2. The social-democracy of national interest;
3. The social-democracy of renewed taming of capitalism.

Social-democracy of fear boils down to a maximum international leap forward: total internationalism in order to adapt to the new world order. Adapt or perish! Become a global player, or become totally marginalised! This approach leads to a turbo-deepening and broadening of European integration: a more unified Europe, speaking with one voice in the worldwide arena, will be the only way to rescue European prosperity and European geopolitical influence alongside new emerging powers. This approach also entails a full commitment to fight climate change, leading to a strong reduction of CO$_2$ emissions and a more sustainable economy.

The shadow side of the apocalyptic social democratic politics of fear as a source for internationalism is vulnerability for falsification. What if the alarming trend scenarios of globalisation, climate change, shifting powers etc. turn out to be slightly overrated? See for instance how the future of Chinese world hegemony was put into perspective in the most recent issue of “Foreign Affairs”. How feasible will be the demand for one European voice in world affairs?

The second reaction, is, what one could call, the social-democratic discovery of the national interest. Sometimes social-democrats adopt the less enlightened variation, i.e. the blunt right-wing, ego-nationalistic concept of national interest: blaming the Greek population for the Greek eurocrisis or blaming the Africans for African poverty. But there are also more sophisticated ways of finding new legitimisations for foreign policy, based on a more enlightened idea of national interest. The best social-democratic example of that was the public debate on international affairs, which was organised in Norway by its social-democratic government, under the heading: “Norwegian interests and globalisation”. In its final report we find this more sophisticated approach: ‘The primary objective of Norwegian foreign policy is to safeguard Norway’s interests. In the Government’s view an interest-based foreign policy is one that is designed to systematically advance the welfare and security of Norwegian society and promote our fundamental political values. In order to pursue a targeted and predictable foreign policy over time, it is important that we know and are aware of these interests, and this is an essential point of reference for Norway’s dealing with other countries. Maintaining a focus on interests is also crucial in enhancing our ability to set priorities between various needs, strategies and choices of action in our foreign policy.’

Accordingly, these national interests get enlarged and reshaped to “mutual interests”, or “common, shared interests”. National interest are interwoven with international ones, similarly as national and international public values: ‘As the world becomes increasingly woven together into one global society, Norway’s foreign policy interests can no longer be reduced to narrow self-interest. One of the consequences of globalisation is that Norway’s national interests and our political values are closely intertwined. Our foreign policy must therefore be based on the principle of extended self-interest’. There are a number of examples of this: security policy is intended to ensure the physical integrity of the individual citizen and protect against threats and attacks by foreign powers, but at the same time it must also be designed to safeguard the principles of a liberal society, such as the rule of law and human rights, which play an essential role in maintaining peace between countries and preventing radicalism and conflicts in many parts of the world.’

---

Comparable to this approach of finding new legitimisations, is the concept of ‘global public goods’, a central issue in Dutch policy reviews. By emphasising that issues like climate change and resource scarcities require globally coordinated solutions, it can be argued that this is in the interest both of developing countries and the Netherlands (see inter alia the advice of the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy: Less Pretention, More Ambition. Development Policy in times of Globalisation).

One of the problems of this national interest-perspective is that it narrows itself down to an analysis on country-level only. International and transnational relations and trends are underestimated. It also tends to become a rather a-political approach, not putting into question the process of globalisation, nor criticising its polarising effects on different countries, economies, and groups of people. Many problems are indeed caused by the unbalanced impact of globalisation, producing big inequalities and conflict potential between and within nation states. To confront these, a cross-national political approach is needed, not one of national interest.

A third reaction can be found in a renewed ideologisation of social democracy on an international level. Using the international arena to tame global (financial) capitalism and neo-liberalism. For many social democrats, the EU was seen as a Rhineland buffer against global ‘Anglo-Saxon-type’ of capitalism: Social Europe against a Neoliberal World Order. See the PES-manifesto of the European Elections of 2007 – ‘Market failure’ became the new prevailing motive, shifting the focus steadily from internal to external concerns. Neo-liberal globalisation was the designated enemy.

But this strategy is not without problems either. To what extent, have Third Way social-democrats been accessories to the derailment of the international financial markets themselves? See how the Clinton and Obama governments are accused of being ‘Wall Street governments’. On top of that: ‘When the global financial crisis broke, the dominant picture, however, was that of a significant gap which had emerged between the political rhetoric and the prospect of real change. Social democracy got stuck in a lonely fight against global developments whose actual implications were often ill-understood or not appreciated by the European public, let alone shared by other global players. To many, the processes of Europeanisation and globalisation looked almost identical, making the task of pitching the former against the latter all the more difficult. Moreover, the policy solutions presented by the centre-left, from a “Robin Hood” tax to a “Green New Deal”, meant little to citizens concerned with stagnant wages, job security and migration.

Sadder and wiser: a new social-democratic internationalism?

All this being said - how should a renewed social-democratic internationalism look? Social democratic internationalism for the 21st century should be intrinsically motivated, directly social and democratic in its consequences rather than indirectly, and therefore closely linked to the interests and values of our constituencies. We will need to recast globalisation’s narrative, and show more respect to the conditions for sustainable solidarity.

- The prerequisite of intrinsic motivation implies that we need a positive narrative of our own. Sustainable engagement cannot be built solely on references to disasters that will materialise unless we do things that we would otherwise be (intrinsically) reluctant to do (e.g. moving decision-making power away from national democratically legitimated actors to centralised, technocratic actors).


7 O. Cramme, op. cit. p. 6.
• Our internationalism should be more directly social and democratic of a nature. For too long our internationalism has boiled down to liberalism-light, while we have invested our hope in the positive indirect off-spins of economic growth for social-democratic objectives. Indeed, the globalisation and financialisation of the economy has contributed to rapid economic growth, enabling social-democratic governments to continue, among other things, financing strong welfare states. The negative side-effects of this strategy have however received too little attention.

• We need a distinctive social and democratic conceptualisation of national interest. Preoccupied as we have been with the conceptualisation of our global values, we have left the definition of national interest to the right, resulting in an emphasis on the interests of capital. A social democratic conceptualisation of the national interest should emphasise human security at a decent level for all. That means: controlling and managing the crisis vulnerability of global financial capitalism; fighting the extremes of exploitation and exclusion, caused by this system; fighting race-to-the-bottom competitions in labour relations and social arrangements; and maintaining, by any means ay all, the capacity for national welfare democracies to uphold their social standards.

• The ultimate necessity to uphold and defend parliamentary democracy against the standard reaction to the coordination problems of the global world: centralisation and technocratisation.

• The need for another idea and concept of globalisation. See Dani Rodrik, who points at "the fundamental political trilemma of the world economy": "We cannot simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination, and economic globalisation. If we want to push globalisation further, we have to give up either the nation state or democratic politics. If we want to maintain and deepen democracy, we have to choose between the nation state and international economic integration. And if we want to keep the nation state and self-determination, we have to choose between deepening democracy and deepening globalisation. Our troubles have their roots in our reluctance to face up to these ineluctable choices.

Even though it is possible to advance both democracy and globalisation, the trilemma suggests this requires the creation of a global political community that is vastly more ambitious than anything we have seen to date or are likely to experience soon. It would call for global rulemaking by democracy, supported by accountability mechanisms that go far beyond what we have at present. Democratic global governance is a chimera. There are too many differences among nation states, I shall argue, for their needs and preferences to be accommodated within common rules and institutions. Whatever global governance we can muster will support only a limited version of economic globalisation. The great diversity that marks our current world renders hyperglobalisation incompatible with democracy.

So we have to make some choices. Let me be clear about mine: democracy and national determination should trump hyper-globalisation. Democracies have the right to protect their social arrangements, and when this right clashes with the requirements of the global economy, it is the latter that should give way.

You might think that this principle would be the end of globalisation. Not so. Re-empowering national democracies will in fact place the world economy on a safer, healthier footing. And therein lies the ultimate paradox of globalisation. A thin layer of international rules that leaves substantial room for manoeuvre by national governments is a better globalisation. It can address globalisation’s ills while preserving its substantial economic benefits. We need smart globalisation, not maximum globalisation."

---

Human solidarity can remain the source and the driver of an intrinsic motivation of internationalism. People want to do good. People want to help other people in need. That’s part of the human condition. But long-lasting solidarity requires fundamental and specific conditions. “Regarding the prospect for solidarity, research shows that most people are willing to engage in solidaristic cooperation for common goals even if they will not personally benefit from this materially. However, for this to happen, three specific conditions have to be in place. First, people have to be convinced that the policy is morally justified (substantial justice). Secondly, people have to be convinced that most other agents can also be trusted to cooperate (solidaristic justice), that is that other agents are likely to abstain from “free-riding”. Thirdly, people have to be convinced that the policy can be implemented in a fair and even-handed manner (procedural justice)””, as Bo Rothstein argued.

Conclusion:

The global financial-economic crisis puts new pressures on international solidarity, insofar as internal solidarity within nation states is hurt and sacrificed by harsh austerity politics, affecting the middle class more severely than the affluent few. For social-democrats the balance, the coherence between national welfare solidarity and international solidarity should be the core of their preoccupation and programme. No international solidarity without national solidarity; and vice versa. That is the new face of social-democratic internationalism.

Monika SIE DHIAN HO and René CUPERUS are director and senior research fellow, respectively, at the Wiardi Beckman Stichting, The Hague.

References


Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008-2009) Interests, Responsibilities and Opportunities. The main features of Norwegian Foreign Policy.


Queries

03
The oft-declared ambition of progressives is to construct a new narrative, which would evocatively signal what kind of a society they wish to build in the 21st century. Cosmopolitanism has much to offer in this regard, as a framing concept that speaks to the need for a New Social Deal in many western capitalist democracies. Based on ideological principles, it could serve to help achieve a greater degree of social justice in our societies. The challenges posed on one side, and the need for solutions on the other, has been the motivation that brought the people of the Occupy Movement, los Indignados and others onto the streets. These protests have changed substantially the framework of political discourse. In his article, Michael D. KENNEDY considers the impact of this and advocates an international reaction of the worldwide left. Society also remains the heart of the deliberations of Lydia D. MORRIS’ piece, where she examines the challenges for cosmopolitanism from a perspective of multilayered migration. Her point is that a new vision, granting rights and responsibilities for all, will require a shift in the cognitive and normative orientations of the ordinary citizen. Louis LEMKOW echoes this thesis, showing the importance of attitudes in implementing the principle of intergenerational solidarity.
The left enjoys many connotations, but it is hard to imagine a left worthy of the name that does not take worldly obligation seriously. Internationalism historically has been the word used to frame that commitment, but cosmopolitanism is rapidly taking its place for good reason. This outlook accompanies globalization as a new frame with which to articulate a worldly sensibility based on emergent networks and publics engaging world issues. The solidarities that develop out of such new global articulation vary in a number of ways, but are usefully distinguished by the different ways in which resemblance and recognition function to generate not only symbolic but consequential solidarity. Mobilizations over the last year – especially those supporting internet freedom and those challenging inequality: promise a change in the worldly left’s articulation of solidarity.

**The Sociological Cosmopolitanism of a Worldly Left**

Cosmopolitanism, more than socialism, nationalism, or internationalism, is an emergent consciousness based on alternative communicative networks and disarticulated global threats. With that, it is useful to consider the dilemmas of a worldly left alongside the problems associated with making cosmopolitanism more than a philosophical disposition.

The worldly conditions making cosmopolitanism not only philosophically attractive but also sociologically real are new. Ulrich Beck has done much to make that argument, beginning with a clear sense of the cosmopolitan outlook, or a:
Global sense, a sense of boundarylessness. An everyday, historically alert, reflexive awareness of ambivalences in a milieu of blurring differentiations and cultural contradictions. It reveals not just the ‘anguish’ but also the possibility of sharing one’s life and social relations under conditions of cultural mixture. It is simultaneously a skeptical, disillusioned, self-critical outlook.¹

Not all cosmopolitan outlooks are, of course, the same. For example, in a familiar fashion after Marx, Beck himself distinguishes between a kind of passive and a more active cosmopolitanism, not unlike the distinction between class in and class for itself.² That distinction, however, requires a base of which to be more and less aware.

There are many things that go under the heading of globalization. Beck has included the global networking of markets, the transformation of information and communication technology, universal demands for rights and democracy, the stream of images from the global culture industry, the emergence of a polycentric world polity with many more actors, and the articulation of truly global problems like poverty and environmental destruction alongside transcultural conflicts³ as conditions making the outlook sensible, and not just desirable. Indeed, when faced with a variety of world risks like ozone depletion, tropical deforestation, and unregulated flows of weapons of mass destruction, the idea that global threats could create a global society does not seem to be merely philosophical wish-fulfillment.⁴

These threats are not, however, simply cumulative. They generate various cosmopolitical responses that reflect the variety of movements the World Social Forum represents, and more. These are disarticulated threats that a cosmopolitan outlook may, or may not, recognize as common. After all, recognition depends not only on the object of recognition, but on the particular location from which that cosmopolitan viewpoint develops.

Craig Calhoun has argued that cosmopolitanism might really be the “class consciousness of the frequent traveler” whose imaginaries suggest an escape from locale. That, however, is sociologically unrealistic for in fact all cosmopolitanisms

reflect influences of social location and cultural tradition. The ways in which any one such location and tradition opens to understanding or valuing of others are specific and never exhaust all of the possible ways.⁵

Hiro Saito develops these points effectively using Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory. This orientation is especially helpful for addressing the emergent and contingent qualities of different cosmopolitanisms, highlighting how networks produce their own practical orientations to the world and their own particular cosmopolitanisms. By rejecting the “epistemological privilege” not only of critical theory, but also of Europe, in defining cosmopolitanism, Saito proposes that we consider

how the normative ideal of cosmopolitanism facilitates people’s extension of their attachments to foreign others, and of how new attachments to foreign others in turn influence people’s normative commitment to the world as a whole as well as their identity as members of humanity.⁶

---

Calhoun reinforces and extends Saito’s point: practical cosmopolitans go beyond vague appeals to humanity, which are far too thin to create real solidarity. Instead, we need to attend to how transnational publics are constructed through meaningful communications.\(^7\)

I have previously proposed that one might even go further to consider the variety of publics so constructed and assess the degrees to which they reflect the systemic conditions to which they respond, or, on the basis of their own reflexive dispositions and communicative competencies, recognize and articulate new needs and possibilities that don’t simply reflect actually existing global conditions and networks.\(^8\) Two mobilizations over the last year suggest just that kind of transformation of cosmopolitanism’s sense.

### Cosmopolitan Solidarity through Resemblance and ACTA\(^9\)

Following the USA, Japan and others, on January 26, 2012, representatives of most of the European Union’s countries, as well as the European Commission’s representative, signed the Anti Counterfeiting Treaty Agreement (ACTA). After earlier contests over kin legislation, most in the know expected electronic protest of some sort. In the USA, for example, Wikipedia went dark on January 18, 2012, to challenge the Stop Online Piracy Act in the US House and Protect Intellectual Property Act in the Senate. But the European protests against ACTA went far beyond what happened in the USA. And this mobilization has gone far beyond what most of those promoting ACTA and other elaborations of intellectual property revisions anticipated.

Most thought these disputes would be business world battles over how to define intellectual property, with content providers and internet service providers taking the lead opposing positions in the contest.\(^11\) But it became something quite different, redefined as a contest over threats to freedom and the conditions of creativity in a digital world.\(^12\) What one might call “civi-digital society”\(^13\) hit the fiber networks and streets across Poland.\(^14\) A few weeks later, on February 11, more than 30,000 people across more than 100 cities of the European Union marched to demand that their fundamental rights stay protected, and that their interests as citizens take precedence over the rights of content providers worried about losing money due to copyright infringement.\(^15\)

While the different Pirate parties might readily stand with this mobilization, and benefit politically by it, various liberal and left political parties in the European Parliament have followed that mobilization to move against ACTA, focusing primarily on questions of democracy, transparency, and rights. And it appears at the time of this writing, that while ACTA is not officially dead in Europe, the European Commission Vice President

---

\(^7\) Saito develops this work further in an unpublished paper over how to understand the cosmopolitics involved in memory contests over the Asia Pacific War, especially Japan’s wartime atrocities.


\(^13\) I introduced this term on twitter during the ACTA protests in Europe; I have not seen its use elsewhere, but would be glad to learn from others of its previous usage.

\(^14\) And has now entered popular culture in Poland: “Michał Wąsniak @rysiekpl tweeted, “Apparently it’s as dangerous as #ACTA” already entered the day-to-day Polish language. Interesting development. #copyfraud” on April 4, 2012.


---

### Queries

48
responsible for the digital agenda, Neelie Kroes, has recently anticipated such, and in that statement, acknowledged its defeat by a “strong new political voice”.

It would be a pity if this movement’s unanticipated mobilization became only a new element with which compromises are found in fashioning internet legislation. There is far greater opportunity at hand than to defend existing rights and practices within a world defined by procedural rationality and existing political institutions. After hours of actual and virtual public discussion, Poland’s prime minister, Donald Tusk, whose party was part of the European alliance that led on ACTA, declared that the “concept of property rights – the Internet has turned this traditional reality upside down”. By drawing on refined policy documents a new political vision could mobilize civi-digital society across Europe, and the world, not only to defend what exists, but to develop a vision of the future that reframes the relationship between property and the public good. The mobilization against ACTA has shown that popular mobilization, in alliance with new business models, has made traditional defenders of property rights an anachronism. The next left should be in the forefront of property’s redefinition, and learn from civi-digital society. But civi-digital society could also learn from the next left.

There is already a powerful emergent identification around this anti-ACTA mobilization. “Web-Kids” reflects a European movement that might wear the Guy Fawkes mask as a symbol, but could dig deeper in its challenge to those who define injustice. This is already potentially a part of the anti-ACTA movement, especially to the extent that this was not only a mobilization against constraints on private file sharing but also protest against the ways in which this legislation risks access to generic drugs and public health in poorer regions. The next left itself needs to dig deeper anyway, and it can start with the occupy movement and its kin.

Cosmopolitanism can too easily imply commonality based on similarity before universality. Sometimes that reflects the class consciousness of the frequent traveler. It may be a response to real global risk. It might even, as the case above suggests, not only reflect rejection but be an act of projection about new identities, issues, and processes. But for cosmopolitanism to be progressive, and critical, it needs to develop a sensibility beyond the similarities on which civi-digital solidarity relied; it needs to develop a deeper cosmopolitanism that engages differences through meaningful connections. Occupy has changed the terms of that discussion on national, but also a global scale.

---


19 P. Czerski, We the Web Kids, February 15, 2012 http://pastebin.com/0xXV8k7k


21 I draw here on what I have learned in a variety of ways from Craig Calhoun, most especially in his volume in preparation, Cosmopolitanism and Belonging: American Power, European Integration, and Global Citizenship. For one of his inspirations, and mine, one should consider the work of Charles Taylor on the politics of recognition, whose foundation in dialogue can be found here: A. Gutmann, Ch Taylor, K. A. Appiah, J. Habermas, S. C. Rockefeller, M. Walzer, S. Wolf, (eds.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Taylor was recently awarded the Bruno Kreisky prize for the ways in which Taylor brings the challenges of secular assumptions into dialogue with justice and equality. His work invites us to think about solidarity and difference together, most especially in a secular age where individuals seek authenticity as communal membership is more intensely desired (Ch. Taylor, A Secular Age, Harvard University Press, 2007). That such work is now recognized and celebrated by the intensely secular social democratic tradition in Austria is a critical step toward recognizing the challenge of difference in Europe beyond what (Christian) secular assumptions allow (http://www.bka.gv.at/site/Infodate__03.01.2011/7459/default.aspx?id40075)
Occupy Beyond the USA

In *The Next Left and Its Social Movements*, I drew upon Todd Gitlin’s magnificent new book on the Occupy movement to elaborate its politics and possible consequences. I won’t address that US-based movement here, given my focus on global articulations of solidarity. However, it is critical to emphasize just a few points.

The Occupy Movement is about challenging and changing conventional politics. There is, of course, an inner ring of the movement complete with its own culture and rituals. But the greater significance of the movement rests in the discursive shift it has enabled. Now, it’s not only radical movements and the left that talk about inequality. It is no longer possible for conventional politicians to avoid talking about inequality. Thus, it’s not only a question about whether the Occupy movement is or is not feasible or sustainable. It’s a matter of figuring how the conventional Left and this new movement will, in dialogue, and sometimes in contest, produce a new kind of politics that puts inequality far more effectively at the center of transformative politics.

The Occupy Movement is not, of course, limited to the USA. There are movements that very much resemble Occupy Wall Street across the world, with Occupy LSX in London being the most obvious given their common protest at the core of world financial powers. But Occupy is more than a movement of resemblance, and might, in fact, mobilize through a politics of recognition appreciation for how occupy movements struggle over very particular local contests even as they struggle to recognize their implication in global chains of inequality and injustice. Vetevendosje’s letter of solidarity with the Occupy movement was based on just that kind of recognition.

There are too few who might recognize that act of solidarity, but more should. Vetevendosje is the most substantial opposition movement in Kosovo, calling not only for “self-determination”, as the name in Albanian implies, but also about greater equality and justice within nations and across them. Within the Kosovar parliament and also a social force in civil society, Vetevendosje is among the most innovative in its repertoire of movement techniques and political maneuvers. But perhaps its most powerful force lies in its self-positioning as a force for “truth” against what it says is the “institutional lie” of the international protectorate in which Kosova’s move toward sovereignty is embedded.

Solidarity with Kosova’s struggle for sovereignty is not a simple point around which global solidarity might be realized, given the ways in which that movement is itself embedded in a geopolitics overdetermined elsewhere. But the idea that there are great institutional lies around which global regimes of power and inequality are organized is a point around which a cosmopolitanism from below might be developed, a cosmopolitanism grounded in claims about justice and equality. Such a cosmopolitan solidarity might be developed through Kosova, but it is more immediately recognizable in Egypt.

The mobilization in Tahrir Square has been the most recognizable global precedent for Occupy Wall Street. Even beyond resemblance, Egyptian activists in particular have connected with OWS not just symbolically, but physically and strategically in order to figure out how the recognition of difference and variable implication in chains of inequality and injustice might turn symbolic solidarity into consequential...
solidarity.\textsuperscript{27} In particular, Atef Said, a sociologist and human rights lawyer from Egypt, is among those mediating and mobilizing around solidarity with Tahrir Square.\textsuperscript{28} His November 21, 2011, Facebook posting identified explicitly how solidarity might be developed. He writes,

\begin{quote}
A bloodbath is taking place now in Egypt in Tahrir Square, the icon of all justice seekers and activists of the occupy movement worldwide and the symbol of liberation from all oppression and exploitation of capital and dictatorship (Tahrir in Arabic literally means liberation). Most of the weaponry used against protesters, especially tear gas containers, is U.S.-made. Egyptian military is dependent on the U.S. military aid, as 1.3 $ billion goes yearly to the Egyptian military.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

On November 22, those who occupied Tahrir Square asked the world for the following actions of support:

- Occupy/shut-down Egyptian embassies worldwide. Now they represent the junta; reclaim them for the Egyptian people.
- Shut down the arms dealers. Do not let them make it and ship it.
- Shut down the part of your government dealing with the Egyptian junta.\textsuperscript{30}

Actions have become even more specific and targeted. For example, in those same postings about calls for solidarity with Tahrir, activists proposed to assemble on December 1 outside the gates of the Combined Systems International plant in Jamestown, Pennsylvania to protest sales of those tear gas canisters used by the Egyptian military to repress protesters in Tahrir. Protests at CSI are more difficult given the relatively isolated location and the dependence of the local community on the plant's employment, making the 24-person turnout not altogether surprising. But rather than focus on numbers, one should consider the object's example for consequential solidarity.

This CSI protest was not a simple affirmation of support for Tahrir by Americans, but a direct protest by Americans against the Egyptian government's violence. It focused attention on the ways in which US government policy and US corporate practice facilitate that violence. It is an expression of solidarity that, with sufficient mobilization, public recognition, and policy response, could alter the geopolitics that connects Egypt with the USA. That is, perhaps, what Tahrir's call for solidarity is about, and why its call extends beyond its immediate importance. This solidarity is not based on resemblance, but recognition of various implications in chains of inequality and injustice.

But is that cosmopolitanism?

**Consequential Solidarity, Cosmopolitanism and the Worldly Left**

We might call it worldly, we might call it internationalism, or we might call it cosmopolitan. Connotations matter, but those associations might also change as we move beyond philosophy, and even political programs, to consider how mobilizations develop solidarity across borders and political visions develop in their wake.

\textsuperscript{27} E.g., R. Keating. From Tahrir Square to Wall Street: What can Occupy Wall Street Learn from the Activists Who Took Down Hosni Mubarak?, [in:] Foreign Policy, October 5, 2011.
\textsuperscript{28} For his account of the first wave of Egyptian revolution, see: A. Said, at The Immanent Frame.
\textsuperscript{29} A. Said, Save the Egyptian Revolution from Military Rule - Your Solidarity is Needed with the Egyptian Revolution, Facebook, Nov. 21, 2011.
\textsuperscript{30} http://occupywallst.org/article/answering-egypt-call-solidarity/
The mobilization of civi-digital society across Europe was clearly an act of cosmopolitan solidarity in every sense of the term. Depending on how the movement develops, it could articulate a different sense of the worldly left, where freedom and creativity depend on new forms of property that connect more clearly with the public good by design rather than through derivatives or derivation. This movement has already been, and could be become even more, an exemplar of a cosmopolitan solidarity of consequence. But it is also too easy if our ambitions are to dig our solidarity deeper in global and social terms.

The Occupy movement and its mobilizing kin across the world suggest just such a deeper solidarity. That depth does not rest only on its focus on inequalities and the abuse of all sorts of power by a 1% at the cost of the other 99. It is, rather, an invitation to attend more substantially to how global chains of inequality and injustice connect us, and how acts of solidarity in one place might bear consequence for those in another. That demands not just a solidarity based on resemblance, but one based on recognition of the qualities of ties that bind us and that diminish us all. Clearly such networked publics exist, but a worldly left should ask how to multiply those ties not only across issues, but to multiply the consequences of recognizing those connections. And that might mean focusing less on the next election, and more on how to redefine the public so that injustice, creativity, and freedom go together.

Civi-digital mobilizations around ACTA and the Occupy movement and their kin not only suggest contrasts in cosmopolitan solidarity, but a synergy that could make their combination’s value go well beyond the multiplication of Guy Fawkes masks toward the remaking of a worldly left deserving the name.

Michael D. KENNEDY (@Prof_Kennedy) is professor of sociology and international studies at Brown University, Providence (RI). He also serves currently as Executive Committee Chair of the Social Science Research Council’s Board of Directors.
References


Multi-Layered Migration and the Cosmopolitan Challenge

By Lydia D. MORRIS

The cosmopolitan challenge

When Hannah Arendt adopted the phrase the right to have rights she was reflecting on the stateless persons generated in the aftermath of the 1st world war, but writing in a moment when the world was poised on the brink of a new era, to be ushered in by the launching of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Her reflections thus offer an interesting opening for thinking about the challenge of creating universal rights, especially in relation to trans-national migrants, and they turn upon the following paradox:

We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights and a right to belong to some kind of organised community only when millions of people had emerged who had lost and could not regain those rights. Her comments stem from what was seen as a problematic relationship between citizenship and human rights, illuminated by the position of cross-border migrants and more especially asylum seekers. When large numbers of people live outside their national country of origin and membership, their access to basic rights marks the level of commitment to a notion of shared humanity, and to what has come to be termed cosmopolitanism.

Contemporary cosmopolitan thinking poses a challenge for the social sciences in requiring a fundamental reconceptualisation of society. Thus Beck has questioned the viability of the container image of society associated with a methodological nationalism, which takes the boundaries of society to be synonymous with the boundaries of the nation state. This is the context for Fine’s observation that cosmopolitanism entails both a de-naturing and de-centring of the nation state. According to Beck, we must begin to think of society not as a bounded entity but as a network of social forces and trans-national

2 Ibid p.296
3 Ibid. p.296-7
movements which have no clearly delimited geographical home. He therefore argues that the social changes associated with globalisation require a cosmopolitan outlook which can recognise and accommodate the permeability of national borders. However, he distinguishes between the normative and the empirical manifestations of such an outlook; the former referring to the level of ideals, and the latter to the extent of actual movement towards a more cosmopolitan society.

The normative content is captured by the notion of the world citizen, which embraces the idea of membership in a world community fuelled by a cosmopolitan empathy and underpinned by the principles of universal human rights. The argument is not that the nation state would be redundant in a new cosmopolitan order, but rather that it would occupy a critical position in building new forms of belonging and entitlement. At the empirical level, however, Beck and Sznaider (2007) recognise that nationalism persists as a co-existing and often conflicting force which may push against the manifestations of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, Habermas notes a peculiar tension arising between the universal meaning of human rights and the local conditions of their realisation.

The trans-national migrant is a key figure in this scenario and the tension between cosmopolitan ideals and national interests will often be played out in. However, the cosmopolitan project remains conflictual and contested. In this essay I briefly outline three aspects of rights as they relate to trans-national migration and asylum seeking – recognition, participation, and governance, before considering their interconnections, and how they point towards the next steps for cosmopolitanism.

**Rights and recognition**

It has long been recognised that the significance of rights reaches beyond legal guarantees to stand as a marker of social status and belonging, and hence of recognition. An early example of this position is to be found in the work of T.H.Marshall, and his seminal essay on "Citizenship and Social Rights", which is about the role of rights in confirming equal social standing, or what would now be termed recognition. Though his focus is on citizenship as the marker of membership in society, Marshall’s writing has a broader application in helping us to think about the role of rights as an expression of social worth: a kind of basic human equality associated with the concept of full membership of the community. Indeed, he makes the interesting claim that a degree of class inequality can be tolerated provided that it does not cut too deep, and that the equality of status is assured.

However, Marshall has been criticised for his failure to consider the exclusionary aspects of citizenship, which come into play in relation to trans-national migration, and there is now a set of more pressing questions in relation to rights and recognition, for:

*In the cosmopolitan constellation sociology is...concerned with the formation of post-national and cross-national bonds, or who belongs and who does not, and how inclusion and exclusion arise.*

Charles Taylor offers the best known linkage between rights and recognition in relation to the position

---

9. Ibid. p.6
of minority groups, and his work was important in two ways; firstly, in seeing collective cultures as closely tied to the personal identity of group members, and secondly, in seeing the affirmation of a right to difference (through cultural rights) as a form of social recognition. The absence of such recognition is argued to inflict damage on the individual’s sense of self and self-worth, and therefore on their identity, in a form of mis-recognition. Taylor ties this linkage to a broader development in the terrain of rights, also apparent in Marshall’s work, and manifest in the move from ascription to universalism. Hence: with the movement from honour to dignity has come a politics of universalism, emphasising the equal dignity of all citizens. \textsuperscript{2}

In an important alternative to assimilationist approaches to minority groups, Taylor argues that toleration of difference is insufficient for recognition without some more positive valuing of diversity as of worth in its own right.

Despite the hugely significant impact of Taylor’s argument, it has two limitations for thinking about the position of migrants: firstly, it is confined to cultural rights, and raises the question of whether the argument about recognition and mis-recognition can apply to other aspects of entitlement; secondly, writing with the position of French Canadians in mind, he makes repeated reference to equality and dignity for all citizens. So an interesting question arises as to the dynamic of recognition beyond cultural rights, and with reference to trans-national migrants who do not possess the full status of citizenship. Here we can look to the work of Axel Honneth \textsuperscript{13} which is concerned with a much broader array of rights and, like Marshall’s essay, postulates that full membership in a rights-granting community amounts to a form of moral approbation and a mark of social worth. Honneth therefore starts from a view of rights as grounded in citizenship, and rooted in his conception of society as an ethically integrated community of free citizens \textsuperscript{14} which shapes the individual’s sense of self-worth through a recognition of their positive contribution to society.

In this argument the granting of rights through membership is based on a set of requirements which reflect the conditions for belonging, thus carrying an idealised notion of the good citizen, while conversely a denial of membership and rights will carry the opposite connotation. There are therefore two dimensions of rights at work; rights as flowing from a formal legal status of citizenship, and rights as expressive of the informal conferral of social esteem. It is in the context of this second dimension of rights that Honneth speaks of the social medium within which the law operates \textsuperscript{15} and also of supplemental cultural interpretations \textsuperscript{16} of social worth. Although Honneth has been criticised for the unacceptable communitarian baggage \textsuperscript{17} that this theory carries, an analysis of rights in communitarian terms does not necessarily imply its endorsement. Indeed, Honneth sees the establishment of universal human rights as the final stage of a longer process of development documented in Marshall’s chronological account of citizenship rights – away from ascription and towards inclusion.

While for Marshall the inclusionary dimension of rights was addressed through to the internal functioning of citizenship, Honneth sees the logical conclusion of a move away from ascription to be the institutionalisation of universal human rights. He is also interested in the possibility that the social experience of disrespect could generate struggles for recognition through rights, and one example may be found when groups excluded

---

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. p.37.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. p.12-3.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. p.122.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. p.126.
\textsuperscript{17} N. Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics, [in:] N. Fraser & A. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, Verso London 2003, p.10.
from full citizenship and its associated rights make a claim to rights based on universal guarantees. There is an obvious link here with the position of trans-national migrants who, despite advances are commonly perceived as signalling an emergent post-national society, do not have access to the full array of citizen rights. So the contemporary position of trans-national migrants and asylum seekers with regard to rights provides a litmus test of how far the situation described by Arendt has now changed.

## Rights and participation

For Benhabib the very question exposes a dilemma at the heart of liberal democracy, whereby claims to sovereign self-determination co-exist with adherence to the universal principles of human rights. Hence:

> There is not only a tension but often an outright contradiction, between human rights declarations and states’ sovereign claims to control their borders as well as to monitor the quality and quantity of admittees.

This has been expressed by Habermas in terms of the Janus faced nature of the nation state:

> Modern democracies act in the name of universal principles which are then circumscribed within a particular civic community.

In formulating a normative approach to this paradox, Benhabib observes that attempts to develop theories of global justice have been curiously silent on the matter of trans-national migration, given that a permanent alien status is not compatible with the liberal-democratic ethos. Indeed, alongside the erosion of state sovereignty, we also often find its vigorous re-assertion, especially with respect to the defence of national borders. Hence Grande emphasizes the force of migration as a polarizing issue in which: *The lowering and unbundling of national boundaries …renders them more salient.* Here we come to my second theme – that of participation, for Benhabib frames the matter as a problem for the principles of deliberative democracy, according to which:

> only those norms and normative institutional arrangements are valid which can be agreed to by all concerned under special argumentation situations.

Hence, a discourse theory of democracy requires morally justifiable closure, and yet as Habermas argues, there is no clear normative explanation for the boundaries of political inclusion. Indeed, within the territory of the nation state there are many non-citizens who fall under the authority of the law but have no voice in its formulation. The discursive scope of all those affected by the immigration regulations of any given polity would be extremely wide, yet according to Benhabib, discourse theory cannot articulate any justifiable criteria for their exclusion. While a communitarian approach would seek justification in the fact of already existing social and political communities, and a realist approach would assert the supremacy of political interest over moral constraints, discourse ethics points to the necessity of mediation – between the moral and the political, or in effect between human rights universalism and national particularism. A tension between the two is an inherent aspect of the contemporary nation state system – rule by a distinctive bounded notion of “the

---

20. Ibid. p.2
people”, but through processes and institutions that embrace universal principles. Yet in Benhabib’s view, modern constitutional democracy is based on the belief that these two commitments can be used to limit each other through what she refers to as democratic iteration. Hence:

We can render the distinctions between “citizens” and “aliens”, “us” and “them”, fluid and negotiable through (such) democratic iterations.25

However, as Benhabib herself argues, the rights of those present on the territory but lacking full membership of the nation are negotiated on a conflictual terrain where national interests and human rights may come into confrontation. Honneth’s interest in the experience of disrespect as a motivating force behind the claim to rights by those outside of citizenship is obviously relevant here. For them, a question remains as to how far membership of the community of humanity can secure basic human rights, or better put, how far have we moved from the time of Arendt’s dismal judgment on the scope for trans-national universals? In fact, the constitution of liberal democracy is not quite the paradox it is presented as being – if the commitment to universals is confined to members of the national community via national citizenship, then they are not universals at all.

## Rights and governance

The exclusion of non-citizens from full political membership reflects what is perhaps the last bastion of citizen privilege, and many basic universal rights have indeed been extended beyond national belonging, though they operate with a legitimate hierarchy of absolute, limited and qualified rights. Absolute rights will always involve difficult questions of interpretation, while limited or qualified rights offer scope for equivocation in the name of national interests. Here we come to the third issue for the present essay - rights as a form of governance, for differentiated access to rights has been a central plank of attempts by national governments to control trans-national migration. Throughout the post-war period the member states of Europe have been faced with a set of conflictual issues, and thus control over welfare and the labour market sit alongside labour demand and a commitment to human rights, which can be restricted but rarely completely denied.26

One of the ways in which individual member states, as well as the European Union as a whole, have attempted to manage these multiple influences has been by the designation of varied legal statuses with different rights attached. I have used the concept of civic stratification to describe this process, a term borrowed from the work of David Lockwood,27 where it is used in relation to the inequalities generated by the functioning of citizenship, for:

In contemporary capitalist democracies, the ethos and practice of citizenship is at least as likely as class relations to structure group interests and thereby fields of conflict and discontent.28

Civic stratification refers to a system of inequality by virtue of the rights that are granted or denied by the state, and it is well suited to an analysis which moves beyond citizenship to address the differential granting of rights for different categories of migrant. We see this in the varying conditions of access to the national

25 S. Benhabib, op.cit. p.21
28 Ibid. p.536
territory, and to rights of residence, work and welfare, whose purpose is both to encourage desirable categories of migrants, while discouraging others. There have been a number of relatively recent examples, such as preferential access to work permits and family unification for highly skilled workers who qualify for the Blue Card available in EU member states. At the other end of the spectrum, low skilled workers are increasingly limited to temporary permits and denied family unification rights. We find other examples in relation to asylum, such as the elaboration of statuses of protection which fall short of full recognition under the Geneva Convention, denial of employment for the first 12 months of the status determination period, and the erosion of systems of basic maintenance.

We should also note that wherever there are conditions attached to the granting of a right, there will also be opportunities for monitoring and surveillance in its administration, while the treatment which groups or individuals receive at the hands of officialdom will also often be reflected in shifting public perceptions of social worth. Thus, Lockwood distinguishes between two axes of civic stratification: the formal dimension expressed in terms of the presence or absence of a right; and the informal dimension expressed in terms of gain or deficit (as rooted in privilege or stigma) which affect the actual enjoyment of a right. These two dimensions of civic stratification are similar to Honneth’s distinction between legal status and social esteem, and both writers concur in seeing a dominant value scheme to be operative in the functioning of rights. We see this at work in conceptions of the good citizen and the worthy migrant, increasingly cast in terms of ability to serve the needs of the labour market, with corresponding exclusionary measures for groups who cannot meet this requirement.

Of central importance are what Lockwood terms the moral and material resources that claimants can bring to bear in accessing their rights; such resources can enhance existing entitlement, and may also underpin mobilizations for the expansion of rights by a given group. However, the reverse dynamic is possible, such that the discrediting of a group may serve as a prelude to reducing their rights, as in the construction of the bogus asylum seeker. In other words, there is an interesting interaction between the formal and informal aspects of civic stratification, which may be implicated in both expansive and restrictive changes in any given regime of rights. However, while Honneth looks to the experience of disrespect as a motivating factor in claims to greater recognition through rights, Lockwood notes that the stigma attaching to certain groups may well have a disabling effect on their potential to mobilise for change.

The courts as a deliberative space

At this point, the three themes of this essay come together, and we see formal and informal forces of (mis-)recognition at work in the construction of groups which are excluded from the national polity, precariously placed on the lower rungs of the civic stratification ladder, and lacking both the moral and material resources with which they could contest their position. However, a number of writers have predicted increasing recourse to legal action, and Lockwood remarks on the role of civic activists in taking up the cause of society’s most vulnerable groups. Habermas has also noted a possible role for the courts in providing one forum for translating the concept of deliberative democracy into more sociological

29 With the exception of the UK, Ireland and Denmark
31 For a fuller working through of this argument see: L. Morris, Civic Stratification and the Cosmopolitan Ideal, [in:] European Societies, 11 /2010, pp.603-24.
terms. He sees the organisations and movements of civil society to be active both in shaping public opinion and in serving as advocates for neglected issues and under-represented groups, thus providing a lifeworld anchor for the public sphere.

In Habermas’s model for the functioning of the public sphere, conflicts can be brought from the periphery of political concern to the centre, provided there is a sufficiently vital civil society in operation which can appeal not only to office holders and the legislature, but to the critical judgment of a public of citizens. However, where public support cannot be invoked, where vulnerable groups are excluded from direct representation in the polity, and where fundamental rights are at issue, then legal action may provide a way forward. These interests come close to Alexander’s focus on the sources of social solidarity, but his work gives greater emphasis to the contradictory and fragmented nature of ‘real’ civil societies, which he argues can be as repressive as they are liberating. In this context, Alexander also notes the dual functioning of the legal system both as a tool for the coercive power of class, caste or state, and as a means by which such power may be challenged, through a process of civil repair.

One interesting example is to be found in a series of ten legal judgments in the UK which considered whether the withdrawal of welfare support from asylum seekers who did not make their asylum claim as soon as reasonably practicable amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment (IDT) under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and therefore the 2000 Human Rights Act (HRA). Asylum seekers, being denied access to employment for the first 12 months of their stay, are a vulnerable group who have no prospect of earning their way to inclusion. Indeed, it should be noted that many of the dis-benefited asylum seekers were reduced to sleeping on the streets and begging for food, in a winter when temperatures fell to well below freezing. Their cause was taken up by a small number of lawyers and NGO’s who flooded the courts with requests for judicial review of the Home Office decisions which had withdrawn their entitlement for maintenance. NGO’s and community groups were also instrumental in helping asylum seekers compile the evidence of their suffering that would support the legal challenge.

For Habermas, the purpose of legal procedure is to open up a deliberative space which promotes contextual interpretation of the law informed by the worldviews of actual participants, but rooted in universal principles. Thus, the substantive context of a case will be an important factor in the interpretation of legal principles, and in the case of welfare and asylum the judgments eventually came to focus on the point at which enforced destitution amounted to a breach of article 3. In the final two hearings an important intervention was made by Shelter, whose submission to the court included a description of what it felt like to sleep on the streets, the suffering and humiliation involved, and the argument that:

To require special and detailed evidence of intense suffering in circumstances when any ordinary person would suffer intensely, entails regarding the person as less than ordinarily human.

This intervention amounts to a claim on behalf of the disbenefited asylum seekers to be recognised as members of the community of humanity, and the denial of support for a group prohibited from seeking

---

34 Ibid. p. 383
36 This act enshrined the ECHR in domestic law
37 Ibid. p.229
38 An NGO representing the homeless
employment was presented in terms of a broader denial of human dignity. The final judgment was a unanimous decision by five judges in the House of Lords,\(^4\) which found in favour of the claimants and in effect placed a limit on the deprivations which could legitimately be imposed at the lower reaches of civic stratification\(^5\). In the process, the judges offered an innovative interpretation of an absolute right to protection from IDT, which was rooted in accounts of the suffering and humiliation experienced as a result of enforced destitution.

The court thus acted as an intermediary between a government set on a deterrent policy through the erosion of rights and a small group of activists representing a dispossessed and vulnerable group, in an interesting example of the internalisation of universal principles in domestic law. The passing of the HRA, by enshrining the ECHR in domestic law, enhanced individual access to adjudication and offered a deliberative space in which a group outside of citizenship and with few moral or material resources at their disposal could stake their claim to a universal right. The success of the case shows how a claim to universal rights can, on occasion, break with a more limited approach that ties entitlement to narrowly framed societal goals.

**The next steps for cosmopolitanism**

For the next steps we must look to the social medium within which the law operates; can judgements of this kind restore the social esteem of a denigrated group, or will they fuel a backlash of resentment from the wider public? We have learnt from Taylor that rights are only part of recognition, and are insufficient without an accompanying affirmation of worth, so we return to the relationship between the granting or withholding of rights and social esteem. A final step in the process of recognition requires some engagement of public sympathy and a shift in the cognitive and normative orientations of the ordinary citizen. Thus, for Fine\(^4\), one element of cosmopolitanism is the involvement of existing forms of political community in a transformative project. However, where Beck and Sznaider see cycles of cosmopolitan sympathy\(^4\), Fine rather sees a dilemma for citizens in choosing between a narrow, nationalistic interpretation of rights and one shaped by a more distant cosmopolitan orientation. Isin and Turner\(^4\) address this issue by seeing an essential compatibility between citizenship and human rights, and arguing for a broadened conception of citizenship which emphasises engagement in the civil sphere. They advance the notion of a cosmopolitan citizenship to argue that:

*Citizenship remains important as an active domain of democracy and as the principle expression of being political...it should be regarded as a foundation for human rights and not as a competitor.*\(^4\)

---

\(40\) R v. SSHD ex parte Adam, Limbuela and Tesema [2005] UKHL 66

\(41\) It was significant that the claimants were asylum seekers and therefore unable to return home


However, this is an ideal which requires cultivation, and Turner’s earlier argument, which seeks a grounding for universal rights in the common condition of bodily frailty, has some relevance here. The present essay, in considering three aspects of rights – recognition, participation, and governance, has shown how the conflictual aspects of cosmopolitanism can produce the spaces in which such cultivation can take place. However, the argument has also served to demonstrate the often fluid nature of rights and the different roles they can play in fashioning and supporting competing political visions of a future society.

Lydia D. MORRIS is Research Director of the Department of Sociology at the University of Essex and an editorial board member of the British Journal of Sociology.

References


Sustainability is about intergenerational solidarity; that is to say it is about framing our socio-environmental policies in terms of the welfare and wellbeing of future generations. Caring for the quality and health of the environment almost invariably involves policy making which has to take the long view, spanning and influencing the lives of more than one generation. Overcoming the problem of global climate change is very much an intergenerational issue which involves analysing, planning and policy making for a period which will take us to the end of this century. It is also about social and environmental justice, given that climate change will have particularly negative impacts on the most socially vulnerable communities.

Living in a Risk Society

Climate change manifested by atmospheric warming and the “greenhouse” effect is probably the clearest and most dramatic representation of the globalisation of environmental risks and of what some have chosen to call the “risk society” (U. Beck). It contains all the ingredients of what we know as “new environmental risks” and which have spread globally since the middle of the last century; climate change is on a planetary scale; it has much to do with accelerated techno-economic change at the level of production and consumption; it is difficult to detect, measure and control; it impacts on all social groups, but most importantly it accumulates and hits the most socially and economically vulnerable groups in our society; future scenarios for climate change and the outcomes in the medium and long terms are uncertain (even the scientific community doesn’t agree about the range and depth of climate change impacts on the planet) and above all, in large part, the causes of current climate change are related to human action.

All these notoriously complex elements have generated concern and a sense of insecurity, especially, but not exclusively in the most economically developed societies with the highest living standards, the societies which have precisely contributed most to the causes of climate change through processes of rapid industrialisation and mass consumption patterns largely initiated in the first half of the 19th Century in Western
Europe and United States of America and much more recently in north east Asia. Public anxiety and concern has been endorsed and represented by the mass media and in part this has contributed in situating climate change at the centre of international political debate and on the agendas of governments and intergovernmental institutions. The political and social responses and the involvement of society particularly through the intense activities of NGOs has resulted in the articulation of policy proposals for mitigating climate change which necessarily involves all nations – nations which are highly differentiated from one another in terms of social and economic structure and wealth and which have very different priorities and political agendas. These structural differences, which have a great deal to do with the now very tense and strained international negotiations on global climate change where the issues of social justice, inequalities and vulnerability, have begun to play centre stage.

**Short history of climate change**

Before addressing the question of social justice and inequalities in the context of climate change it is necessary to clarify how global climate change has been analysed and how it has evolved. The first and very important point to make is that climate change is not new, indeed it is inevitably part and parcel of being a planet orbiting a star (our Sun) in the so-called “habitable zone” (where life as we know it is possible). Planetary atmospheres and climates evolve and change and the causes of such changes, very often taking place over millions of years, are the result of a multiplicity of “natural” causes. The origins of such changes can be related to the variation of solar activity or intensity of solar radiation; volcanism; asteroid impacts; the variation of the Earth’s orbit around the sun; the production of “greenhouse” gases by living organisms….

Our closest planetary neighbours in the solar system, namely Venus and Mars have undergone considerable climatic and atmospheric changes due to natural non biological factors. In the very distant past (we are talking of billions of years) Mars had a much denser, wetter and warmer atmosphere where liquid water was present in the form of rivers and lakes and possibly seas and oceans with evidence of precipitation in the form of rain and snow. Today, with its extremely tenuous atmosphere and with no trace of liquid water on its surface (there is ice), Mars is an intensely arid and a very cold planet. Venus, is a very different story where it probably evolved from being a relatively temperate planet but one which today has temperatures on the surface which would melt lead and is due to a “runaway” greenhouse effect related to the strong presence of greenhouse gases (probably produced by volcanism and aided by Venus’s closer orbit to the sun (compared with Earth). What is so strikingly different and new about recent climatic change on the planet Earth is the speed of such change, which has largely been induced by human activity. We are talking about changes which have taken place at the most over 200 years – which is no more than a “blink” of an eye in terms of planetary evolution. Such accelerated climate changes are extremely unusual, although these have occurred in the past due to natural causes, as was the case in the impact of a large asteroid which probably resulted in the extinction of the dinosaurs about 56 million years ago.

Our knowledge about the climate of Earth, its continents and regions is the product of the accumulation of meteorological data over an extended period of time. This data includes precipitation, temperature, wind, atmospheric pressure etc. This allows us to create a profile and main characteristics and of “normality” in terms of the expected weather during a year in a given region. On this basis we can classify types of climates
according to a set of shared and compact climatological characteristics. In this way we are able to talk about, for example the “Mediterranean climate” which exists not only in most of the Mediterranean basin but also in much of California, Central Chile and parts of South Africa, New Zealand and Australia where these regions have in common summer droughts with high temperatures and rainy mild winters. Data analysis allows us to draw maps of the distribution of average precipitation and temperatures of the whole globe and allows to have an idea of normal climate conditions and to identify deviations from the norm over time. Particularly significant is our capacity to study global climate variability not only from the time when scientists could take measurements with modern and reliable equipment (this is very recent). Paleoclimatology has developed sophisticated techniques which allow us to identify periods of rapid climate change in the recent and remote past. The study of geological formations, sediments and biological indicators such as pollen and plant and animal fossils have allowed us to develop models of the evolution of Earth’s temperature of periods over many millions of years.

An example of abrupt climate change in the relatively recent past (in geological terms) is the last glacial period which began more or less 70,000 years ago with the glaciations and the presence of very extensive ice sheets which covered large parts of North America and Eurasia and which retreated to their more or less present positions only 10,000 years ago. In fact this glaciation formed part of the most recent “ice age” which began about 2.7 million years ago and which consisted of a series of glacial and interglacial periods which involved oscillations between cold and warm periods. One of the most significant impacts of glaciations was the lowering of sea-levels while de-glaciation produced rising sea-levels - a particularly worrying subject given that the loss of mass of the Antarctic and Greenland ice-sheets would have on rising sea-levels and the flooding of densely populated coastal regions and low-lying islands. If we don’t take into account anthropogenic (that is to say man-made) effects it is expected that the next glacial period will begin in about 50,000 years time. One of the explanations for these glaciations in are changes in the Earth’s orbit around the Sun.

**Parabola of societal and climate changes**

In order to understand the dynamics and implications of present day and recent climate change it is necessary to take into account anthropogenic factors without losing sight of the natural influencing variables mentioned above. It is worth mentioning that some scientist warned of the effects of human activity on the climate well over a century ago and that it was very plausible to postulate the idea of increasing global temperatures because of very rapid industrialisation based on the intensive use of fossil fuels as its principle energy source which represented the origin of much higher carbon dioxide emissions. The best known of the early warnings was made by the Swedish Nobel laureate Svante Arhenius in 1896 in his article *On the influences of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the Ground* in which he made the conjecture that as CO₂ increased geometrically in the air, temperatures at sea-level would increase arithmetically – doubling CO₂ would result roughly in a 1º temperature increase. It is worth noting that his predictions do not differ very substantially form those of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. However he felt that the contribution of CO₂ to the atmosphere as a result of industrialisation would be positive because it would allay the effects of a coming period of glaciation. The writer, scientist, and essayist H. G. Wells not averse to making extrapolations about future scientific and societal changes writing in 1922 opted for a prudent approach to

---

climate change arguing that it was necessary for more scientific data and empirical evidence before a clear statement could be made:

“But we do not know sufficient of the causes of climatic change at present to forecast the possible fluctuations of climatic conditions that lie before us... we lack sufficient science.” H. G. Wells, p. 36.

The scientific evidence was soon to emerge. Systematic measurements of atmospheric CO$_2$ taken at Mauna Loa, Hawaii beginning in the 1950s demonstrated a clear increase of this and other greenhouse gases and which seemed to be related to the rapidly growing use of fossil fuels for a whole host of industrial, domestic and other activities giving rise to the hypothesis of the “greenhouse effect”. Little by little during the 1960s and 70s the premise about the relationship between industrialisation and global warming became consolidated in scientific circles in the context of increasing public concern about globalising environmental hazards so eloquently denounced in Rachel Carson’s “bestseller” Silent Spring published in 1962 (we shall come back to Carson shortly).

The response by international organisations as a result of initiatives and pressures from the World Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations Environment Programme was to eventually (“better late than never”) create the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 coinciding with the hottest year of the 20th Century (up until that year). The IPCC published its first report two years later. The objectives of this and later reports were to:

Assess periodically the science, impacts and socio-economics of climate change an of adaptation and mitigation options .... The long-term nature and uncertainty of its driving forces require scenarios that extend to the end of the 21st Century ...scenarios cover a wide-range of main driving forces for future emissions, from demographics to technological and economic developments.

Socio-economic issues were being addressed as was the sensitive and complex issue of economic development. The reports clearly vindicated the notion of human induced climate change while admitting that there were many uncertainties in making forecasts. The reports were to also provide a tool for policy makers to propose and formulate responses to global climate change. The logic and urgency of this situation resulted in the creation of a dynamic of international conferences to tackle global climate change under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The first convention, the so-called “Earth Summit” was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and was followed as of 1995 by a series of ”Conferences of the Parties” (COP) on a yearly basis and includes the Kyoto COP 3 meeting held in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was signed. A watershed was last year’s COP 15 held in Copenhagen.

An agenda for social justice and equality worldwide

While it has often been the case, there have been concerted attempts to avoid addressing the social issues related to climate change, it is also fair to say that the critical questions of inequalities, social justice and vulnerability have become increasingly addressed and in many ways came to a head during the Copenhagen, Cancun and Durban Conventions largely as a result of the efforts of the group of developing nations. It is at this point that it is relevant to discuss the question of environment, inequalities and health which might help to clarify why climate change should be discussed synonymously with social justice.

The discussion on inequalities and health has recurred in modern society, although it has been particularly associated with the analysis of industrialisation and urbanisation. The literature on this subject is vast and spans well over a century, focusing on the social and environmental determinants of health in the European industrial cities. The variables examined explain the ill health and high mortality of the working class and the socially vulnerable included: air and water pollution, housing conditions, migratory processes, population density, diet and income. Classical indicators such as mortality were used to emphasize the massive differences in health between deprived and advantaged communities in the cities. Descriptions of the physical and environmental conditions, lifestyles, and work within the new, dirty, polluted, overcrowded and unhealthy cities found their way into fiction. Charles Dickens described in 1854 the environment of a fictional, yet very real city named Coke Town:

*It was a town of red brick, or brick that would have been red if the smoke and ashes had allowed... it was a town of machinery and tall chimneys, out of which interminable serpents trailed themselves for ever and ever, and never got uncoiled. It had a black canal in it, and a river that ran purple with ill-smelling dye.*

Most accounts, whether analytical or fictional, agreed that the environmental degradation of specific areas of the city mainly affected the already socially vulnerable and economically weak groups. In other words, urban environmental conditions inflicted the most harm on working-class neighbourhoods and communities. Other social classes were, in general, more fortunate. These unacceptable inequities in health, based as they were largely on the socio-economic and environmental circumstances of different groups and classes in society was denounced as a flagrant case of social injustice which should be remedied. It is more than ironic that the industrial revolution, made possible through the gross exploitation and pillaging of colonies through the imperial system would also result in the effective exploitation of the new working class at home and begin a process of massive environmental degradation which would severely impact the most vulnerable communities while at the same time spark off global climate change which more than a century down the line we are today having to confront with urgency. The burden and impact of these environmental processes have in the past and will in the future be born by the socio-economically most vulnerable and is a dramatic example of social and environmental injustice.

It is often forgotten, that in the face of problems created through the environmental aggressions caused by the industrial revolution that there were organised efforts to reverse the trend by trying to regulate and diminish the sources of industrial pollution. Progressive forces, including socialists and the trade unions would call for the intervention of the state to regulate, control and redress the manifest inequities. However the whole notion of state intervention was anathema to the conservative right which was articulating its arguments against state intervention at the turn of the century on the basis of the crudest form of pseudoscientific social Darwinism and biological reductionism. For these ideologues (often disguised as scientists), men and women could not escape their their biological destinies. It was considered positively dangerous to attempt to do so because tampering with natural selection by protecting so-called weak individuals, groups or classes and institutions would inevitably lead to decadence and decline. Inequity was natural!! In applying Darwinian evolutionary theory to the social world, it was argued that all implied state planning was inherently dangerous because it went against nature and could lead to the weakening of the nation and in particular, humanity as a whole. Every act of government intervention that fomented social assistance effectively supported the weak (who were to blame for their condition) and whose undesirable

---

and unfit characteristics would normally be selected out of existence. Herbert Spencer in his Man versus the State was all too clear in his regressive views (shared by neo cons today)and radical opposition to state interference:

*If the benefits received by each individual were proportionate to its inferiority … Progressive degradation would result.*

Many progressive law makers regard the role of intervention as a key to the policy for achieving social justice, combating inequalities, redressing wrongs and to support the socially vulnerable. The Welfare state has been the corner-stone of western European states in the effort to reduce health inequalities through universal health-care for all and has represented one of the great achievements of the reform era immediately following the Second World War. The objective was precisely to undo the manifest injustice of health inequalities, especially in relation to the most vulnerable groups which were frequently excluded from access to health care because of a lack of income. It was also a corner-stone of Barak Obama’s presidential campaign for social justice. A direct parallel can de drawn between the struggle to reduce health inequalities and the fight against environmental and social injustice generated by global climate change. While all humans are in the same boat with regards to climate change, not everybody is equally affected by it, indeed it is the socially vulnerable groups several generations from now which will bear the burden of this process created initially as a result of the rapid industrialisation of the developed countries. The notion of the “democratisation of risk” – that is to say that all classes are subject to environmental risks paints a false picture of what is really happening in the context of climate change and other environmental issues. The democratisation of risk is a half-truth and as such not only distorts the impacts of global climate change it also covers up the fact that this profound socio-environmental process exacerbates inequalities and injustices.

As we have already pointed out, environmental degradation during the industrial revolution hit working class communities the hardest and in that sense it discriminated against the most vulnerable group and affected in particular the quality of their lives and especially their health. As we move into the 20th Century, the dynamics of environmental degradation began to change in important ways. It was the American biologist and writer Rachel Carson in her brilliant and hugely influential bestseller “*Silent Spring*”, published in 1962 who first pointed out the way in which new pollutants could contaminate the whole biosphere. The globalising environmental hazards which she described were very different from the much more localised impacts of environmental problems of the industrial revolution which affected most directly the new working class. In the chapter, “Elixirs o Death” she tells us:

*For the first time in the history of the world, every human being is now subjected to contact with dangerous chemicals, from the moment of conception until death. In less than two decades of their use, the synthetic pesticides have been so thoroughly distributed throughout the animate and inanimate world that they occur virtually everywhere… They have been found in remote mountain lakes, in earthworms burrowing in the soil, in the eggs of birds – and in man himself. For these chemicals are now stored in the bodies of the vast majority of human beings regardless of age. They occur in the mothers’ milk and probably in the tissues of the unborn child.*

She presented a bleak picture of our future environment – the environment of all men, women and children regardless of their social position in society. No one would escape the consequences of the “ecological disaster being perpetrated by the use of synthetic chemicals such as DDT. The book was published as a

---

paperback and was a bestseller for months – it had entered the living rooms and discussions of middle class America and was soon to do the same in Western Europe.

These new environmental hazards which Rachel Carson mentioned, were not visible in the dramatic form of the smogs of the industrial revolution, but appeared to be more insidious and potentially more destructive and dangerous. Furthermore, because of their tendency to accumulate and spread throughout an ecosystem and up the food chain, they were capable of affecting groups which hitherto had come out relatively unscathed from the worst environmental effects of industrialisation. These new groups, and especially the middle class began to feel vulnerable and insecure in the face of the qualitative changes taking place in the environment. This new awareness and feeling of insecurity had a lot to do with the emergence of environmental movements of the late 1960s and during the 1970s, which were very much lead and inspired by middle class activism.

Carson’s message was important and it was certainly true that new industrial processes and practices were leading to the globalisation of intergenerational environmental problems. However, it was easily misinterpreted and changed into a half-truth; all humans are indeed now subject to the dangers of environmental degradation regardless of their class, ethnicity or gender. While this is clearly the case, it does not mean that we are all affected in the same way or to the same degree. The epidemiological evidence of the health impacts of environmental pollution are overwhelmingly clear – lower socio-economic status implies greater probability of negative impacts. While many environmental risks affect us all, they continue to accumulate more on the most socially vulnerable. This is also the case for the most paradigmatic form of globalising environmental problems; climate change. It has been argued in some quarters that if we are all in the same boat and are all affected by climate change then we should “all row together” in an attempt to overcome this profound challenge – there is apparently a shared responsibility for the current state of affairs and we should all share the burden – such burden sharing does not necessarily imply solidarity nor does it represent social justice given that the responsibilities are in fact clearly in the domain of the rich. As we have already shown the origins of climate change lie fairly and squarely on the rich developed and industrialised countries – countries which continue to provide the bulk of carbon emissions worldwide.

Global environmental change in the context of the greenhouse effect have considerable implications for our planetary future in the medium (soon to become short) and long term - the impacts will be felt most in specific and socially and geographically vulnerable parts of the world and felt by very concrete collectives and communities. While scientists debate about the details of climate change scenarios there is consensus that there will be an increase in “extreme climate events” as ocean temperatures gradually rise (along with the sea-level). Oceans are reservoirs of energy and as there will be more energy in the ocean/atmosphere system, then more frequent and violent meteorological phenomena will occur in the form of torrential rain, hurricanes and droughts with the resulting damage to those communities affected. It is very well documented the differential impact of extreme climate events in terms of how these effect societies according to their socio-economic status; death and destruction are infinitely more devastating in poorer regions compared with rich and developed ones. Rising sea levels and droughts will generate environmental migrations as they have in the past in the face of ecological change/disasters (take for example the migrations from the Aral Sea area in Central Asia - a sea which almost disappeared as a result of the thoughtless and gigantic irrigation policies and programmes of the former Soviet Union).

It should not be forgotten, of course, that within even the most economically developed countries great social inequalities exist. While the USA has a huge GDP, it also has huge inequalities. The USA, the society
which consumes 20% of the world’s fossil fuels with its resulting emissions and contribution to global warming will not be left unharmed by climate change, however it will be precisely the result of social inequalities that climate change will inflict greatest damage the socially vulnerable areas and people of the United States. Western Europe will not be unscathed and again largely because of the many different dimensions of inequality which exist in the continent. We already have a great deal of documentation on, for example the impacts of flooding and heat-waves in Europe (both of which are expected to increase as a consequence of climate change). There are no great surprises here in terms of the discriminatory nature of these impacts; vulnerability being the key word.

**Intergenerational solidarity as a tangible pledge**

A long and depressing list of natural hazards and impacts resulting from climate change could be included here, however in this short essay it is neither possible nor relevant to be exhaustive in the description of the innumerable climate related social and economic problems which will emerge from climate change. The idea here is not to preach “gloom and doom”, but to point to the important precedents for improving the wellbeing of people through the kind of politics of social justice and intergenerational solidarity which gave us the welfare state and, for example universal health care. A similar approach must be taken towards climate change. Responsibilities lie with the rich industrialised countries to support socially just strategies for tackling climate change including not only the control of emissions and measures to move us away from a carbon based economy, but also through capacity-building for more resilient communities. The Copenhagen summit failed, perhaps precisely because of the difficulties in addressing the key issue of social justice in the framework of climate change.

---

**Louis LEMKOW** is Professor at the Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA) of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB). He hold degrees in Sociology, Geography and Environmental Science. PhD. Researches on environmental and technological risks and the environment-society interface. Vice-Rector of the UAB 1994-2002 and Director of ICTA 2006-2012.

**References**


IPCC Special Report (1990) *Emissions Scenarios; Report for Policy Makers*, IPCC.


Queries

04
One of the difficulties with the political championing of cosmopolitanism is that the concept may appear somewhat vague. The previous section focused on a moral cosmopolitanism. This closing section examines institutional cosmopolitanism. The core query that the articles aim to answer is how different principles may guide political choices beyond the national level. Inge KAUL argues in her article for a new internationalism, which should be supported by strengthened regionalism and states abiding by the logic of responsible sovereignty. Gerassimos MOSCHONAS takes a closer look at the questions of legitimacy, examining the specific case of the European Union and the cooperation of political parties within it. His main focus remains the aftermath of the global crisis and the search for a new, post-liberal Europe. Simon LIGHTFOOT joins these deliberations, stating that it is high time for Europe to become a matter of political choice and reconnect with its citizens.
The world is trapped in an increasingly dense web of global crises – financial instability, global warming, spreading health risks, chronic human deprivation, and terrorism. The Doha Trade Round has stalled, and Copenhagen and Cancun failed to deliver the expected. Evidently, international cooperation isn’t working well. The result is a growing trend towards “going it alone”: trade and currency “wars”; the scramble for scarce natural resources; new signs of protectionism; and cultural clashes.

More than ever, the promise of the better life that today’s world actually holds is being squandered, and governments are being seen as losing control.

How could a turn-around be possible? The answer in brief is by recognising that in today’s world ever more national interests would best be pursued through fair international co-operation; and that opportunities do exist for solving global problems in positive-sum ways. Or, put differently, by shaping a new internationalism.

First, however, why are we facing an ever lengthening list of global challenges?
Deepening policy interdependence, shifting power relations

The malfunctioning of international cooperation should not come as a surprise. Its current architecture was designed to serve a different world order – a world of relatively closed national borders with a few powerful states acting as policy-setters and many other states, often poor and newly independent, finding themselves as policy-takers.

Economic liberalisation and market integration have changed global realities. Today’s world is marked by greater openness of national borders and deepening policy interdependence. More and more policy issues, previously considered only as domestic questions, now depend not only on national policy choices but also on external factors – on what other states, international market actors, global civil society, or international organisations do. Many states are only now beginning to fully realise this globalisation of public goods.

Concurrently, global power relations are shifting. New economic and political powers are emerging – Brazil, China, India, with several other countries following closely behind. Strengthening multi-polarity is blurring the familiar divide between policy-setters and policy-takers, a fact to which both the conventional major powers as well as the new emerging powers appear to be adjusting with hesitation.

Add the growing and increasingly dynamic involvement of business and civil society in global affairs and it is clear that we are in a state of transition and uncertainty. Consensus is difficult to reach and problems, as we are currently witnessing and allowed to reach crisis proportions.

Making openness and sovereignty more compatible

A major source of political friction results from the present uncertainty about how to balance economic openness and policymaking sovereignty. Reaching a better, shared understanding of this issue, therefore, appears to be an important first step towards better national and international governance of global challenges.

Interestingly, a number of policy innovations are underway that seem to aim at defining different aspects of this balance. Most exist only in nascent forms and would, as discussed below, need further development. Among the ongoing experiments in reform are the following.

The search for a notion of responsible sovereignty

Whether one listens to debates on the 2008 world financial crisis, climate change, the H1N1 flu, or civil strife and conflict, an underpinning concern appears to be finding a new balance between the rights and duties of states, with the duty side now receiving a strengthened emphasis. Sovereignty is increasingly understood as responsible sovereignty. While external partners and global actors hold states responsible for failing to control harmful spillovers from their territory or blocking collective-action initiatives like new multilateral trade rules or caps on CO₂ emissions that others perceive as desirable and mutually advantageous, domestic constituencies protest against states’ failures to live up to global norms like those of human rights.
and democracy or to protect them against spill-ins like cyber-based crimes or other states’ beggar-thy-neighbour policies.

It is barely possible for a world of open borders to do without a notion of responsible sovereignty. The reason lies in the nature of the problems themselves. Addressing global challenges requires in most instances that many, sometimes even all countries take appropriate national-level policy action, for example, launch a vaccination campaign to help fight a pandemic or improve airport security to help control illicit trade and terrorism.

If states were to commit themselves in a credible way to a notion of responsible sovereignty and take the outside world more into account when making national policy, fewer problems might, indeed, end up on international policy agendas; and more challenges might find a solution more quickly. The incentive for them to do that would be the same that motivates most of us to respect others’ freedoms: self-interest in reinforcing the normative power of the principle concerned. If all were committed to a principle of responsible sovereignty, we could all feel more assured that their own sovereignty would be respected by others.

**Moves towards more open and inclusive international decision-making**

The issue of responsible – more respectful yet also limited, but ultimately stronger – sovereignty is closely linked to the nature of international decision-making.

Developing countries have for some time been arguing for “no agreement on responsible sovereignty without international voice reform”. That is, without all having an effective say, especially in determining what constitutes responsible state action and on what constitutes a violation of responsible sovereignty, then agreement on it would be difficult.

The conventional major powers have, recently, arrived for quite a different reason at the issue of more inclusive international decision-making. Their reason for suggesting, for example, the leadership forum of the G20, was the realisation that addressing challenges like excessive financial volatility requires buy-in from the major actors, including the major emerging markets. However, the G20 experience also shows that bringing a few more states to the decision-making table is important but not sufficient. The reason is a structural and systemic one: state failure on challenges that could have outcomes which contribute to the public good, as in fact many of today’s crisis issues do.

When appearing internationally, states tend to behave just like individual actors when faced with this type of challenge: they tend to free-ride, not revealing their true preferences, avoiding firm commitments and hope that others will step forward and foot the bill.

I do not wish to be misunderstood, states are important. But, just because they are important, we must not turn a blind eye to the fact that they are fallible. They fail not only for such reasons as bureaucratic self-interest or corruption, but also for a more fundamental reason – they are individual actors representing national interests, but in a world of vast disparities and differences and often varying and conflicting preferences. Therefore, states themselves need to be tamed to tame markets - especially globalising markets - and to contribute their share to other collective-action initiatives.
The current tacit agreement among states to accept that free-riding runs counter to the notion of responsible sovereignty – to states meeting their obligation towards their own people as well as towards other states and the global community. Non-state actors could play an important role in encouraging more cooperative behaviour among states, because they often have plural, including global, affiliations (like sharing concern about global environmental sustainability). However, the Copenhagen and Cancun meetings on climate change have shown that while large “side events” of non-state actors have their place, clearer forms of interaction between state and non-state actors are required, nationally and internationally. The ongoing debate about how to combine representation with effectiveness of decision-making also point in this direction.

Importantly, domestic constituencies would need to understand that they often pay the cost of their government’s free-riding on global issues when a crisis hits. Having lived through the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the public in industrial countries in particular can hardly have doubts any more about that.

**Strengthened regionalism**

Regionalism is another possible way of promoting enhanced participation in, and effectiveness and efficiency of, international cooperation. The number of the negotiating parties tends to be smaller, and contexts and preferences more similar, so that agreements could be more easily achievable, especially where basic territorial and geopolitical issues have been settled.

Again, reality is already pushing in this direction. The number of regional cooperation initiatives is growing. ASEAN, Mercosur, and SADEC are but a few examples of the plethora of regional bodies that have emerged in the developing world. True, many EU citizens criticise EU bodies for taking on issues formerly dealt with at a national level. Cases of over-centralisation certainly exist. But no cooperation at all may be even less desirable.

A key driver of regionalism in the developing world is development: a strengthened capacity within the regions to reach out to neighbouring countries.

**Regional cooperation can be an important stepping stone towards worldwide cooperation. If further strengthened it could contribute to a flattening of global governance.** Rather than being highly centralised, global governance could take on a more horizontal, regionally networked shape and help create new, expanded policy spaces. Regional entities could act as filters between the national and the global, filtering national and regional demands up and agreed upon global policy expectations down.

**An added focus on mutually-beneficial, positive-sum strategies**

Willingness to engage in more open international bargaining will, of course, be more forthcoming where the parties concerned see possibilities for win-win solutions. Thus, we are in some respects lucky that many challenges today have public-good attributes. Many offer significant scope for win-win solutions, because their benefits are non-rival and are there for all.

Yet, in order to see potentially non-rival solutions, we must first take off the blinkers of conventional zero-sum thinking, assess challenges through a positive-sum lens, and seek collective solutions rather than competition and conflict.
To illustrate, rather than states and firms rushing for the last drop of oil, sometimes even at high costs to local communities and the environment, more could be done, nationally and internationally, to undertake R&D on alternative energy technologies and create mechanisms, like a global fund, to support the dissemination of innovative technologies to poorer countries. Similarly, looking at the emerging scarcities in respect to water and arable land from a public good perspective could lead to new non-rival, win-win policy options rather than increasingly desperate and ruthless competition.

Also, forging agreement on norms like responsible sovereignty or fair international negotiations would mean choosing a positive-sum option, because it is likely to foster countries’ willingness to cooperate which is critical to pursuing positive-sum strategies. Global agreements on these two norms, responsible sovereignty and fairness of process, would be global public goods par excellence.

**Trading mutual gain for added accountability**

If there was consensus that international cooperation, on the whole, ought to be mutually beneficial, it would only be fair to make agreements more binding and require more mutual accountability. This would be particularly appropriate where a bargain resembles a trade as, for example, it would, if compensatory finance were paid by some countries to others in exchange, say, for undertaking strengthened terrorism control or biodiversity preservation within their jurisdiction, over and above what they would do were they guided by national interests alone.

As country circumstances, and thus national priorities, differ, such trade in policy reform commitments is not uncommon, notably in situations where the “supplying” country holds a policy-taker position in international negotiations and its national interests may not fully overlap with those of more powerful nations.

So far, however, supplying countries have often experienced such exchanges as unfair, as they are often presented as foreign aid, offering low financial reward but requiring significant conditionality. This must and could be countered, as the realisation grows on the part of the major states that fair deals find more traction and are, in the longer run, the more effective and efficient policy path.

**A new role for the state**

Despite all rhetoric to the contrary, most states today have long ceased to enjoy a full policymaking sovereignty. Most have responded to external policy expectations like those calling for more privatisation, labour market flexibility, and greater economic openness. However, they have done so mainly in areas where they were nudged into action by other more powerful states (based on their self-interest) or by powerful non-state actors, especially large firms operating transnationally. Thus, the provision level of global public goods that, like the multilateral trade regime, are facilitating market integration is usually higher than that of market embedding, regulating global public goods like socio-political, environmental or financial norms and standards.

So, in order for today’s level of risk and volatility to subside, states now need to develop into fully-fledged broker states – and would have to be very frank and transparent about this role change (the pro-business-oriented beginnings of which most people have, in any case, noticed and often resented). States would need to convincingly explain when and why international cooperation – or, perhaps in other instances, non-cooperation – is good for the country, particularly what the national costs and benefits are and how they will
be shared. Importantly, they would need to have clearer strategies for how people can be secure, despite the more intense international competition that greater economic openness entails.

Evidently, economic openness was promoted without due consideration being given to its full implications, including how non-economic policy aspects could become less idiosyncratic, less national and more open, and based on shared global norms and standards.

The missing link: a new internationalism

To conclude, in order to disentangle ourselves any time soon from the increasingly dense web of global crises - including first and foremost the global crisis of governments losing control - and benefit from globalising markets without paying the costs we have so far incurred, then political openness, that is, more cross-border cooperation, has to complement economic openness, especially in market-embedding policy fields.

Put more simply, a new internationalism is needed, based on the recognition that under conditions of economic openness national interests, particularly those pertaining to global public-good type challenges, are often best pursued through fair international cooperation.

Such internationalism is sorely lacking today. However, as is shown here, change is underway on which further reforms could build.

This is not to say that we will, or ought to, head into an era of mere positive-sum thinking. Rivalry among states, firms, and people is likely to continue. Efforts at finding common solutions to global problems will complement not replace foreign affairs, military security, or foreign aid; and they should also not overshadow the importance of the state’s role in providing pure national and local public goods.

However, more and more policy concerns are global, affecting us all, for better or worse, and we need to find ways of addressing them more effectively, efficiently and equitably. A new internationalism – keeping the outside world in mind when formulating national policy and recognising that fairness must also apply internationally – could help us accomplish that.

Inge KAUL, Dr., is adjunct professor at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany and adviser to various governmental, multilateral and non-profit organizations on policy options to meet global challenges, including new and innovative ways of international-cooperation finance and global-issue diplomacy.
Trapped in Europe?
“Problematic” Reformism, the PES, and the Future

By Gerassimos MOSCHONAS

“MM. Schuman, Adenauer, de Gasperi, and Jean Monnet possess exceptional merits. But they have never claimed that of being the builders of a working-class or labour Europe”
(François Perroux, 1954).

The problematic reformism

In the framework of the nation-state the limited number of power centres and political actors, as well as the less constraining influence of ‘external’ factors, made it easier to formulate and implement a reformist strategy. Moreover, once the strategy had been formulated (the greatest difficulty consisting in the formulation), the practical mechanisms of its realisation – a more or less centralised state, a powerful party, probably a popular leader and, obviously, a social coalition of support (trade unions and the left-wing electorate) – afforded reasonable prospects for successful implementation (if the socialists were in a majority), or for exercising real influence (through ‘external pressure’, if the socialists were in opposition). Within the social-democratic movement, the problem of collective action and cooperation was less acute, the emergence of a strategic leadership easier, and the capacity for programmatic innovation greater. Reformism in the national era was coherent. It was rather at ease in its sphere of action, a sphere that was homogeneous politically and (invariably) culturally.

By contrast, the European ‘transnational’ terrain, while not chaotic, is structured very differently. The centres of authority and the (institutional and political) actors are very numerous; their ideological repertoires are heteroclite;

1 In this short discussion note citations are “minimal”. A later version will better reflect the works that have influenced the following lines.
and the logics of actions often diverge. The multiplicity of power centres and the superimposition of decision-making levels short-circuit the unity of the decision-making process and reduce the governmental efficacy (problem-solving capacity) of the regime. To be adopted, a policy requires (depending on the sector and institution) either vast majorities or unanimity, which leads the member States or the national parties either to construct grand coalitions or to abandon their policies. In this highly complex and fissured institutional set-up, the capacity of political parties for institutional and policy harmonization – and, as a result, their capacity for efficient government – is greatly diminished. Furthermore, there is practically no European civil society (a European demos or transnational left-wing electorate); and forming parties and organisations of a pan-European kind, possessed of the vitality and centrality of yesteryear (the equivalent of the national parties and trade unions of the past), represents an extraordinarily difficult task. It is sufficient to observe the persistent weakness of the Europarti-es.

Analyses that only see Europe’s “liberalism” underestimate the fact that the Community’s model of political economy is fundamentally two-fold: produced both by liberalisation and by a certain (uneven, fragmented and minimal) kind of federalism. Europe is notable for a remarkable concentration of powers in certain sectors — monetary policy and structural policies are two examples of quasi-State policies. Thus, European integration is the still incomplete product of two almost simultaneous building processes that reinforce one another: the building of Europe through the market and the building of a political Europe. Paradoxically, despite social-democratic aspirations (political Europe as a counter-weight to the market), the politicisation of integration (through a dense, rigid institutional apparatus) consolidated and solidified the liberalisation of Europe. It was the building of a political Europe that gave liberal economic solutions a long-term advantage. Such was the major irony – and unanticipated ruse – of the politicisation of the process.

The outcome? The formulation and implementation of a strategy of ambitious reforms has become very difficult. The institutional reality of the EU is a sizeable obstacle in the path of all actors (national states, left-wing parties, populist right-wing parties, anti-globalisation or alternative globalisation movements) aspiring to achieve policy or regime change in the EU. All these actors find themselves facing a difficult – in the short term, insurmountable – problem of collective action and coordination. This problem is strategic in a twofold sense: in the European system there is no Winter Palace to occupy or surround (a political system factor); and there is no royal road for prompting and co-ordinating the mobilization of national actors with highly diverse sensibilities, cultures and interests (an agency factor).

Naturally, this problem of collective action and coordination is common to all political parties and families. Nevertheless, it particularly affects socialist parties (and, more generally, left-wing parties). Parties that aim to correct – or change – the dominant economic paradigm are more in need of strong institutional (and societal) resources. As a result, they are the ones most affected by the problem of collective action and co-ordination created by the fragmentation of multi-level European governance.

Compared with the political systems produced by the nation-state, the European system has complicated the strategies of “strong reformism” in unprecedented fashion, at national and European levels alike. The national level is no longer pertinent for the adoption of a credible social democratic strategy, while the European level is not structured or unified enough, or sufficiently flexible, to facilitate the implementation of a European social-democratic

strategy. Europe poses a major problem for the left – and not simply because it is liberal. It poses a major problem because the European regime is complex, cumbersome and institutionally inimical to change. The renaissance of Europe, the extraordinary strengthening of the EU (since the mid-1980s) has ushered the left into a new era – one of problematic reformism.

In a polycentric system with significant centrifugal forces, the mechanisms of conception and realisation of any strategic project, whether of the left or right, are insufficiently developed. Management of the sovereign debt crisis, which will be presented very briefly, clearly illustrates the rationales to which we have just referred.

**Debt Crisis, and the Programmatic Leap Forward of the PES**

The financial crisis on the one hand, and the sovereign debt crisis on the other, have restored the possibility of European reform.

Given its minority status, social democracy was not in a position to impose its conception of an alternative Europe. But it was able to influence decisions (‘external pressure’) and establish itself as a sort of European ‘opposition’, vector of a different conception of Europe, albeit a minority one. In addition, for the first time in its history the Party of European Socialists (PES) was naturally well placed to become the organic framework for coordinating socialist action. The minority participation of socialists in European institutions favoured such a role, which would have consisted in steering socialists’ political and programmatic production through the PES and the leaders’ conference. The scale of the crisis, the strong resurgence of interest in Europe and, above all, the theatre of operations (the fact that socialists were in opposition) had created a context conducive to strengthening the PES’s organisation and visibility.

The initial phase of the crisis began with the Greek collapse and ended at the beginning of May 2010. During this period (the Greek rescue plan was signed on 2 May 2010), socialists were conspicuous by their virtual absence. It would, however, be unjust not to point that during this phase a number of specific proposals were formulated – proposals that left behind the kind of soothing generalities at which the Europarties are past masters. Three of them are the most significant: insistence on a ‘firm policy for regulating financial markets’; a European tax on financial transactions; and, particularly since March 2010, a proposal to establish a ‘European mechanism for financial stability’. Moreover, the PES adopted a more partisan and confrontational style in contrast with the traditional PES’s programmatic discourse, habitually formulated in an equivocal, imprecise, and irresolute manner. Nevertheless, social democracy as a whole has not succeeded in promoting its agenda successfully. Without a coordinated and powerful message focused on the issue of the moment (the Greek problem), the programmatic “offer” of social-democratic family lacked political specificity and intellectual force.

The second phase opened after the agreement on the Greek rescue package and extends to the time of writing (June 2012). It has to be said that, having lost the first battle, socialists then rallied, albeit only partially. During this period, European socialism advanced in less disorderly fashion in the direction of an effective political response. There is now a significant body of socialist programmatic thought about reforming Europe. Even if it is often fleeting and vague when it comes to the measures proposed, it is both much more concrete (when compared with the traditional idle chatter of the Europarties) and more left-wing than past programmes. In addition, the thematic range is much broader and the tough tone and alarmist accents dominate. The PES has proved capable of ‘rising above itself’. It has demonstrated that it is not an empty shell.

---

The new political-programmatic formula has been developed around four major themes:

The first is focused on financial regulation, regarded as a ‘matter of urgency’ and a central priority (strengthening of European supervisory authorities; stricter control over derivatives and speculative funds; regulation of private ratings agencies; creation of an independent European ratings agency). This initial series of options and priorities is very prominent in the PES's new rhetoric, constituting a central element in the distinctive new brand of European socialism.

The second theme, concerned with solving the debt problem, revolves around the establishment of a ‘European mechanism for financial stability’. It is to be noted that the proposal for Eurobonds (intended to finance long-term investments), which appears ever more systematically in official texts, has developed. It has been progressively integrated into the strategy of establishing a ‘European Stability Agency’ that would issue Eurobonds for the purposes of ‘common management of a specified portion of cross-border public debt and investment’.

The third theme is articulated around a ‘European pact for jobs and social progress with a view to equitable growth’ (a European pact for a minimum wage above the poverty threshold; more aggressive use of European structural funds; active employment policies; inclusion of a social clause in every piece of European legislation to better protect the rights of workers faced with a jurisdiction that prioritises economic liberties; an active European industrial policy for sustainable and qualitative growth; a strengthening of the financial resources of the European Investment Bank). This section of the PES’s formulations is distinguished neither by its detail nor by concrete measures. It confines itself to stating and juxtaposing policy oriented ideas without the requisite ‘costed’ articulation. It is a road map containing a vision, a lot of good ideas, but not a real programme.

The fourth theme concerns repairing the public finances and advocates the use of new financial instruments, fiscal and non-fiscal. Obviously, the tax on financial transactions is the flagship measure, serving as an emblem of the new brand image of contemporary socialism. Alongside this pet theme, a green tax and resolving the issue of tax evasion and fraud through European cooperation, among other measures, round off this set of objectives.

In general, it might be noted that the programmatic strategy we have just briefly reconstructed marks a political break, even though it is sometimes fleeting when it comes to the measures proposed. The PES now counts among its assets a more elaborate and dense discourse, a more systematic agenda and a significant number of policy proposals. The PES has gradually brought renewal to the European strategy of the Left, the emphasis being placed on the articulation of an ‘alternative policy’.

The ‘Paradoxical’ Semi-Failure of Social Democracy

Nevertheless, the PES (and the social democratic family) has not been able either to take centre-stage or ‘remedy’ the deficit in the European imaginary of socialism. Given the general frenzy of the period, this mediocre result is a cause for surprise, especially considering the programmatic progress that has been made. Extenuating circumstances are certainly not wanting. Of necessity, the pace of the crisis has given governments and, as a result, parties of the centre-right a decisive role. Yet the balance of forces does not explain everything.

The semi-failure stems from three main causes:

Socialist strategy contained certain key ideas as well as certain concrete measures for reforming Europe. But solely on paper. In practice, the PES, bereft of a centralised structure and institutionally powerful elite, has not transformed its ideas into an offensive and powerful message.
National social-democratic parties have not really taken things up. For want of solid relays in national societies (and the European Council), the PES has found itself without structured political and institutional support. A link between the policies proposed, on the one hand, and European citizens and institutions, on the other, has never been established. Only recently, mainly after June 2011, given the failure of the European policies concerning the debt crisis, have the national social-democratic parties adopted more common policies. The haircut of part of the Greek debt and –mainly– the severe criticism of austerity policies and the emphasis on growth strategies have partly unified the social-democratic parties and reduced the divergence between the programmatic statements of PES and the policies of its member parties.

With the unprecedented austerity measures they have adopted, the socialist governments of Southern Europe (and, in the first instance, the Greek government) have significantly contributed to a further loss of bearings within the socialist family. The discrepancy between the economic strategy of socialist governments and that of the PES (geared to growth) – two strategies highly unequal in their visibility – has shattered the discursive unity of European socialism’s strategy. As a result of circumstance the PES has not been able to establish itself as a powerful actor, just as during the 2009 European elections it proved incapable of proposing an alternative candidate to José Manuel Barroso. Once again the moderate left has got lost in its contradictions.

The PES failed even as it assumed its role: such is the ‘paradox’ brought out by management of the crisis. This paradox is only apparent. If socialism has not succeeded in imposing or promoting its agenda and options more successfully, fault should not be laid at the door of the PES. In fact, the crisis has dramatically illustrated something we already knew: the multi-level, polycentric structure of the European regime is reproduced, albeit not in identical fashion, within the European party families. The multiplication of levels and centres of power, influence and action within the socialist family (inside and outside the PES) has created an enormous problem of effectiveness – and practical coherence. It has posed a significant problem of collective coordination and strategic centre and leadership. In sum, it is not so much ideas that were lacking as the mechanisms of realisation and effective implementation of a left-wing reformist project. But this ‘lack’ should not surprise us. It pertains to the very matrix of the system’s functioning. The ‘paradox’ of the PES’s success and the family’s semi-failure (positive programmatic balance-sheet, weak political performance), has illustrated this basic fact. Ironically, a real success story (the programmatic leap forward of the PES) ended up as a very poor “goal achievement”.

**Conclusion: In search of a post-liberal Europe**

1. The social-democratic adoption of the neo-liberal globalization rationale was based on the supposition that the liberation of markets would increase overall social wealth and so could easily be combined with the social guarantees of the European model. This over-optimistic analysis entailed what Wolfgang Merkel (referring to the British New Labour) aptly called “criminal neglect” of the supranational control of globalization. The socialists promoted hundreds of small ideas for alleviating the costs of liberalization for the underprivileged classes. But they did not promote even one comprehensive idea, or one large-scale initiative for controlling the new global economic game. The collapse of Lehman Brothers and the debt crisis merely made the already obvious blindingly apparent: that the combination of liberal globalization and the European social model is hard to achieve. The two phenomena, which coexisted for a time, today, particularly

---

7 The non-participation of the Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, in PES meetings illustrates the problem.
8 The ‘arms-length policy’ adopted by Spanish and Portuguese socialists towards their Greek counterparts, particularly during the first months of the crisis (when Greece was not reputable company), is an excellent example both of the problem of effectiveness and of that of collective coordination in the socialist family.
in the countries of the European periphery, are in a head-on collision. The collapse of the scenario of market self-regulation, which has twice been proved to be catastrophic, in the 1930s and in the second half of the 2000s, swept away the social-democratic ideological and programmatic stance – formulated in the second half of the 1990s around the ideas of the ‘Third Way’. And this, in spite of the fact that the Third Way revision has been one of the greatest and most innovative attempts to prepare social democracy for the intellectual and policy challenges of the new era.

2. The thesis above, namely that Social Democrats have not promoted either a grand idea or a grand initiative for reform of the new global economic game, is only partly true. Globalization has been the great force behind several European initiatives. The grand social-democratic idea for active participation in the global game, but also for protection from it, was the deepening of European integration, the constitution of Europe as an autonomous economic and geopolitical pole. But this deepening was not accompanied by a kind of transnational ‘Bad Godesberg’ on Europe (to use a formula of Robert Ladrech). Social democracy opted for a “European” strategy (meaning seeking solutions at a European level) but it continued to use discursive schemes inspired by the globalisation model. Today, to loosen the grip of the liberal globalisation, it is first of all necessary to get Europe moving. The European Union could become the instrument for a change of framework, particularly in a period when the pressure risks becoming unbearable for the dominant economic paradigm. In particular, the Eurozone, this contradictory and slow-moving area, is large enough to be able to introduce the necessary changes to the “big picture”. Will social democracy be able to deliver?

3. The crisis, the remarkable response of the PES and, notwithstanding that, the ineffectiveness of its action have shown that there is a major – structural – disparity between transnational party actors, national parties and the structure of European decision-making. We do not know whether the serious programmatic effort of the PES foresees a new, more cohesive era for European social democracy or whether it is only a precarious face-lift. What we do know is that for the moment, and without predicting the future, the national parties that make up the PES are depicted, thanks to the PES, a lot more united than they really are. The paradox of the PES’s success and the social democracy’s semi-failure has served as a pointer to both European constraints and the weaknesses of socialists’ strategic potential in Europe. Social democracy has once again confirmed profound doubts about its unity and its capacity to deliver. Once again the moderate left has got lost in its contradictions.

4. Nevertheless, with respect to its electoral structures, socialism represents the most Europeanised political current on the continent. The social-democratic family is the only one present in every European country (its coverage of European territory is 100%); the distribution of its electoral strength within member states is the most homogeneous; and the continuity of its party

---

10 On this tension-ridden project (p. 149), see the crucial work, nuanced and innovative, of J. Andersson, The Library and the Workshop, Social Democracy and Capitalism in the Knowledge Age, Stanford University Press 2010.
structures, particularly in Western Europe, is remarkable. In addition, socialism has taken significant steps in the direction of its ideological and programmatic homogeneity, gradually becoming a more coherent and pro-European transnational pole than the forces represented by the European People’s Party. The PES is the front-runner among the big Europarties. Given the more established Europeanisation of its electoral and ideological structures, social democracy is currently better placed to accelerate its mutation and deepen its internal integration than other political tendencies. Will socialists resort to ‘cooperative strategies’ in Europe and accomplish their ‘third refoundation’?

5. The historical record warrants pessimism. All the factors impeding the advance of reformism in Europe remain operative. Even if socialists accelerate the pace of their collaboration, and strengthen their programmatic unity (this is our hypothesis), it is not absolutely certain that they will make a ‘great leap forward’. Certainly, prior to François Hollande’s win, the French Socialists and the German Social Democrats had been engaged, for quite some time, in a bilateral collaboration for the purpose of co-ordinating their policies should they both find themselves in power. And the awakening of the social movements and of the left intellectuals exerts pressure towards solutions outside of the mainstream. Nowdays, Social Democrats have an interest in winning back what they lost in the 1990s and 2000s: the battle of economic structures, which have in the meantime escaped all control, and of political ideas. Nevertheless, the “good” solutions involve a high element of risk, and low-risk solutions are not “good” (because they cannot change the “big picture”). The institutional logic of the EU, needless to say, tends to favour status quo ideas. The recent history of Social Democrats, along with their internal disagreements, give a clear advantage to low-risk solutions.

6. However, like any deep crisis, the current one creates the conditions for the emergence, if only temporarily, of a new ‘collective rationality’. Whether or not they are conscious of it, strategic actors are always capable of overcoming the rationality of institutions and the rationality of their own weaknesses. Since history sometimes likes to repeat itself, the search for a post-liberal Europe is on the agenda, as during the crisis of the 1930s. The times are paradoxically favourable, before the pieces of the economic and institutional puzzle are put back in place. “When conditions are favourable”, writes Nicolas Jabko in his excellent book, “a carefully developed political strategy can … impose its dynamic on the chaotic jumble of interests, ideas and institutions”.

The crisis – every crisis – raises a formidable question for actors: if not now, when?

Gerassimos MOSCHONAS is associate professor of comparative politics in the Department of Political Science and History - Panteion University of Athens.
ger.moschonas@gmail.com

15 N. Jabko, op. cit., p. 270.
References


The PES and the Future of ‘Social’ Europe

By Simon LIGHTFOOT

How can the Party of European Socialists (PES) connect with citizens and how can it make itself relevant to the debate on the future of social democratic politics?

PES member parties are in opposition in 20 of the 27 EU member states. The 2009 election saw the downward trend for the centre-left that started in 1999 and still continues, prompting headlines that proclaimed a ‘crisis of socialism’. History tells us though that it is too early to write off social democracy. In 1992 a book was published with a chapter entitled ‘Is social democracy doomed to decline?’. This title summed up neatly the thinking at the time. Yet only six years later, commentators were talking about the ‘magical return of social democracy’ with 13 of the then 15 EU governments from the social democratic family. This does not mean that social democracy can just carry on as normal and wait for the electoral cycle to swing their way. The next ‘magical return’ will be built on new policy initiatives and new alliances with progressive forces.

Any ‘return’ will also need to be built on a more explicitly pro-European stance than the past. I argue that part of the problem for the centre-left was its failure to push a distinctive vision for the future direction of the EU. Social democracy has always been international in its outlook, and as a result has come to accept the EU as ‘the only game in town’. However, the EU needs a social democratic face and that is where European political parties come into the picture. Political parties connect citizens to the state. For this reason, any political party at the EU level is going to find itself in an unusual situation as the EU is currently not a state. How then should the Party of European Socialists (PES) aim to connect with citizens and how can it make itself relevant to the debate on the future of social democratic politics?

The PES is made up of 33 full member parties and as a result of this size it can feel like an artificial construct. However, recent rule changes have given the PES a solid legal basis and the financial security from which it can develop. The problems that remain are visibility and ideological coherence. In theory, all individual members of social democratic parties are de facto members of the PES. The big concern is the link between being a member of a national party and membership of the PES, which remains opaque at best amongst
many party members. How then can the European socialists overcome this visibility gap?

Many have suggested individual membership to the PES. I am not sure this is the right way forward for the party. Apart from practical issues such as how to weight the vote of individual members vis-à-vis those of the member parties, I believe it is too early. Talk of mass European parties also runs contrary to the current literature on party membership, which talks about the weakening of the old mass parties. A simpler but possibly more effective way to really connect with party members is to encourage awareness of PES's existence and its role at the European Parliament. To do that you need to get past the fears of national political parties, who can often act as gatekeepers. Therefore, an effective strategy would be to engage national party members in an organic and grassroots way.

In addition, the PES has tried to find numerous ways to connect with both party members and European citizens. The 2009 European Parliamentary elections are a good example. In relation to party members, the PES used social media tools such as Facebook, Twitter and blogs to try and involve citizens in the various campaigns and to engage party members in constructing the manifesto. The project to renew the party focuses on exciting developments such as Initiatives and City Groups, with the aim to bring together grassroots political activists and connect them to the PES leadership. Clearly MyPES and other such initiatives are interesting, but how well do they actually connect with the broader party membership and even non-members? Such action might appear as impressive but is insignificant when measured in terms of the EU as a whole. The problem is that the contributors to those kind of initiatives need to see a connection between what they suggest and what emerges from the PES. If member parties veto or water down proposals (as they have in the past), how long will this spirit of engagement last?

The lack of the PES logo on national membership cards, party websites and especially election manifests does not help. A great amount of credit must go to them for pulling together a common manifesto but all this work is undermined by the lack of their visibility on the final document. There might have been a high degree of compatibility between the message that the PES produced in its European manifestos and the one that emerged on the national level in election campaigns, but if the PES is not visible to citizens who are members of their affiliated parties, how can it be seen to be relevant to the broader citizenry? If the member parties regard PES membership as worthwhile (and I think they do), then they must allow their voice in Brussels to become louder.

The pan-European electoral manifesto must be a vehicle that social democracy can use to show to the European electorate it has a vision for the future of Europe. The days when it was ok to produce a document just as an internal symbol of unity need to be replaced by a manifesto that speaks to all of the electorate. For all its faults, the 21 pledges in the 1999 declaration at least tried to create a social democratic vision for the left that could be used by all member parties. This is the challenge for 2014, yet there are a wide range of issues that PES member parties should be able to identify with that resonate with the electorate, from the Euro ‘crisis’ through climate change and global poverty to the key policy issue, namely employment. The policies that were developed in the 1990s by the PES had the potential to transform European society, but the party leaders were too apprehensive in their full implementation.

The other challenge for 2014 is the need to enter the election with a viable candidate for the office of the President of the European Commission. The post 2009 debacle where the social democrats opposed Barroso yet were unable to present an alternative candidate, sent a terrible message to the voters. Both of these actions will require member parties to cede sovereignty to the PES. If the smaller steps outlined above will not
happen then I am concerned that once again lessons from the past have not been learnt. Acknowledging that they belong to a European party of social democrats may not always be what the party leaders want to admit in public for a whole variety of (usually) electoral reasons.

The PES plays a key role at the elite level applying peer pressure to ensure that member parties take the EU seriously. The electoral temptation to critique the EU is large, yet the EU offers the only vehicle to deliver social democracy in Europe. The need for unity and a common European message in this time of financial crisis and electoral difficulties is vital. Hiding behind national boundaries will not help tackle the socio-economic, environmental and political challenges of the EU. The PES can play a role of a connecting party if its national partners will allow it and in doing so open up the prospect of party members appreciating how EU action can prevent a ‘race to the bottom’.

Interestingly, the current malaise of social democracy may offer the best hope for the construction of a distinctive EU vision. When social democracy had its magical return in the late 1990s, as Donald Sassoon argues, the left failed to construct a distinct vision. Perhaps what is worse is his conclusion that “it did not even try. It was clueless” (Sassoon, 2011, p. 138). Via the PES the social democratic family must try to build a vision for the EU that reflects the progressive values of social democracy but also reaches out to other political forces. The nature of the EU tends towards consensus, but the system has evolved enough to have the space for ideological debate.

Is the Party of European Socialists able to contribute to forming a social democratic vision for the EU? This piece has identified a number of small steps that are necessary to provide the foundations of cooperation and mutual support that can re-connect social democratic parties to European citizens. This message is hardly the type of message that fires the passions and it might not be regarded as a big breakthrough. However, if getting a PES logo onto an electoral manifesto is so tricky, how do we expect to get member parties from 27 different states to agree on CAP reform or labour market policy or fiscal harmonisation? The EU project shows that the spillover method is the most practical way to work and it is the only way to connect the PES with its national companions and ultimately European citizens. If these steps cannot be achieved, then the broader aim of potential European candidates with their election manifestos stating clear and genuine policy alternatives, and also a unified stance in selecting a candidate for a President of the EU are a long way off.

---

Simon LIGHTFOOT is senior lecturer of European politics at University of Leeds.

---

1 This essay is in response to David Miliband’s Lecture by Donald Sassoon, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 2
NEXT LEFT, NEXT EUROPE

In 2009, FEPS launched a call for papers addressing PhD and PhD candidates to elaborate on how they saw Europe in a decade, within the framework of its [Next Left] programme, run under the leadership of former Austrian Chancellor Alfred GUSENBAUER. The first release of Queries contains a selection of the most interesting pieces, of whose authors became founding members of FEPS Young Academics Network.

Contents: Future of Social Europe | Changing European Society | Green Agenda for a Sustainable Europe | Europe of Democracy and Civic Participation | International Responsibility of Europe in a Global Age

THE NEXT WAVE OF EMANCIPATION

Since the beginning FEPS has been strongly involved in a debate on gender equality, which in fact was one of the very first projects that it established. This issue reviews the history of the struggle for gender equality in national member states, in Europe and elaborates on the progressive agenda for the future.

Contents: Gender sensitive, progressive Europe | A commitment that arises from a century struggle | Stronger from the past, encouraging experiences | The next agenda for changing society
WHAT COMES BEFORE, WHAT COMES NEXT
A tribute to Tony JUDT

Queries serving as a guideline in selecting themes and articles that pose the most crucial questions and can stimulate an intellectual debate, it comes with no surprise that this issue commemorates late Tony Judt and his work. As Ernst STETTER, FEPS Secretary General writes, the last book of Tony Judt, “Ill Fares the Land”, poses an extraordinary challenge. This very particular intellectual testament of an outstanding academic and universalist socialist encompasses a fair, though bitter, assessment of today’s world. It touches upon the mission that a renewed social democracy must embark upon in order to reverse the negative processes corroding our societies, through respecting all the achievements of past generations and being optimistic about the chances for the progressives to succeed in the future. This motivated the title of this issue.

THE NEXT GLOBAL DEAL

New answers seem indispensable in times in which people lose their confidence in international institutions, their governments and politicians in general. Their detachment and scepticism about politics can be overcome once the democratic rules are put back in place, as far as global governance and European decision making processes are concerned. The disastrous consequences of the recent financial, economic and social crisis exposed the bankruptcy of today’s world order, dominated by neo-liberal ideologies. Its inability to respond to global challenges makes it inadequate for the 21st century. But recognising this is not enough; Europe and the world need a new, feasible agenda. For FEPS this is both a challenge and a chance to present our NEXT Global Deal.

Contents: Preface by Joseph E. STIGLITZ | Regulating and taxing the system | The New Global Deal | A new political economic response | Conference Report

NEXT LEFT: SOCIAL PROGRESS IN 21ST CENTURY

A decade into the new century, Europe is beset by a striking mood of social pessimism. 49% of EU citizens believe they will be worse off in 20 years time, with majorities perceiving the rise of emerging economies as direct threats to their living standards. Such anxiety presents a particularly debilitating political problem for social democracy. Historically, the promise of social progress has been a powerful force in all of its projects, and a cornerstone to the movement’s political offer. Overwhelming disbelief in the primacy of political ideas and the ability of politicians to make a difference has translated into voter resignation and subsequently to widespread withdrawal from political life.

The contributions to this issue of Queries are the result of a symposium that took place in London in March this year as a joint contribution to the FEPS Next Left research programme and Policy Network – Wiardi Beckman Stichting Amsterdam Process.
ASIA: WHAT’S NEXT?
AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

It is commonly repeated that the post-War order belongs to the past, as it no longer mirrors reality and its institutional set-up has proven incapable to respond to the challenges of the modern times. Beyond any doubt, the groups of so called “BRICS” countries will play a crucial role in writing the next chapter of global governance – which is why the attention of FEPS is given to one of them, India. Resulting from a study visit that took place in Spring 2011, the issue features articles by respective Indian high-level authors, who kindly share their views on 4 themes.

Contents: Asian Spring: Promoting Diversity and Democracy | India in Shaping its future | A world player in the making | China: Reshaping the Status Quo

THE NEXT WOMENS’ MOVE

Emancipation of women has been a core part of the pro-gressive ideology. Despite this proud tradition, the women’s agenda is gradually being claimed by conservatives and right wing extremist parties. This is high time to answer in a bold and decisive manner – and hence this issue of “Queries”, which was launched on 8th March 2012, shows deliberations on constructs of modern truly feminist cause. Bringing together European and American scholars, the volume presents aims that need to be achieved by pro-gressives worldwide if they are to champion equality in the 21st century and reiterate their own “raison d’être”.

Among the specific themes, a prominent space is given to the question of domestic work. Studies and opinions shared indicate that it is the next mainstreaming theme – showing dilemmas of contemporary labour market. The evolution, that brought empowerment of women and enhanced their participation in employment, meant also that new mechanisms are needed to help the families and individuals cope with domestic work. The parallel growing demands (connected with the i.e. ageing society) and mounting deficiencies of welfare state, they induced an urge to find assistance elsewhere. A new precarious working group of domestic workers emerged herewith – majority of them being migrant women. Responding to that “Queries” proudly present the campaign “12 by 12”, which materials have kindly been provided by ITUC – International Trade Unions’ Confederation.

Contents: Emancipating Contemporary Women - Recognising the Value of Domestic Work | Responding to Anxieties – Justifying Women’s Migration | Regaining Women’s Support – Vanquishing Right Wing Populism | Defending Progressive Feminism – Inspiring the Next Wave
The metamorphosis of international relations brought about by the processes of globalisation on the one hand and the global financial crisis on the other, have thrown up a divisive set of questions within the left around progressive internationalism and outward facing political and economic integration. In this dialectic, the concept of cosmopolitanism has come under fire. It has been conflated with an elitist disconnect from mainstream society and the fracturing of the social contract between the winners and losers of globalisation. At the same time, the pervasive loss of confidence in the centre-left’s ability to deliver social progress in a time of economic upheaval has stimulated a revival of conservatism in political thought on the left. In this age of insecurity and uncertainty there seems to be little place for cultivating values such as international solidarity.

Many others, however, see this scepticism towards internationalism as symptomatic of a failure of ambition and an inward-looking perspective which is largely responsible for the troubles of the centre-left. They argue that now more than ever, the globalisation of capitalism requires a response of equivalent ambition and boldness from social democrats. Action at the state level is no longer sufficient, on its own, to achieve centre-left objectives: regulation of market capitalism, social justice, and the creation of public goods. These require social democrats to look beyond short-term national interests and work together for an international ‘greater good’, with the European project taking front and centre-stage.

ThisQueries volume, emerging from a FEPS Next Left – Policy Network & Wiardi Beckman Stichting Amsterdam Process high level seminar that was held in Brussels on 5th October 2011, surveys both perspectives, taking on board criticisms of “progressive cosmopolitanism, before outlining some signposts for The Next Mission of Cosmopolitan Social Democracy. The volume is premised on the assertion that the next mission would need to start with an explanation of what has happened, where global capitalism and global labour find themselves, before setting out credible, and incremental steps, for creating new space at the global level for progressive politics and new mechanisms for multi-level governance. The central dilemma is that there are very narrow limits to “Socialism in one country” in a world of growing interdependence. Progressives need to make this case, balancing it with the volatility of public opinion, and combined with an offensive vision for a new internationalism.

The issue is composed of 4 Chapters, which encompass 13 articles by progressive scholars from both sides of the Atlantic. The introductory remarks by Alfred GUSENBAUER and Pascal LAMY additionally anchor them strongly in the contemporary political debate at the global level, before our respective authors look at how these theoretical deliberations play out in relation to specific issues such as: new social movements, climate change, migration and European integration.

Ania SKRZYPEK, FEPS Senior Research Fellow – Managing Editor of “Queries”
Michael McTERNAN, Policy Network Senior Editorial and Communications Manager